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The proposal for a European 
competition agency 
by Karel VAN MIERT, Commissionner responsible for Competition 
Community competition law comprises 
rules covering the activities of private 
enterprises, state monopolies, monopoly 
rights and state aid granted by Member 
States, some of which are not applied 
at national level. All these rules are 
currently applied and enforced by the 
Commission (Article 89 EC Treaty). 
However, at the Inter-governmental 
Conference, launched in Turin on 29 
March 1996, the German government 
has put forward a proposal designed to 
change the current institutional order. 
They argue that a competition agency 
separate from the Commission should 
be created. This agency would be 
charged with the application of the 
competition rules vis-à-vis private 
enterprises (i.e. the prohibition of 
restrictive arrangements (Article 85 EC 
Treaty) and abuses of a dominant 
position (Article 86 EC Treaty) as well 
as EC merger control (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89) 
["antitrust rules"]), whereas the 
Commission would retain the 
responsibility for enforcing the 
remaining competition rules and, of 
course, for conducting competition 
policy. Both sets of rules are equally 
important even in quantitative terms. In 
1995, there were: 
- 668 "antitrust" cases (559 new cases 
of restrictive arrangements and abuse of 
dominant positions and 109 merger 
cases), and 
- approximately 685 state monopoly 
and monopoly rights as well as state 
aid cases. 
In my view the proposal to add 
another agency to the already existing 
12 is flawed for a number of reasons. 
COMPETITION POLICY IS 
CLOSELY LINKED TO OTHER 
COMMUNITY POLICIES 
Community competition policy serves 
special objectives which are unique to 
a Union of 15 Member States. The 
Community was founded with the aim 
of establishing a common market and 
an economic and monetary union. In 
order to achieve these ambitious goals 
the Community has a number of 
common policies at its disposal. The 
common policies, of which 
competition policy forms a part, are 
closely interlinked. 
The classical example of the link 
between policies is the single market 
programme which aims at creating an 
internal market without frontiers. The 
Community applies these common 
policies hand in hand in order to 
abolish barriers for trade between 
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Member States and to open up 
national markets for other European 
competitors. Competition policy plays 
an important rôle in this. Thus, 
whereas internal market policy 
introduces directives in order to open 
up public procurement markets and 
stimulates the establishment of 
European technical standards, 
competition policy ensures that these 
constraints are not replaced by new 
ones. Companies must not be allowed 
to thwart the emerging internal market 
through restrictive agreements, abuses 
or mergers which would allow them 
to keep markets partitioned, block 
exports and imports and impede new 
entrants. In the same way Member 
States must not be allowed to replace 
eliminated forms of protectionism by 
state aids or exclusive rights accorded 
to monopolies. More generally, 
competition policy ensures that the 
single market with its efficiency gains 
becomes a reality and not only a 
theoretical possibility. 
The close link between commun 
policies also means that the 
competition principle is already taken 
into account at a very early stage of 
the development of measures of the 
Community, for instance, in the areas 
of research&technical development, 
regional or environmental policy. 
This link between policies is reflected 
in the institutional order of the 
Community. The mandate of a 
European competition authority has 
been given to the same institution 
which has been entrusted with the 
comprehensive task "[of ensuring] the 
proper functioning and development 
of the common market" (Article 155 
EC Treaty) (the Commission). This 
enables the competition rules to be 
applied jointly, and more effectively, 
with other common policies. To take 
the enforcement of the competition 
rules away from the Commission 
would render it more difficult to 
achieve the ambitious objectives of 
the Union. 
ALL COMMUNITY 
COMPETITION RULES FORM 
A UNITY 
As I have already pointed out, there is 
a broad range of Community 
competition rules. These rules allow an 
effective competition policy. They 
form a unity which requires a uniform 
approach. This means, for instance, 
that the effects of a state aid on 
competition have to be assessed in the 
light of all other Community 
competition rules (see, for example, 
CH 1995 ECR II, 1971 Aitec, British 
Cement Association, Blue Circle, 
Castle, Rugby and Titan ν Commission. 
The antidumping rules are also a part 
of this unity, see ECJ 1992 ECR I, 
3843 Extramet ν Council). If applied 
coherently, the rules mutually reinforce 
each other. A uniform approach is 
particularly relevant for those cases 
where all the instruments have to be 
applied together. 
The combined use of the rules has 
been essential in the past to make the 
single market programme a success. 
At present, the comprehensive 
application of the full range is crucial 
for the Community to liberalise the 
markets, amongst other, for 
telecommunications, postal services, 
energy and transport. 
Take, for example, the sector of air 
transport. Cases of state aid to "flag 
carriers", and the formation of 
strategic alliances occurring in the 
industry (see, for instance, the alliance 
of Swissair/Sabena), are found 
together and have to be analysed 
together. The same applies to state aid 
for "national champions" as well as 
abuses of dominant position (see, for 
example, Air Lingus/Ryan Air case). 
Finally, cases of access to essential 
facilities such as ground­handling 
services at airports have to be dealt 
with (see the cases of Frankfurt/Main 
and Milan). 
In future, the full range of Community 
competition rules will again be 
instrumental for integrating the 
national economies of new Member 
States into the existing single market 
in order to create an even larger single 
market. The same holds for the 
structural changes occuring as a 
consequence of the creation of the 
European Monetary Union. 
The proposed creation of an agency 
would make it much more difficult to 
apply all the strands of Community 
competition law coherently. Thus, for 
example, the Commission would 
remain responsible for the control of 
state aid but the agency would control 
the transaction for which the state aid 
may have been granted. The agency in 
turn would be responsible for the 
prohibition of an abuse committed by 
a private enterprise in one Member 
State, whereas the Commission would 
have to deal with a similar abuse in 
another Member State where it has 
been committed by an undertaking to 
which a Member State granted 
monopoly rights (see, for instance, the 
Holyhead and Rødby cases where ferry 
operators were refused access to these 
ports). Responsibilities would thus be 
split­up where they should not. 
The dilution of enforcement of the 
Community competition rules would 
not be the only result of the split­up. It 
would also have negative repercussions 
for the further progress of the single 
market, liberalisation, enlargement and 
monetary union. 
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THE COMMISSION IS THE 
APPROPRIATE COMPETITION 
AUTHORITY FOR THE 
COMMUNITY 
The legislators of the Treaty of Rome 
entrusted the Commission with the 
responsibility of applying the 
Community competition rules (Article 
89 EC Treaty). They believed rightly 
that only the Commission would 
possess the authority and legitimacy 
with the wider public necessary to 
reconcile possible conflicts between 
policies and to set priorities for the 
promotion of the principle of 
competition in view of the evolving 
Community. And, in fact, the 
Commission has developed 
competition policy and its instruments 
successfully on the basis of a 
consensus which it achieved 
throughout the Community in spite of 
the differences between Member State 
in terms of approaches, stages of 
development and weight attributed to 
competition policy. 
The consensus at Community level has 
allowed the Commission to develop a 
fully-fledged system of legal 
instruments (including merger control 
since 1990) and to exercise an effective 
competition law enforcement. Outside 
observers acknowledge the control 
practice as competition-oriented and 
reasonably strict. The German 
government, for example, stated with 
regard to EC merger control that "all in 
all there exists no reason for 
substantial criticism of the decisional 
practice" (German government in an 
official publication of the German 
Bundestag on the Activities' Report of 
the Bundeskartellamt for 1995. The 
original German text reads: "In der 
Gesamtbewertung sieht sie keinen 
Anlaß zu wesentlicher Kritik an den 
E r g e b n i s s e n der 
Entscheidungsfindung"). 
The Commission would not be able to 
fulfill its comprehensive task as 
effectively as at present, if it had to 
cede the application of the 
Community antitrust rules to an 
agency. The agency, on the other 
hand, would lack the authority and the 
flexibility to apply the competition 
rules successfully in the Community 
context. What is more, its democratic 
accountability is uncertain. The 
proposal would thus also impede the 
objectives of the Community through 
the weakening of an institution key to 
its success. 
ARGUMENTS GIVEN FOR THE 
CREATION OF A EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION AGENCY 
Not just law enforcement 
One of the main arguments used to 
justify the creation of an agency is 
that decisions in individual 
competition cases should not be a task 
for a politically oriented decision-
making body. 
However, it is a strength of 
Community competition policy and 
law that is not to be developed and 
applied in isolation but as an integral 
part of other Community policies and 
by the Commission. It is due to these 
factors that competition policy has 
been a success in the past and that a 
comprehensive and effective body of 
case law and practice has been 
developed. The Community finds 
itself in a unique situation which 
requires policies, legal instruments 
and an institutional order for which 
there is no parallel in the Member 
States. 
It is unlikely that "pure" and dogmatic 
law enforcement through an agency 
could have been equally successful in 
the Community context. The pursuance 
of the Community objectives requires 
political judgement. Certainly, the 
Commission must only consider 
competition criteria and apply the rule-
of-law. However, to the extent that the 
competition rules leave room for 
assessment and discretion, it can use 
this room to apply the rules in an 
evolutionary manner and in view of 
other Community policies. The 
application of any rules can only be 
delegated to an agency once the 
development of the Community has 
reached a certain maturity and there 
exists a widely shared consensus on 
the policy and its rules. This is not the 
case for Community competition 
policy at the moment. There is a wide 
range of views between Member States 
on the emphasis to be given when 
applying this policy but, more 
importantly, the rules themselves are 
still evolving to adapt to radical 
changes of the economic and political 
environment because of liberalisation, 
enlargement and monetary union. 
Whilst policy and application of the 
rules must evolve to meet these 
challenges, it is noteworthy that 
Community procedures provide a 
system of legal 'checks and balances'. 
The College of Commissioners has to 
take account of proceedings which 
include oral hearings of the parties and 
the deliberations of an Advisory 
Committee of Member States' 
competition experts. All decisions are 
subject to close scrutiny of the 
European Courts which look 
remorselessly into all the procedural 
and substantive issues a case raises. Of 
the many decisions taken in the last 40 
years, none has ever been annulled 
because it had been motivated by other 
than competition considerations. 
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Moreover, the proposal for an agency 
would, contrary to its objective, 
increase the risk of decisions in 
individual cases being taken on 
political considerations. It is more 
than likely that the creation of the 
agency could only become acceptable 
by the parallel establishment of a new 
level of political control. A public 
interest test exists in one form or 
other in almost all Member States, 
including notably Germany (In 
Germany the Minister of Economics 
can overrule a prohibition decision of 
the Bundeskartellamt in a merger case 
on request of the parties. Of the 108 
prohibition decisions of the 
Bundeskartellamt 6 have been 
overturned on political grounds by the 
Minister in 1973-1994). It would 
allow the Commission to override the 
competition based decisions of the 
agency on political grounds. 
Obviously, that power would have to 
be exercised when the parties or 
individual Member States raise 
arguments of political or industrial 
opportunity in favour of the merger. 
The above described two step-
decision-making could also introduce 
an undesirable element of conflict 
between Member States. It could 
trigger the reappraisal of agency 
decisions, and the Commission, which 
would have to overrule the agency by 
putting competition considerations 
aside. 
Efficiency 
It is also alleged that an agency would 
be more efficient than the Commission 
dealing with the constant increase in 
the number of cases. In view of the 
future enlargement of the Community 
the Commission should, it is argued, 
therefore be relieved of the burden of 
decisions on individual competition 
cases. 
It is difficult to imagine how the 
creation of an additional enforcement 
entity could render the application of 
the competition rules more efficient. 
Whereas the agency would apply the 
antitrust rules, the Commission would 
continue to enforce the other 
competition rules. Since the legal 
procedures, consultation mechanisms 
with Member States and multi-
linguistic regime would remain 
unchanged, the growing number of 
cases would pose the same difficulties 
to an agency as it would to the 
Commission. 
It is likely, however, that the split-up 
would render law enforcement less 
efficient than it is at present. The need 
for close cooperation between the two 
authorities in order to ensure coherent 
application of all Community 
competition rules would most probably 
prolong proceedings in individual 
cases and would certainly require more 
resources to accomplish the task. Also, 
the introduction of a two-stage 
procedure for mergers, which would 
allow parties to request a review by the 
Commission or the Council on non-
competition grounds, would certainly 
prolong the decision-making process. 
Contrary to what is alleged, the 
proposed agency would render 
competition law enforcement less 
efficient and, thus, less effective than 
at present. 
ENABLING PROVISION 
In the absence of consensus on the 
implementation of the suggestion, it 
has been proposed to add only an 
enabling provision to the Treaty in 
order to allow the creation of a 
competition agency in the future. 
However, this proposal would not 
only meet the same objections as the 
creation of the agency itself but would 
further aggravate the concerns. This is 
because existing deep divergences of 
opinion on the future institutional 
structure would only have been 
papered over. 
The result would be that the 
Commission would find it more 
difficult to conduct an independent 
competition policy and apply the 
competition rules autonomously. Any 
Member State not satisfied with a 
decision of the Commission in an 
individual case, could at any time call 
or threaten to call for the transfer of 
the Commission's competences to an 
agency by application of the suggested 
enabling provision. This would not 
only destabilise the Commission in 
developing competition policy and law 
but also have the perverse effect of 
"politicising" the decision-making 
process in individual cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed creation of an agency, 
which would enforce the Community 
antitrust rules separately from the 
Commission, would cut important links 
between competition policy and other 
Community policies. It would 
endanger the current comprehensive 
and uniform application of all 
competition rules and weaken the 
Commission as the promotor of the 
Community. The agency would, thus, 
have a negative impact not only on the 
effectiveness of the competition rules 
but also on the future progress of the 
common market and the economic and 
monetary union. The proposal would 
therefore cause a big reorganisation 
and involve many risks for the small 
result of removing a theoretical 
concern. 
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Liberalization policy and State aid 
in the air transport sector 
By Michael NIEJAHR and Giuseppe ABBAMONTE, DG VII-C-2 
On 1 January 1993, the third and final 
package of measures for the 
liberalization of the Community's 
internal air transport market entered 
into force. This package completes the 
process of gradual market liberalization 
which started with a limited initiative 
on inter-regional air services in 1983, 
followed by two consecutive packages 
of liberalization measures in 1987 and 
1990 as well as rules for the free 
provision of air cargo services between 
the Member States of the Community 
in early 1991. 
THE THIRD PACKAGE 
The third package essentially consists 
of three complementary sets of 
regulations. 
First, Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2407/92 (OJ No L 240, 24.8.1992, p. 
1) establishes common rules on the 
licensing of air carriers. Any 
undertaking which complies with those 
rules, including the obligations of being 
majority owned and effectively 
controlled by Member States or 
nationals of Member States, is entitled 
to receive an operating licence 
permitting it to carry out carriage by 
air of passengers, mail and cargo for 
remuneration or hire. 
In its decision of July 1995 in the case 
of Swissair/Sabena (OJ No L 239, 
7.10.1995, p. 19), the Commission had 
the opportunity to provide extensive 
guidance of its interpretation of the 
ownership and control requirements 
enshrined in the Regulation. It stated 
that those requirements are essentially 
designed to safeguard the interests of 
the Community's air transport industry 
and, in particular, to ensure that market 
access possibilities under the third 
package will effectively be exploited by 
Community air carriers and will not be 
exercised, either directly or through 
subsidiaries, by air carriers from third 
countries. First, the majority ownership 
requirement is complied with if at least 
50% plus one share of the (equity) 
capital of the air carrier concerned are 
owned by Member States and/or 
national of Member States. The 
remaining shares may indeed be held 
by one or more investors from third 
countries, and such shareholding must 
not in itself be considered incompatible 
with that requirement (although the 
scale of the third-country investment as 
well as the distribution of the shares 
within each group of shareholders need 
to be taken into account in any 
assessment under the effective control 
requirement). Second, the effective 
control requirement is complied with if 
Member States and/or nationals of 
Member States have, either individually 
or acting together with other Member 
States or nationals of Member States, 
the ultimate decision-making power in 
the management of the air carrier 
concerned. They must be able, either 
directly or indirectly through 
appointments to the decisive corporate 
bodies of the carrier, to have the final 
say on such key questions as, for 
example, the carrier's business plan, its 
annual budget or any major investment 
or cooperation projects. Such ability 
must not be substantially dependent 
upon the support of individuals or 
companies from third countries. 
Second, Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2408/92 (OJ No L 240, 24.8.1992, p. 8) 
provides that an air carrier holding such 
a licence generally enjoys free access to 
all intra-Community routes. No 
distinction is made any longer between 
scheduled and non-scheduled flights, nor 
between air passenger and air cargo 
services. The operation of cabotage 
services continues, until April 1997, to 
be subject to certain limitations 
pertaining to their consecutive nature 
and the capacity which can be offered. 
Moreover, the Regulation contains a 
number of well-defined safeguard 
clauses allowing a Member State, under 
the control of the Commission, to 
intervene in the principle of free market 
access for public policy reasons such as, 
for example, the maintenance of air 
services to remote regions, airport 
policy or the protection of the 
environment. Member States have so far 
made use of those safeguard clauses 
primarily to distribute traffic between 
airports belonging to the same airport 
system (Article 8) and to impose public 
service obligations on regional routes 
(Article 4). 
The Regulation entrusts the Commission 
with special decision-making powers to 
control the application of any of the 
safeguard clauses mentioned above. In 
this area, the Commission is therefore 
not required to have recourse to the 
normal infringement procedure of 
Article 169 of the Treaty. In the first 
three years of application of the third 
package, the Commission made use of 
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those special decision-making powers 
in order to ensure that Community air 
carriers were granted access to the 
airport of Paris(Orly). That access was 
initially obstructed by the way in which 
the French authorities distributed the 
traffic between the airports of the Paris 
airport system (Orly and Charles-de-
Gaulle). In three decisions of May 
1993 (OJ No L 140, 11.6.1993, p. 51) 
and April 1994 (OJ No L 127, 
19.5.1994, pp. 28 and 35), the 
Commission found the French 
measures in question to be 
discriminatory and disproportionate in 
relation to the policy objectives pursued 
and, thus, incompatible with the 
requirements of Article 8(1) of the 
Regulation. 
As a matter of practice, the 
Commission's intervention was crucial 
for an effective and timely 
liberalization of the air transport market 
in France since Orly accounted for 
some 85% of the domestic air services 
to and from Paris. The importance of 
the Commission's special decision-
making powers in this context is 
illustrated by the follow-up to the two 
decisions of April 1994. In both cases, 
the French authorities appealed to the 
Court of Justice and, in addition, 
applied for interim measures 
suspending the effects of the second 
decision concerning access to the routes 
Paris(Orly)-Marseille and Paris(Orly)-
Toulouse. After the Court had rejected 
that latter application for interim 
measures (1994 ECR 1-5229), the 
French authorities complied with their 
obligations under Community law by 
implementing the contested decision 
and, thus, established a fait accompli 
from which no roll-back was possible 
any more. In February 1996, the 
French authorities eventually withdrew 
their appeal. The French authorities 
also withdrew their appeal against the 
first decision concerning access to the 
route between Paris(Orly) and London 
after they had committed themselves to 
abide by the Commission's reasoning in 
the context of the state aid procedure 
concerning Air France (OJ No L 254, 
30.9.1994, p. 73) and revised their 
traffic distribution rules for the Paris 
airport system in a way which the 
Commission, in a futher decision of 
March 1995 (OJ No L 162, 13.7.1995, 
p. 25), found to be acceptable. 
Third, Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2409/92 (OJ No L 240, 24.8.1992, p. 
15) allows an air carrier to freely set its 
fares and rates for the services operated 
within the internal market under the 
above-mentioned rules. Again, Member 
States may intervene in that pricing 
freedom under safeguard clauses 
allowing them to withdraw excessively 
high passenger fares or to stop 
sustained downward developments of 
such fares (so-called downward 
spirals). Cargo rates, in contrast, cannot 
be subject to such interference. Neither 
of those intervention possibilities has 
been used so far. 
The Commission services have, 
however, established informal 
guidelines to be followed in any future 
cases. According to those guidelines, 
the safeguard clauses are exceptions to 
the general principle of price freedom 
and, as such, must be interpreted 
strictly and applied only in exceptional 
circumstances. An air fare will 
generally not be challenged as 
excessively high if there are no legal or 
factual barriers to market entry, and if 
there is a high degree of competition 
on the route or routes concerned. In all 
other cases, the final assessment will be 
based on a qualitative analysis of, first, 
the respective fare operating ratio and, 
second, the comparison with fares 
charged by the carrier under 
investigation for other comparable 
services. Moreover, any intervention in 
the case of sustained downward 
development of air fares presupposes at 
least two previous rounds of fare 
decreases by the carriers operating on 
the route or group of routes concerned. 
Such intervention will only be required 
if none of those carriers is able to 
generate profits from its operations. 
Neither does it suffice that the carriers 
merely lose revenues (but are still 
operating profitably), nor that only some 
of the operating carriers suffer from 
losses. 
IMPACT OF THE THIRD 
PACKAGE 
The third package has largely replaced 
the bilateral agreements between 
Member States, which used to impose a 
multitude of restrictions on the 
provision of international air services, 
and can truly be called revolutionary as 
regards both its substantive content and 
the number of states involved in the 
liberalization process. It is now possible 
to set up an air carrier anywhere in the 
Community in accordance with one 
single set of rules and to operate 
between two Community airports 
without generally being subject to any 
restrictions on capacity, frequency or 
pricing. The new rules have thus 
introduced the flexibility which the 
Community's air transport industry 
needs to face the global challenges. 
They allow the air carriers to become 
more efficient in their operations and, 
thus, to offer better and cheaper services 
to their coustomers. 
In the first three years of its application, 
the third package has produced some 
encouraging results and further market 
developments can be expected. Member 
States have altogether licenced some 
800 air carriers of which around 20% 
operate scheduled air services. 
Moreover, there has been a significant 
increase in competition both in the 
domestic air transport markets of some 
of the larger Member States as well as 
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on some of the existing international 
routes within the Community. Finally, 
air carriers have over the past three 
years introduced a large number of low 
promotional fares for passenger 
transport. The levels of basic fares for 
business travel, in contrast, have so far 
remained relatively stable. It is notably 
in this latter area where increased 
competition should result in further fare 
decreases over the years to come. 
ANCHXARY AH* TRANSPORT 
LEGISLATION 
The Community has also enacted 
several ancillary sets of rules in order 
to establish the conditions for fair and 
equitable competition. Those rules 
include, in particular, regulations on the 
allocation of airport slots (OJ No L 14, 
22.1.1993, p. 1) and the operation of 
computerized reservation systems (OJ 
No L 220, 29.7.1989, p. 1 and OJ No 
L 278, 11.11.1993, p. 1) as well as 
directives on the mutual acceptance of 
cockpit personnel licences (OJ No L 
373, 31.12.1991, p. 21) and the gradual 
phasing­out of noisy aircraft (OJ No L 
76, 23.3.1992, p. 21). Moreover, the 
Community has created a legal 
framework for the certification of 
aircraft, maintenance organizations and 
air operators and for the licensing of 
personnel involved in aviation safety 
and aircraft operations (OJ No L 373, 
31.12.1991, p. 4). Finally, reference 
should be made to a draft directive on 
the gradual liberalization of the ground­
handling market at Community airports 
which is presently passing through the 
legislative process (common position 
adopted by the Council on 28 March 
1996, OJ No C 134, 6.5.1996, p. 30). 
The directive, if adopted, is aimed at 
increasing competition in that particular 
market and, thus, reducing the costs 
and improve the quality of ground­
handling services. 
COMPETITION AND STATE ΑΠ) 
POLICY 
The internal air transport market would, 
however, not be complete without an 
effective enforcement of the 
competition rules of the Treaty and the 
Merger Regulation (OJ No L 395, 
30.12.1989, p. 1). 
As regards the enforcement of the 
competition rules applying to 
undertakings, the Commission has 
repeatedly acknowledged the need for 
a restructuring of the airline industry 
(most recently in the XXV Report on 
Competition Policy, § 76) and, thus, is 
generally prepared to look favourably 
on mergers and alliances between air 
carriers. The Commission therefore 
approved, albeit subject to certain 
conditions, the merger between 
Swissair and Sabena in July 1995 
(Case No IV/M.616) and the alliance 
between Lufthansa and SAS in January 
1996 (OJ No L 54, 5.3.1996, p. 28). 
The two cases are discussed in more 
detail in respectively summer 1995 and 
spring 1996 editions of the Competition 
Policy Newsletter. 
The most important and most 
contentious policy area is the control of 
state aids granted to individual air 
carriers by the Member States. Before 
the entry into force of the liberalization 
measures, at the time when the air 
transport sector was tightly regulated 
by virtue of bilateral agreements 
between the Member States, there was 
little point in strictly controlling state 
aid. Those agreements regulated air 
transport between two countries and 
prevented free competition from taking 
place on the corresponding routes. In a 
report of March 1992 (Document 
SEC(92) 431 final), the Commission 
indicated that several air carriers were 
benefiting from public funding which 
often took the form of direct operating 
aid. That finding was not surprising 
since a large part of the Community air 
carriers are state owned undertakings 
benefiting from privileged financial 
relations with the public entities. 
With the exception of two cases 
involving Sabena (OJ L 300,31.10.1991, 
p. 48) and Iberia (XXII Report on 
Competition Policy, p.269), the situation 
only changed after the entry into force of 
the third package which opened up the 
possibilities for meaningful competition 
between the air carriers and, thus, 
created a situation where state aid 
severly distort competition in the market­
place. Between 1993 and 1994, the 
Commission scrutinized the restructuring 
programmes of several state­owned 
airlines, including Aer Lingus (OJ L 54, 
25.2.1994, p. 30), TAP (OJ L 279, 
28.10.1994, p. 29), Air France (OJ L 
254, 30.9.1994, p. 73) and Olympic 
Airways (OJ L 273, 25.10.1994, p. 22), 
and made its authorization of the aid 
elements involved in those programmes 
subject to increasingly stringent 
conditions. The main elements of this 
new policy, which are clearly spelt out in 
the Commission's guidelines on the 
application of Articles 92 and 93 of the 
Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA 
Agreement to state aids in the aviation 
sector (OJ C 350, 10.12.1994, p. 5), can 
be summarized as follows : 
* Direct operating aid is prima facie 
prohibited. It can only be acceptable in 
the form of a reimbursement for 
compliance with standards required by 
public service obligations imposed 
under Article 4 of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2408/92 or as aid of a social 
character under Article 92(2)(a) of the 
Treaty. 
* Any other aid to an individual air 
carrier, for example aid involved in a 
recapitalization programme of the 
airline, can only be authorized if it 
forms part of a comprehensive and self­
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contained restructuring programme 
which is designed to restore the 
carrier's financial health within a 
reasonable time period and does not 
envisage, or in fact implies the risk, 
that further aid will be required in the 
future. 
* Any such authorization of 
restructuring aid will include conditions 
which are designed to prevent, inter 
alia, that trade is affected to an extent 
contrary to the common interest and 
that the beneficiary carrier transfers its 
problems onto its competitors (e.g. 
prohibition of price leadership on the 
European routes or prohibition to buy 
stakes in other air carriers). 
* Restructuring aid to an airline which 
has already received such aid before 
will only be allowed under exceptional 
circumstances, unforeseeable and 
external to the company (the so-called 
one-time-last-time principle). 
The one-time-last-time principle does 
not mean, however, that a Member 
State is prevented from entering into 
any financial transaction with an air 
carrier it owns. Article 222 of the 
Treaty in fact explicitly acknowledges 
the existence of public ownership 
systems and, thus, enshrines the right 
for the Member States to invest or 
divest in company capital. According to 
a consolidated case-law of the Court of 
Justice (see case C-40/85, Belgium ν 
Commission, (1986) ECR 2321; case 
C-142/87, Belgium ν Commission, 
(1990) ECR 1-959), in order to examine 
whether a financial transaction between 
a Member State and a company 
involves aid the Commission applies 
the market economy investor principle. 
No state aid is involved if a private 
investor of a size comparable to that of 
the bodies administering the public 
sector, would have provided capital of 
such amount under the same 
circumstances. A capital injection into 
a state-owned air carrier by the 
Member State is only subject to the 
one-time-last-time principle if, on the 
basis of the market economy investor 
principle, it has been demonstrated that 
it amounts to state aid. 
These principles were tested in the 
most recent (second) case concerning 
Iberia. In January 1995, the Spanish 
authorities asked the Commission to 
approve a capital injection of 130 
billion pesetas into Iberia. The 
Commission applied the market 
economy investor principle with the 
assistance of an external consultant 
and, notably in view of the high risk 
and cash drain associated with Iberia's 
investments in South America, 
concluded that the envisaged 
transaction amounted to state aid. The 
Commission then indicated to the 
Spanish authorities that, as Iberia had 
already received restructuring aid in 
1992 and could not rely in this case on 
any exceptional circumstances, 
unforeseeable and external to the 
company, it would not be possible to 
approve the transaction. After intensive 
discussions with the Commission, 
Iberia and the Spanish authorities 
eventually agreed to sell the major part 
of the company's investments in South 
America to a holding controlled by US 
banks and to reduce the amount of the 
capital injection to 87 billion pesetas. 
On the basis of those changed 
circumstances and in view of a number 
of additional commitments by the 
Spanish authorities, the Commission 
came to the conclusion that the 
transaction satisfied the market 
economy investor principle. The future 
cashflows generated by Iberia, 
appropriately discounted at the 
company's cost of capital, exceeded the 
capital outlay. Therefore, no state aid 
elements were involved. Consequently, 
the Commission raised no objections in 
respect of the recapitalization plan of 
the Spanish air carrier in January 1996 
(OJ No L 104, 27.4.1996, p. 25). 
The Iberia case gives strong evidence 
that the Commission is determined to 
adhere to the one-time-last-time 
principle and to allow restructuring aid 
once and only once. This case is, 
however, not the first where the 
Commission applied the market 
economy investor principle and 
concluded that the financial transactions 
involved did not contain any state aid 
elements. In fact, there are three 
precedents of May, July and October 
1995 involving, respectively, Lufthansa, 
Sabena and the French air carrier AOM. 
A negative application of the market 
economy investor principle is found in 
the CDC case, where the Commission 
considered that the subscription by the 
French public bank CDC to FF 1.5bn 
bonds issued by Air France did not take 
place under market conditions. The 
transaction would not have been entered 
into by a rational private investor and 
amounted to state aid (OJ L 258, 
6.10.1994, p. 26). 
Finally, it should be recalled that the 
Commission also investigated and 
decided other state aid cases in the air 
transport sector regarding, inter alia, 
compensation for the deficit incurred by 
TAP on the air routes to and from the 
Azores and Madeira (OJ L 260, 
8.10.1994, p. 27) and aid granted for the 
operation of air routes to and from 
Sardinia (OJ L 26, 2.2.1996, p. 29). 
Those two cases demonstrate that the 
Commission is generally willing to 
authorize any direct operating aid 
granted outside the framework of any 
duly established public service 
obligations only in cases where either 
the aid is of a social character or Art. 4 
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2408/92 does not (yet) apply (such as 
the air routes to and from the Azores)" 
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OPINIONS AND COMMENTS 
In this section DG IV officials outline developments in Community competition procedures. It is important to 
recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. They 
have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as a 
statement of the Commission's or DG IV's views. 
La révision du règlement sur le 
contrôle des concentrations: la 
proposition de la Commission 
par Eric CUZIAT, DG IV-B 
Suite à la publication de son Livre 
vert sur la révision du règlement 
relat if au contrôle des 
concentrations d'entreprises 
(Règlement du Conseil (CEE) n° 
4064/89 du 21 décembre 1989) 
(COM (96) 19 final; voir également 
Competition policy newsletter ­
number 1 ­ volume 2 ­ Spring 1996 
pages 8 à 10) et du débat qui s'en 
suivit, la Commission a adopté le 
10 juillet dernier une proposition de 
modification du règlement sur les 
concentrations (NB: La version 
finalisée de cette proposition dans 
les onze langues officielles de 
l'Union sera transmise dans le 
courant de l'été au Conseil et au 
Parlement Européen. Elle sera dès 
lors disponible pour les parties 
intéressées et publiée au JOCE). 
Cette proposition se présente sous 
la forme de deux projets distincts, 
sous couvert d'une seule 
communication au Conseil et au 
Parlement Européen. En effet, 
compte tenu de l'existence d'une 
double base juridique (article 1er 
paragraphe 3 du règlement pour la 
révision des seuils, d'une part, et 
articles 87 et 235 du Traité pour 
toute autre modification) et des 
modalités de vote attachées à 
chacune de ces deux bases 
(majorité qualifiée dans le premier 
cas, unanimité dans le second), la 
Commission a présenté deux projets 
de règlement, l'un relatif à la 
réduction des seuils, y compris le 
dispositif pour les plurinotifications, 
l'autre relatif aux autres 
changements dont le nouveau 
régime pour les entreprises 
communes. 
LA REDUCTION DES SEUILS 
DE CONTRÔLABILITÉ ET LE 
DISPOSITIF POUR LES 
PLURINOTIFICATIONS 
Comme la Commission l'a 
démontré dans son Livre vert, un 
grand nombre d'opérations ayant 
des effets transfrontaliers 
significatifs dans la Communauté 
é c h a p p e au c o n t r ô l e 
communautaire, compte tenu du 
niveau élevé des seuils actuels. Or, 
la Commission a considéré que 
pour de telles concentrations, 
l'intervention communautaire se 
justifie conformément au principe 
de subsidiarité. De plus, la 
Commission a constaté qu'un certain 
n o m b r e d ' o p é r a t i o n s de 
concentration, en dessous des seuils, 
étaient notifiées auprès de plusieurs 
autorités nationales de contrôle. 
Nonobstant la multi­notifiabilité de 
ces opérations qui constitue un très 
fort indice de leur caractère 
communautaire, la Commission, 
consciente des problèmes 
spécifiques en termes de délais et de 
sécurité juridique que posent les 
plurinotifications aux entreprises, a 
considéré qu'il convenait de 
résoudre également cette question. 
Pour les raisons exposées ci­dessus, 
la Commission proposait dans son 
Livre vert de réduire les seuils de 
contrôlabilité des opérations de 
concentration, aujourd'hui fixés à 5 
milliards et 250 millions d'écus, à 2 
milliards d'écus pour ce qui 
concerne le chiffre d'affaires 
mondial réalisé par l'ensemble des 
parties à la concentration et à 
100 millions d"écus pour ce qui 
concerne le chiffre d'affaires 
communautaire réalisé par au moins 
deux des entreprises concernées. 
Par ailleurs, la Commision 
proposait, à titre subsidiaire, de 
résoudre le problème de 
notifications multiples par une 
procédure spécifique. 
A la lumière des débats engagés 
dans le cadre de la révision du 
règlement, la Commission est 
parvenue à la conclusion qu'il était 
nécessaire de combiner les deux 
propositions du Livre vert, afin de 
recueillir un plus large consensus 
sur le niveau des seuils et 
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d'apporter, en tout état de cause, 
une réponse aux problèmes posés 
par les plurinotifications. 
La Commission propose donc de 
réduire les seuils actuels à 3 
milliards d'écus pour ce qui 
concerne le chiffre d'affaires 
mondial et à 150 millions d'écus 
pour ce qui concerne le chiffre 
d'affaires communautaire. La règle 
des deux tiers demeurerait quant à 
elle inchangée. De plus, entre ces 
nouveaux seuils et des seuils 
planchers de 2 milliards et 100 
millions d'écus, la compétence 
exclusive de la Commission serait 
étendue aux seules opérations qui 
seraient notifiables auprès de trois 
autorités nationales de contrôle. 
Le dispositif envisagé pour le 
traitement des plurinotifications 
s'inscrit dans le cadre des options 
présentées dans le Livre vert. Les 
consultations avec les Etats 
membres et les représentants du 
monde des affaires ont permis d'en 
affiner certains éléments. Toutes 
les opérations de concentration se 
situant entre les seuils ci-dessus 
mentionnés et ne satisfaisant pas à 
la règle des deux tiers seraient de 
dimension communautaire et 
notifiables auprès de la 
Commission, dès lors qu'elles 
rempliraient les conditions 
d'examen (critères de seuils ou 
autres) dans au moins trois Etats 
membres de la Communauté 
européenne, que le système de 
chacun de ces trois Etats soit 
obligatoire ou volontaire. 
L'opération de concentration serait 
réputée remplir les conditions pour 
être soumise à examen dans le 
cadre des systèmes nationaux 
mentionnés par les parties dans la 
notification, à moins que les Etats 
membres concernés n'informent la 
Commision que tel n'est pas le cas 
dans un délai de deux semaines à 
compter de la réception par ces 
Etats membres de tous les 
renseignements requis. Toute 
opposition devrait être motivée par 
écrit. La Commission, quant à elle, 
se bornerait à vérifier si les Etats 
membres ont réagi dans le délai 
imparti, sans contrôler en propre si 
les critères nationaux ont 
effectivement été remplis ou non. 
Dans le cadre de ce nouveau 
dispositif, la première phase 
d'examen serait prolongée de deux 
semaines. 
Certains détails de cette procédure 
devront être fixés par la suite dans 
un nouveau règlement d'application, 
notamment devraient y figurer les 
circonstances dans lesquelles la 
Commision pourrait déclarer une 
notification incomplète, lorsque 
l'information fournie par les parties 
est insuffisante aux yeux des Etats 
membres pour déterminer 
l'application de leurs dispositions 
nationales de contrôle. 
LES AUTRES PROPOSITIONS 
DE MODIFICATION 
Les dispositions de renvoi 
L'article 9 est modifié de sorte que 
dans les affaires où un marché 
distinct à l'intérieur d'un Etat 
membre ne constitue pas une partie 
subs t an t i e l l e du marché 
communautaire, l'Etat membre 
limiterait sa demande de renvoi à 
démontrer que l'opération affecte un 
tel marché sans avoir à prouver 
l'existence d'une menace de création 
ou de renforcement d'une position 
dominante. Une telle modification 
trouve sa justification dans le fait 
que la Commission ne peut interdire 
une concentration que dans la 
mesure où elle crée ou renforce une 
position dominante dans une partie 
substantielle du marché commun. 
Pour ce qui concerne l'article 22, la 
proposition de la Commission ouvre 
à plusieurs Etats membres la 
possibilité d'effectuer une demande 
de renvoi commune dans les affaires 
où une position dominante serait 
créée ou renforcée dans une zone 
géographique étendue à leurs 
territoires. De plus, les dispositions 
relatives à la suspension 
s'appliqueraient aux concentrations 
renvoyées à la Commission sur la 
base de l'article 22 pour autant 
qu'elles n'auraient pas été mises en 
oeuvre à la date où les parties 
seraient informées par la 
Commission qu'une telle demande a 
été formulée. 
Le traitement des entreprises 
communes 
P r e n a n t en c o m p t e les 
préoccupations exprimées lors de la 
consultation quant au traitement 
différencié des entreprises 
communes, la Commission a décidé 
de proposer une solution qui 
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combine les avantages de chacun 
des deux groupes d'option qui 
figuraient dans le Livre vert. 
Dans le cadre de la proposition de 
la Commission, le concept de 
concentration, tel que défini à 
l'article 3 du règlement, est étendu 
à toutes les entreprises communes 
de plein exercice. Par conséquent, 
les entreprises communes qualifiées 
aujourd'hui de "coopératives" et qui 
sont "de plein exercice" seraient 
désormais soumises au champ 
d'application et à la procédure du 
règlement sur les concentrations. 
Pour les entreprises communes 
coopératives d'exercice partiel, la 
situation demeurerait inchangée. 
Sur le fond, et puisque les 
entreprises communes coopératives 
de plein exercice seraient 
cons idé rées comme des 
concentrations, le critère de la 
position dominante prévu à l'article 
2 du règlement leur serait appliqué 
à titre principal. Toutefois, les 
critères de l'article 85(1) et (3) du 
Traité pourraient leur être appliqués 
si nécessaire, ceci dans la mesure 
où l'entreprise commune conduirait 
à la coordination du comportement 
concurrentiel d'entreprises qui 
r e s t e n t i n d é p e n d a n t e s . 
L'application de l'article 85(1) et (3) 
s'effectuerait alors non pas selon les 
procédures du règlement 17 mais 
selon celles du règlement sur les 
concentrations qui présente le 
double avantage d'un délai bref et 
d'une décision formelle. 
Désormais, une seule décision de 
compatibilité ou d'incompatibilité 
avec le marché commun serait 
adoptée. Pour ce qui concerne les 
aspects éventuels relevant de 
l'article 85(1) et (3), la décision 
accorderait une exemption pour la 
durée de vie de l'entreprise 
commune. Néanmoins, une 
disposition permettrait à la 
Commission de révoquer sa 
décision sur ces aspects, pour 
autant qu'avec le temps la position 
des sociétés mères sur le marché 
serait renforcée de telle manière 
que la coordination de leur 
comportement concurrentiel ne 
correspondrait plus aux exigences 
de base de l'article 85(3). 
Enfin, il convient de préciser que 
les opérations de cette nature 
tombant en dessous des seuils de 
contrôlabilité seraient de la 
compétence des Etats membres. 
Pour ce qui concerne les aspects 
coopératifs de ces entreprises 
communes, le régime actuel de 
répartition des compétences entre la 
Commission et les Etats membres 
continuerait de s'appliquer. 
Le revenu bancaire et les 
propositions de "toilettage" 
Pour ce qui concerne la base de 
calcul du chiffre d'affaires des 
établissements financiers et autres 
établissements de crédit, la 
Commission, afin de mieux refléter 
l'activité de la totalité du secteur 
bancaire, propose de substituer au 
dixième des actifs, le produit brut 
bancaire, conformément à la 
définition du produit bancaire 
figurant dans la directive 
86/635/CEE. Par ailleurs, 
l'allocation géographique du chiffre 
d'affaires serait basée sur la 
localisation de la branche ou de la 
division accordant le prêt ou 
fournissant le service. 
Plusieurs propositions de "toilettage" 
peaufinent ou clarifient le texte du 
règlement. On retiendra notamment 
l'introduction d'une base légale 
expresse pour les engagements de 
première phase (dans ce cas de 
figure, la première phase est portée 
à six semaines pour faciliter la 
consultation des Etats membres et 
des tiers intéressés), de même que 
pour les restrictions accessoires 
couvertes en première phase. On 
signalera enfin l'harmonisation de la 
période de suspension avec 
l'adoption d'une décision finale. 
La proposition de modification du 
règlement sur les concentrations 
dépasse par conséquent la simple 
révision des seuils ou des 
mécanismes de renvoi, prévue par le 
règlement lui­même. C'est un 
projet, somme toute ambitieux, que 
la Commission transmet au Conseil 
puisqu'il s'attache également à 
étendre le champ d'application du 
règlement aux plurinotifications et à 
l'ensemble des entreprises 
communes de plein exercice. De 
plus, la Commission a saisi 
l'opportunité qui lui était ici donnée 
d'optimiser encore la mise en oeuvre 
du règlement sur les concentrations, 
au travers d'un "toilettage" du texte. 
Il appartient désormais au Conseil 
de traduire ces propositions dans un 
nouveau règlement mieux adapté 
aux réalités du marché intérieur. ■ 
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La communication de la 
Commission concernant la non-
imposition d'amendes ou la 
réduction de leur montant dans les 
affaires portant sur des ententes. 
par Vincent JORIS, DG IV-A-2 
par conséquent de percer le mur du 
silence organisé autour de ces 
ententes secrètes. 
De plus, l'absence de lignes 
directrices en la matière ne 
permettait pas à la Direction 
générale de la concurrence 
d'indiquer aux entreprises quelle 
contrepartie elles obtiendraient en 
échange d'aveux de participation à 
ces ententes. 
Sur proposition de M. Van Miert, 
la Commission a adopté, le 10 
juillet 1996, une communication 
prévoyant - à certaines conditions -
de réduire l'amende qui aurait été 
normalement imposée aux 
entreprises qui dénoncent auprès 
d'elle certains types d'ententes 
illicites, voire - dans certains cas -
de ne leur infliger aucune amende 
en échange de leur coopération. 
Comme les autres communications 
de la Commission en matière de 
concurrence, celle-ci codifie 
largement la pratique antérieure de 
l'institution en la matière. D'autre 
part, elle annonce aux opérateurs 
économiques la façon dont la 
Commission entend réagir 
lorsqu'une entreprise la contacte 
pour dénoncer des ententes illicites 
qui lui étaient inconnues ou pour 
lui fournir des informations 
facilitant sa mission de sanction de 
ces ententes. 
LE BUT VISE PAR LA 
COMMUNICATION 
L'objectif de ce nouvel instrument 
est de contribuer à la lutte de la 
Commission contre les ententes 
secrètes les plus dangereuses, à 
savoir celles qui visent à fixer des 
prix ou des quotas de production ou 
de vente, à se partager des marchés 
ou à interdire les importations ou 
les exportations. Ces agissements, 
entraînant des augmentations de 
prix et des réductions de choix, 
sont préjudiciables pour les 
consommateurs, mais aussi pour les 
entreprises qui, du fait de leur 
protection artificielle, ne sont pas 
tentées d'innover et donc d'être 
compétitives. Il est dès lors crucial 
de pouvoir découvrir ces pratiques 
et y mettre fin. 
Or, l'expérience récente prouve qu'il 
est bien souvent très difficile à la 
Commission de déceler des 
ententes dont le secret a tendance à 
être d'autant mieux gardé que les 
profits qui en sont tirés sont 
importants. Les moyens que mettent 
en oeuvre certaines entreprises pour 
les cacher sont parfois sophistiqués, 
allant jusqu'à l'organisation de 
fausses inspections pour enseigner 
à leur personnel comment faire 
disparaître efficacement les preuves 
des ententes illicites. Le but 
premier de la communication est 
L'EVOLUTION DE LA 
PROPOSITION 
La source d'inspiration de la 
proposition est le programme de 
clémence ("leniency programme"), 
introduit en 1978 par le 
"Department of Justice" des Etats-
Unis et élargi en 1993, au profit 
des entreprises lui proposant leur 
coopération avant que le 
"Department" ait connaissance de 
l'entente (1978) ou, lorsqu'il connaît 
celle-ci, avant qu'il ait des preuves 
suffisantes pour pouvoir la 
sanctionner (1993). 
Le projet initial proposait de 
n'infliger aucune amende aux 
entreprises qui: (i) informeraient la 
Commission de l'existence d'une 
entente avant que la Commission 
n'ait officiellement procédé à des 
vérifications sur l'affaire ou, (ii) 
seraient les premières à proposer 
leur coopération au cours des étapes 
préliminaires de l'examen d'une 
affaire, à un moment où la 
Commission n'a pas encore obtenu 
suffisamment de preuves pour 
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motiver l'adoption d'une décision 
infligeant des amendes. 
Le projet de communication traitait 
également des cas dans lesquels les 
entreprises collaboreraient avec la 
Commission sans toutefois 
satisfaire aux critères mentionnés 
ci-dessus. Aux entreprises 
coopérant pleinement avec la 
Commission après que des 
vérifications ont déjà été réalisées, 
il était prévu d' octroyer une 
réduction très importante de 
l'amende, définie comme une 
réduction d'au moins 50 % du 
montant de l'amende qu'il aurait été 
approprié d'infliger sans leur 
coopération. 
Lorsqu'une entreprise aurait coopéré 
sans être la première. la 
communication prévoyait que des 
réductions pouvaient encore être 
accordées, tout en précisant qu'il 
était impossible de donner à 
l'avance des indications sur leur 
niveau, en raison de la diversité des 
situations relevant de cette 
catégorie. Cette approche s'inspirait 
de la politique suivie par la 
Commission, telle qu'illustrée par sa 
d é c i s i o n dans l ' a f f a i r e 
"Cartonboard" (décision du 
13.07.1994, IV/33833, J.O. n°L 243 
du 19.09.1994). 
Cette proposition fut approuvée par 
la Commission en tant que projet le 
6 décembre 1995 et publiée au 
Journal Officiel n° C 341, du 19 
décembre 1995. Le texte approuvé 
et publié différait de la proposition 
originelle en ce qu'il excluait le 
caractère automatique de la non-
imposition, de manière à préserver 
le pouvoir d'appréciation de la 
Commission dans chaque cas. La 
publication avait pour but de 
recueillir les observations de tous 
les intéressés sur ce projet. 
Cette publication a donné lieu à des 
prises de position d'une dizaine 
d'associations, européenne ou 
nationales, d'entreprises, d'une 
association d'avocats et de plusieurs 
cabinets d'avocats. En résumé, les 
associations d'entreprises se 
montraient hostiles au projet, alors 
que, parmi les associations et 
cabinets d'avocats, les opinions 
étaient partagées. Le projet a 
également été examiné par les 
experts gouvernementaux des Etats 
membres, à leur réunion du 
18 janvier 1996. L'accueil y a été 
généralement favorable. 
Le projet publié a été profondément 




Le champ d'application de la 
communication a été précisé. Le 
nouveau texte s'applique aux seules 
infractions qui y sont expressément 
énoncées. Il s'agit de concertations 
secrètes, constituant des violations 
graves de l'article 85. Si les 
ententes horizontales sont 
principalement visées, les accords 
verticaux ne sont pas exclus, s'ils 
prennent l'une des formes énoncées 
dans le texte. 
Le titre B (non-imposition 
d'amende ou réduction très 
importante de son montant) vise les 
cas où une entreprise dénonce un 
cartel avant que la Commission ait 
procédé à une vérification et sans 
que celle-ci dispose d'informations 
suffisantes pour prouver l'existence 
de l'entente. Cette section a été la 
plus profondément modifiée. 
L'objectif principal a été de trouver 
un équilibre entre la nécessité de 
préserver la marge d'appréciation de 
la Commission et celle d'offrir aux 
entreprises une sécurité juridique 
suffisante. 
Une première innovation majeure, 
répondant à l'exigence de laisser au 
Collège son pouvoir d'appréciation 
pour fixer dans chaque cas le 
montant de l'amende, consiste dans 
la suppression du caractère 
automatique de la non-imposition. 
C'est pourquoi les titres B (non-
imposition) et C (réduction très 
importante) anciens ont été 
fusionnés. Toutefois, la sécurité 
juridique ainsi que l'attractivité de la 
communication ont conduit à fixer 
une fourchette de réduction, d'un 
minimum de 75 % pouvant aller 
jusqu'à la non-imposition totale. 
Le titre C (réduction importante du 
montant de l'amende) vise les 
dénonciations intervenant après que 
la Commission a procédé à des 
vérifications. Pour que des 
dénonciations intervenant à ce stade 
justifient une réduction significative 
d'amende, il faut que ces 
vérifications aient été infructueuses. 
Elles ne doivent donc pas avoir 
apporté de preuves suffisantes pour 
justifier l'engagement d'une 
procédure, au sens de l'article 9 §3 
du règlement n° 17. 
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Pour ces dénonciations la fourchette 
de réduction est de 50 à 75%. 
Mais, dans les deux hypothèses, 
(dénonciations avant et après 
verifications) l'entreprise doit 
remplir cumulativement les 4 
conditions suivantes : 
­ être la première à apporter des 
éléments déterminants pour 
prouver l'existence de l'entente, 
­ avoir mis fin à sa participation à 
l'activité illicite au plus tard au 
moment où elle dénonce 
l'entente, 
­ fournir à la Commission toutes 
les informations dont elle 
dispose au sujet de l'entente et 
maintenir une coopération totale 
tout au long de l'enquête, 
­ ne pas avoir contraint une autre 
entreprise à participer à l'entente 
ni eu dans celle­ci un rôle 
déterminant. 
De ces conditions celle consistant 
à n'accorder la non­imposition,une 
réduction très importante ou une 
réduction importante qu'à la 
première entreprise dénonciatrice 
est capitale, car elle crée un climat 
général de méfiance entre les 
entreprises participant à l'infraction. 
En effet, chaque entreprise 
participante se rend compte qu'elle 
pourrait échapper à toute amende 
si elle était la première à dénoncer 
l'infraction, tandis qu'elle serait 
punie par une amende si l'une des 
autres entreprises la devançait. 
Chaque entreprise a donc intérêt à 
essayer d'être la première à 
dénoncer l'infraction, sauf si elle est 
assurée qu'aucune des autres n'a 
l'intention de dénoncer. Dès qu'une 
entreprise perçoit la possibilité 
qu'une autre entreprise puisse faire 
le pas, il devrait se déclencher une 
course à la dénonciation. Ce 
mécanisme tend à ébranler de façon 
déterminante la stabilité et donc la 
durée moyenne des ententes. La 
prévision de cet effet est également 
de nature à diminuer l'attrait de 
participer à de nouvelles ententes. 
Quant aux entreprises qui coopèrent 
sans remplir toutes les conditions 
exposées ci­dessus, elles 
bénéficieront d'une réduction de 10 
à 50% (titre D: réduction 
significative du montant de 
l'amende). Comme dans le projet 
initial, les hypothèses visées sont 
nombreuses. Parmi elles doit être 
mise en évidence celle de la non­
contestation de la matérialité des 
faits après réception de la 
communication des griefs. 
Cet exemple est d'une très grande 
importance pratique. Il existe de 
nombreux précédents d'entreprises 
ayant demandé spontanément quelle 
réduction d'amende leur serait 
octroyée si elles reconnaissaient les 
faits sur lesquels la Commission 
fondait ses accusations. La 
reconnaissance de la matérialité des 
faits par une entreprise partie à une 
en tente secrè te fac i l i te 
considérablement le travail de la 
Commission, en particulier à l'égard 
des autres parties à cette entente, et 
lui épargne des ressources 
précieuses pour la suite de la 
procédure. 
Enfin, il y a lieu de préciser que 
­ la communication ne concerne nas 
les initiatives individuelles d'un 
membre du personnel d'une 
entreprise ; elle ne vise que les 
démarches émanant d'une 
entreprise même; 
­ ce n'est qu'au moment où la 
Commission adoptera sa décision 
de constatation d'infraction qu'elle 
appréciera si les conditions sont 
remplies; 
­ la communication ne modifie pas 
les conséquences civiles de 
l'infraction;l'infraction ne disparaît 
pas du fait qu'elle a été reconnue; 
l'entente reste contraire à 
l'article 85 §1 et, dès lors, est 
nulle en vertu de l'article 85 §2; 
ses victimes pourront bénéficier de 
dommages­intérêts, accordés par 
les juridictions nationales 
compétents 
DEPUIS L'ADOPTION 
Depuis son adoption, la 
communication a été publiée au 
Journal Officiel n° C 207, du 
18.07.1996. 
Surtout, son utilité paraît confirmée. 
Depuis son adoption une entreprise 
a déjà approché la Direction 
générale de la Concurrence pour 
dénoncer une entente inconnue de 
celle­ci. ■ 
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La politique européenne de 
concurrence en 1995 
Karel VAN MIERT présente au Parlement Européen le 
XXVème Rapport sur la politique de concurrence 
Le Commissaire Karel Van Miert a 
présenté le 30 mai le 25ème rapport sur 
la politique de concurrence à la 
Commission Economique et Monétaire 
et de la Politique Industrielle du 
Parlement Européen (COM (96) 126 
final - IP/96/457). A cette occasion, il 
a prononcé un discours, le texte duquel 
est repris ci-dessus. 
" Ladies and gentlemen, 
As last year, I very much appreciate 
the opportunity to present the 
competition report "en primeur" to the 
European Parliament, before it is 
released to the press. 
I firmly believe that the cooperation 
and the dialogue with the European 
Parliament is an essential condition for 
a successfull competition policy. In 
fact, today, more than ever before, 
competition policy is deeply involved 
in the citizens' daily life. It is therefore 
increasingly subject to close and critical 
scrutiny at all levels within the 
European Union and indeed beyond - it 
is no longer a marginal subject that is 
only of interest to specialists. Acting in 
close liaison with the European 
Parliament may thus help to bring 
about the wide democratic consensus 
which is indispensable to have an 
effective competition policy. 
I am pleased that in sensitive and 
crucial areas of my policy, the 
European Parliament has shown itself 
to be a solid ally in the interest of 
European industry and citizens. 
In your Resolution on the previous 
competition report, you have requested 
a further strengthening of transparency 
and democratic accountability in 
competition matters. You may know 
that, following meetings with the 
President of your Committee, Mr von 
Wogau and Mrs. Riis-Jørgensen, I have 
sent a letter to confirm my firm 
willingness to continue the policy of 
openness with the European Parliament. 
I have indicated in this letter that I am 
ready to meet the Parliament more 
frequently to discuss recent 
developments and more specific 
competition policy issues and decisions. 
These discussions could take the form 
of regular two-monthly meetings or 
hearings within the framework of this 
Committee. 
I hope that, in the next few months, we 
will be able to agree upon a practical 
working scheme for these regular 
meetings. 
FORM AND CONTENT OF 
COMPETITION REPORT 
This year's report differs in presentation 
from the previous competition reports. 
In view of the success of last year's 
separate brochure which summarized 
the major decisions and developments 
in the field of competition, I have 
decided to produce a much shorter 
report and to publish it entirely in the 
form of a brochure. The document 
h i g h l i g h t s the main pol icy 
developments, decisions and legislation. 
It situates the competition developments 
within their wider context of other 
Community policies, such as industrial 
policy, internal market, Information 
Society, R&D, social policy and 
environmental policy. This reflects that 
Commission's view that competition 
policy should be applied in conjunction 
with other Community policies to form 
a set of coherent instruments to realize 
basic Community objectives. 
In addition to the Commission's report, 
the Directorate-general for Competition 
is preparing a more descriptive report of 
competition cases in 1995, including 
complete lists of references. It will be 
published around the summer in all 
languages of the Community together 
with the Commission's report. 
SHARP INCREASE OF NEW 
CASES 
1995 has seen an increase of more than 
35 % of the overall number of new 
cases. 
The increase has been more than 42 % 
in the field of restrictive agreements and 
abuse of dominant positions. The 
Commission handled a record number 
of merger notifications : up from 100 in 
1994 to 114 in 1995. Also in the area of 
state aid, the Commission registered a 
huge increase of notifications (680 
compared to 510 in 1994) and it 
adopted a record number of decisions. 
The increase is partly due to the 
accession of three new Member States 
to the European Union on 1 January 
1995. It is certainly also a sign that 
European industries are increasingly 
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aware that their playing field is Europe 
as a whole. In addition, the rapidly 
changing and increasingly global 
economic environment gives firms an 
incentive to cooperate or merge so as 
to remain competitive. 
In the field of state aid, the increase 
also results from greater transparency 
and stricter control by the Commission, 
which gives rise to a higher number of 
notifications and complaints. 
I do not expect that the number of 
competition cases will decrease in the 
near future. On the contrary, I believe 
that it will further grow in the coming 
years. To that we must add another 
factor. The ability to react quickly to 
changes in the market place is an 
essential element of the competitiveness 
of European industry. It is therefore 
important to maintain an efficiently 
administered competition policy. 
For these very reasons, and, in view of 
the limited resources at its disposal, it 
is self-evident that the Commission has 
to fix priorities in order to maintain an 
effective competition policy. 
CORE COMPETITION POLICY 
ACTIONS 
Competition policy has two major 
objectives which are to a large extent 
complementary : competitiveness and 
development of the European economy 
on the one hand and consumer 
protection on the other hand. Both 
objectives are present in the 
Commission's continuing enforcement 
of the existing competition rules to all 
kinds of restrictions of competition - be 
they by means of state or private action 
- which affect the competitiveness of 
European industries or which affect the 
consumers' access to products and 
services. Sometimes it has to do this in 
sectors, such as transport and 
telecommunications, where different 
an t i - compe t i t i ve i ssues arise 
simultaneously. In such cases, the 
Commission has the ability to use the 
whole array of instruments at its 
disposal (e.g. rules on restrictive 
agreements and abuse of a dominant 
position; liberalization measures; 
merger control; and control of state 
aid) to ensure the optimum outcome. 
NEED TO SECURE OPEN 
MARKETS 
Restrictive agreements and abuse of 
dominant positions which act to 
exclude new competitors from the 
market or which seal off national 
markets are a first type of cases which 
deserve the Commission's priority 
attention. 
In 1995, the Commission has continued 
to take vigilant action where 
companies, through anti-competitive 
agreements or practices, wall off 
national markets by restricting parallel 
imports and prevent consumers from 
taking advantage of price differences 
between Member States (Glasurit; 
Organon). With the same end in view, 
the new regulation on car distribution 
in Europe ensures that individual 
consumers are free to carry out 
personal imports. 
The need to safeguard and improve the 
competitiveness of European industry 
requires that markets remain open and 
accessible to companies attempting to 
exploit the possibilities offered by the 
single market. The Commission has 
therefore pursued a stringent policy 
where companies attempt, be it through 
restrictive agreements or unilateral 
action, to obstruct the access of new 
entrants to the market (Unilever/Mars; 
Van Marwijk/FNK-SCK). 
The Commission's strict approach vis-à-
vis this type of restrictions is 
particularly important in sectors which 
traditionally were protected by 
regulatory monopoly or exclusive rights, 
and which, as a result of their 
liberalization, create new possibilities 
for market entry. Recent examples are : 
ground handling services; discriminatory 
landing fees (Brussels airport); 
discrimination against second mobile 
phone operators (Omnitel, Mobistar). 
Other cases of the same nature are 
Roscoff and Elsinor concerning access 
to port facilities for competing ferry 
CONTINUATION OF PROCESS 
OF LIBERALIZATION OF 
TRADITIONALLY 
MONOPOLIZED MARKETS 
The liberalization of traditionally 
monopolized markets remains an 
important priority of today's competition 
policy. Once achieved, these 
competition driven markets will enhance 
competitiveness and innovation, and 
thereby create new jobs. At the same 
time, universal public services, to which 
all citizens have equal access at 
affordable prices, should be safeguarded 
in areas where market forces are 
inadequate. For this reason, a sector-by-
sector approach is the most appropriate. 
For example, with the support of the 
European Parliament, decisive progress 
has been made in legislative provisions 
liberalizing telecommunication services 
which, as a sector subject to rapid 
innovation, can bypass national 
boundaries. I refer to the liberalization 
of mobile telephones, alternative 
networks and voice telephony on 1 
January 1998. I deplore that the same 
progress has not been possible in the 
energy sector given the importance of 
this sector for the competitiveness of 
European economy. 
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COOPERATION AND 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
Today's economic environment is 
characterized by dynamic markets, 
innovation and globalization (with the 
concurrent sharp increase in 
competitive pressures which it entails). 
As a result, companies are looking for 
different forms of cooperation to enable 
them to remain competitive on the 
market by improving their R&D, 
reducing their costs and developing 
new products. 
In principle the Commission takes a 
positive view where such cooperation 
leads to efficiencies which outweigh 
the disadvantages in competition terms. 
The Commission's positive approach to 
strategic alliances in the telecom sector 
(Atlas/Phoenix) and cooperation 
agreements between major air carriers 
(Lufthansa/SAS) are just two examples 
of how it has done so recently. 
In doing so however, the Commission 
has sought to ensure that such 
cooperation between firms does not 
prevent third party access to the 
market. As a matter of fact, only those 
companies which are used to 
competition and which perform well in 
open and dynamic markets will be able 
to do so as well on a wider scale - be 
it in other geographic areas or in a 
more global economy in general. Only 
by securing competitive and growth 
oriented market-structures, can the 
current restructuring process in sectors 
such as telecommunications generate 
new services at competitive prices, 
reduced costs for industry, new 
investment and employment. 
The Commission has also a pro-active 
role to play to cultivate the conditions 
which make dynamic markets possible. 
For instance, it has adopted a new 
block exemption authorizing certain 
categories of agreements on technology 
transfers, which is expected to facilitate 
the diffusion of technological 
innovations within the Union. 
Mergers and acquisitions also have an 
important impact on employment and 
investment. Although in the short run 
they may lead to layoffs, in the 
medium to long term, they have a 
number of positive effects on 
investment and employment. 
The Commission's role in this field is 
to secure those positive effects. 
Mergers which create or strengthen a 
dominant position may hurt other 
industries as well as the final 
consumer. Moreover, in emerging 
markets, concentrations in an early 
stage of market formation may lead to 
foreclosure effects that are discouraging 
technological innovation and 
investment by market entrants. It is 
precisely this concern which has led 
the Commission to prohibit operations 
in the media sector, which is of 
growing significance in the 
development of the Information Society 
(Nordic Satelli te Distr ibution, 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol). 
CONTROL OF STATE AID 
The Community's competition policy 
would be incomplete without a strict 
state aid policy. The Commission's 
fourth survey on state aid in the 
Community has shown that, while there 
is a slow but steady fall, total aid 
granted remains high. Further efforts 
are therefore necessary to reduce aid 
levels by strengthening control 
m e c h a n i s m s and i m p r o v i n g 
transparency. 
In the first place, the prerequisite for an 
efficient state aid control is that 
Member States notify all aid measures 
to the Commission and do not put them 
into effect before the Commission has 
approved them. The continued violation 
by Member States of the notification 
obligation has induced the Commission 
to take further steps to make Member 
States respect that obligation. In a 
communication adopted in May the 
Commission thus reserved its right, in 
certain cases, provisionally to order 
Member States to recover aid granted in 
breach of the notification obligation 
until the Commission had adopted a 
final decision approving the aid. 
Moreover, in a notice on cooperation 
with national courts the Commission has 
shown its willingness to assist them to 
protect the rights of companies against 
non-notified aid granted to competitors. 
An efficient state aid control does not 
mean, however, that all state aid should 
be prohibited. In fact, the majority of 
the decisions taken by the Commission 
are positive. Many state aid measures 
pursue objectives in the interest of the 
Community, such as economic and 
social cohesion, a sufficient degree of 
R&D and environmental protection, the 
development of SMEs, and the necessity 
of allowing time for structural 
adjustment, in particular for social 
reasons. Other cases have shown the 
necessity for the Commission to take 
into consideration the particular 
characteristics of the sector involved 
(Credit Lyonnais; French Post Office). 
The Commission's role is to verify 
whether these aid measures do not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve 
those fundamental Community 
objectives and that they do not distort 
competition and affect trade between 
Member States unduly. 
The Commission adopted, for the first 
time, employment aid guidelines 
explaining under which conditions state 
aid to firms to promote employment 
may be approved. Moreover, it adopted 
a new framework on state aid for R&D, 
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confirming its favourable approach to 
this kind of aid. This shows that the 
Commission's state aid policy continues 
to play an active role in overcoming 
structural unemployment and in 
strengthening the competitiveness of 
the European economy. 
ADJUSTMENTS TO REINFORCE 
THE EFFICIENCY AND 
TRANSPARENCY OF 
COMPETITION POLICY 
The current political and economic 
situation necessitates the continuous 
modernization of the instruments and 
p rocedu re s avai lable to the 
Commission, in order to improve the 
relevance, efficiency and transparency 
of competition policy. 
PRIORITIZATION 
I already referred to the need to be 
more selective in dealing with 
individual competition cases. For this 
purpose, several instruments have 
already been developed. Some of them 
may need to be broadened or refined 
further (for example : concept of de 
minimis). New instruments may need 
to be considered and we might have to 
explore the boundaries of current law, 
in particular procedural rules. 
DECENTRALIZATION 
Where the Commission has to be 
selective, the role of national 
authorities and courts in competition 
cases becomes more important. The 
Commission stimulates, where 
appropriate, more frequent application 
of the competition rules by national 
courts and national competition 
authorities. In cases where an 
appreciable economic effect is felt 
mainly in one Member State, national 
courts and authorities may be better 
placed to handle the case. 
In the field of anti-trust, the preparation 
of a new notice on cooperation between 
the Commission and national 
competition authorities is well 
advanced, and will complement the 
existing one on cooperation with the 
national courts. 
Decentralized enforcement should not, 
however, lead to differing application 
of competition law in the European 
Union. The Commission therefore 
attaches great importance to 
communication and cooperation 
between national and Community 
officials. Moreover, the majority of 
Member States now have competition 
laws which substantially resemble those 
of the Community. This process of 
"soft harmonization" is a natural 
consequence of the integration process, 
which creates pressure for a level-
playing field throughout the 
Community. 
In the field of state aid, the subsidiarity 
principle dictates that the Community 
must have exclusive competence 
because Member States cannot be 
asked to control their own state aid 
expenditures in a fair way vis-à-vis 
their neighbours. However, one aspect 
can be handled at national level : 
national courts may act upon 
complaints by the competitors of the 
firm supported by state aid, and in 
particular it may control whether 
required notification and approval 
procedures have been followed by the 
Member State. The Commission has 
also published a notice in this area. 
SIMPLIFICATION AND 
TRANSPARENCY 
The current legislative framework on 
competition is sometimes felt by 
industry as a too strait-jacket which 
does not necessarily respond to current 
economic realities. The Commission is 
therefore making efforts to simplify and 
review its policy where necessary. I 
have already mentioned the new group 
exemption for technology transfer 
agreements. In the field of state aid, the 
Commission started working on a 
revised and consolidated regional 
framework. The new notice on state aid 
of minor importance also simplifies the 
use of this instrument for Member 
States. 
For the same purpose of simplification 
and review, the Commission is 
preparing a green paper setting out 
different alternatives for future policy in 
the area of vertical restraints. My 
services have already started preparing 
a similar review exercise for horizontal 
cooperation arrangements (in particular 
specialization and R&D). It both cases, 
the results will be submitted to a wide 
and in-depth public consultation of all 
interested political and socio-economic 
partners. I look forward to hearing your 
views on these matters which I will 
fully take account of in deciding which 
line to take. 
The Commission is also publishing 
more frequently guidelines to explain 
how it intends to apply the competition 
rules. I refer for example to the 
guidelines on cross-border credit 
transfers, the employment aid guidelines 
and the recently adopted new SME 
guidelines. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN 
EFFICIENTLY ADMINISTERED 
COMPETITION POLICY 
Where structural adjustment is involved, 
companies are right to expect from the 
Commission decisions that are efficient, 
timely and transparent. In the field of 
merger control, the Commission's record 
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is particularly successful in this respect. 
Most of the decisions are taken in the 
initial examination period of four 
weeks. The remaining operations 
(seven in 1995) which enter into an in­
depth investigation are completed 
within another four months. 
However, further improvements are still 
possible. In January of this year the 
Commission published a Green Paper 
which seeks to further increase the 
efficiency of merger control. It 
examines how to extend the advantage 
of the one­stop­shop principle to 
operations with cross­border effects 
which today may be confronted with 
the problem of multiple notifications of 
the same transaction in several Member 
States. Multiple national filings 
increase uncertainty, effort, and cost for 
business and may lead to conflicting 
decisions. 
Your Committee has already been 
consulted on the Merger Green Paper. 
I am very grateful for your support to 
the reduction of the thresholds. I am 
looking forward to have the opinion of 
the European Parliament on all aspects 
of the Green Paper. I can not but stress 
the role which the European Parliament 
plays in this whole exercise. 
The need for an efficient administrative 
procedure also exists for cooperation 
agreements which involve structural 
changes and important investment. An 
accelerated procedure has already been 
introduced for structural cooperative 
joint ventures. The Commission is now 
considering whether the current 
"voluntary" procedure should not be 
turned into a procedure which sets 
legally binding deadlines for all full 
function joint ventures. 
INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 
The increasing globalization of the 
world economy and the changing 
pattern of modern trade have 
encouraged the Community to co­
operate in competition matters with its 
trading partners where possible. 
The report on competition policy in the 
new trade order, drafted by an 
independent group of experts at my 
request, is a valuable contribution to 
the necessary development in this field. 
It recommends on the one hand the 
strengthening of bilateral cooperation 
on the basis of the current EC/US 
agreement, and on the other hand the 
elaboration of a plurilateral cooperation 
framework. 
On bilateral cooperation, the 
Commission has already started 
examining the report's proposals with 
the Member States' competition 
authorities with a view to determining 
how we should proceed. 
On the multilateral front, I and my 
colleagues hope in the coming weeks to 
be able to present a Commission 
position with a view to launching 
discussion on the need for an 
international framework in the WTO. 
Another important task lies in building 
up our relations with the Countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC), as 
well as the ex­USSR states and the 
Mediterranean States. We have 
experienced competition as an element 
of democracy. We are convinced that 
our partner countries can likewise 
benefit from this experience. We are 
therefore actively involved in a process 
of technical assistance and cooperation. 
I am happy that the CEEC Countries are 
progressively introducing and 
implementing our competition rules. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the increasing workload, I am 
convinced that the Commission is 
perfectly capable of ensuring an 
effective competition policy, fully 
adapted to a rapidly changing economic 
and political environment. Competition 
policy should be seen and applied in 
conjunction with other Community 
policies to form a set of coherent 
instruments to realise basic Community 
objectives. 
What is sometimes presented as a 
weakness is a strength. Community 
competition policy can only be 
effective, if it takes fully into account 
the economic and political realities in a 
rapidly changing common market. 
This is one of the major reasons why I 
do not favour the establishment of a 
separate European cartel office. 
Moreover, the actual system ensures a 
coherent policy as the same authority 
applies all different competition rules. A 
separate office would not be an 
adequate means to increase efficiency, 
but would rather reduce efficiency. 
Finally, and most importantly, the actual 
institutional framework allows the 
European Parliament to be closely 
associated to this policy through its 
fruitful cooperation with the 
Commission." ■ 
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Application of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by Joos STRAGIER, DG IV-A-1 in collaboration with 
Hugo VERLACKT DG IV-F-2 and Stephen RYAN DG IV-F-3 
ACCORDS DE COOPERATION 
Banque Nationale de Paris/Dresdner 
Bank 
Le 24 juin 1996, la Commission a 
décidé d'exempter pour une période de 
dix ans, l'accord de coopération entre la 
Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) et la 
Dresdner Bank (DB) (IP/96/567). 
L'accord prévoit une coopération 
globale et en principe exclusive au 
niveau mondial de la BNP et de la DB. 
Cette coopération comporte quatre 
volets. Les deux banques se 
rapprocheront dans le domaine de leur 
organisation interne, en particulier par 
un échange d'information et un 
développement commun dans le 
domaine de l'informatique, de la 
bureautique, des informations 
économiques, ainsi que des nouveaux 
produits ou techniques financiers. En 
deuxième lieu, BNP et DB vont 
coopérer dans le domaine des 
financements internationaux, du 
merchant banking, des marchés des 
capitaux et du placement des titres. Le 
troisième volet de la coopération vise à 
renforcer les possibilités des deux 
banques d'offrir des services financiers 
internationaux à leur clientèle 
respective par l'amélioration et le 
regroupement de leurs entités dans les 
pays hors de l'Allemagne et de le 
France. Finalement, en ce qui concerne 
les marchés domestiques, chaque partie 
s'est engagée à mettre à la disposition 
de l'autre tous ses services au meilleur 
prix et à offrir lui même la gamme la 
plus large possible de services en 
provenance de l'autre partenaire à sa 
propre clientèle. 
L'accord initialement notifié prévoyait 
que chaque partie peut émettre un veto 
absolu à un accord de coopération que 
l'autre partie souhaite conclure avec un 
concurrent national de la première. 
Néanmoins, les deux banques ont 
accepté, suite à la demande de la 
Commission, de limiter ce droit de 
refus aux cas où l'accord de 
coopération avec la tierce banque 
implique l'utilisation de savoir-faire ou 
de secrets d'affaires résultant de la 
coopération entre BNP et DB ou 
provenant de la banque détenant le 
droit de veto. Cette modification a été 
confirmée dans une annexe à l'accord 
de coopération. 
La présence de chacune des deux 
banques sur le marché national de 
services bancaires de son partenaire 
étant plutôt faible, la Commission a 
d'abord constaté que la coopération 
dans le domaine de l'organisation, des 
marchés des capitaux et de la gestion 
des actifs sur les marchés nationaux 
respectifs ne conduit pas à une 
restriction sensible de la concurrence 
actuelle. La même constatation vaut 
pour l'engagement de chacune à mettre 
à la disposition du partenaire ses 
propres produits bancaires pour qu'il 
puisse les distribuer sur son marché 
national. En revanche, la Commission a 
conclu que ces aspects de la coopération 
sont en mesure de restreindre de 
manière non négligeable la concurrence 
potentielle entre ces deux banques. A 
cet égard, la Commission a pris en 
considération les facteurs suivants: le 
cadre législatif communautaire qui a 
facilité l'accès des banques aux marchés 
tierces dans la Communauté; la future 
introduction de la troisième phase de 
l 'Union monéta i re ainsi que 
l'introduction de la monnaie unique; et 
les nouvelles voies de distribution de 
services bancaires. La Commission 
considère que ces facteurs devraient 
permettre aux grandes banques 
universelles, comme les parties en 
cause, de développer de manière 
indépendante leurs activités sur des 
marchés autres que leurs marchés 
nationaux. Selon la Commission, la 
coopération est telle que les deux 
banques n'auront plus d'intérêt 
économique à faire ainsi. 
Néanmoins, la Commission a décidé 
que les conditions d'exemption sont 
remplies. La coopération conduira à une 
amélioration de la production des 
services financiers offerts aux 
particuliers et aux entreprises ainsi qu' à 
une amélioration de la distribution des 
services et des produits de chacune dans 
le pays de l'autre. Toutes les restrictions 
que la Commission a pu constater sont 
indispensables pour atteindre les 
améliorations résultant de la 
coopération. Cela vaut également pour 
le droit de veto comme il a été modifié 
sur demande de la Commission. Pour le 
reste, la coopération ne conduit pas à 
une élimination de la concurrence sur 
les marchés allemands et français. 
La Commission a fixé la durée de 
l'exemption à dix ans pour pouvoir 
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réexaminer éventuellement les effets de 
la coopération dans un délai 
raisonnable après la mise en place de 
l'Union monétaire. 
En ce qui concerne les marchés 
bancaires dans les pays "tiers" qui sont 
également affectés par la coopération, 
la Commission n'a pas pu constater une 
restriction sensible de la concurrence. 
Cela vaut également pour les activités 
de dimension internationale, en 
particulier les activités sur les marchés 
financiers. Vu la taille relative des deux 
b a n q u e s s u r c e s m a r c h é s 
internationaux, la coopération ne va pas 
restreindre la concurrence de manière 
sensible. Au contraire, elle est plutôt 
favorable à la concurrence en 
renforçant la position des deux banques 
au niveau international. 
BFGoodrich! Messier-Bugatti 
Dans le domaine des roues et freins 
pour avions commerciaux, notamment 
les Airbus A-330/340 et A-321, la 
Commission a autorisé un accord de 
coopération entre les sociétés 
BFGoodrich des Etats-Unis et Messier-
Bugatti en France par l'envoi d'une 
lettre administrative (comfort-letter). 
BFGoodrich et sa division BFG 
Aerospace sont actives dans l'industrie 
aérospatiale et fabriquent plusieurs 
composants d'avion. D'autres sociétés 
du groupe fabriquent des instruments et 
des équipements électroniques ou sont 
actives dans la chimie. 
Messier-Bugatti est une filiale du 
constructeur français de moteurs 
d'avion Snecma. Ses activités 
comprennent divers composants d'avion 
comme les roues et freins. 
En vue de participer à une soumission 
pour les roues et freins des avions 
Airbus A-330/340 et A-321 et de 
répartir les risques financiers liés à une 
telle opération, les deux parties ont mis 
sur pied une filiale commune qui 
coordonne les activités des sociétés 
mères concernant les produits destinés 
aux avions Airbus en question. Ceci 
comprend notamment le développement 
en commun des produits, la 
présentation des offres au constructeur 
d'avion, la recherche de la clientèle 
chez les lignes aériennes, l'organisation 
de la fabrication des composants par 
les mères et la mise à la disposition de 
la clientèle d'un service après-vente. 
Une caractéristique de ce marché est 
qu'il est mondial et que le nombre 
d'opérateurs est réduit, surtout en ce qui 
concerne les constructeurs d'avions. 
Pour sauvegarder un degré maximal de 
concurrence dans ce type de marché il 
est indispensable que des opérateurs 
peuvent coopérer dans des programmes 
de coopération concrets sans pour 
autant perdre leur liberté de coopérer 
dans d'autres programmes avec d'autres 
partenaires. 
La Commission a veillé à s'assurer que 
dans le domaine du service après-vente, 
où un grand nombre d'opérateurs 
indépendants sont présents, les sociétés 
certifiées par les autorités aéronautiques 
soient assurées d'un accès garanti aux 
pièces et aux manuels d'instruction 
nécessaires à la bonne exécution de 
l'entretien et de la réparation des roues 




Le 5 juin, la Commission a pris une 
décision constatant que l'association 
néerlandaise des expéditeurs Fenex a 
enfreint l'article 85 en établissant et 
diffusant des tarifs conseillés 
d'expédition. 
La Commission a pu constater que, pour 
une période allant du 10 janvier 1989 
jusqu'au 1er juillet 1993, Fenex a 
distribué à ses membres annuellement 
des listes de tarifs en florins, ou en 
pourcentages, avec un tarif minimum 
exprimé en florins pour différentes 
services d'expédition à prester dans les 
ports maritimes et aux frontières 
terrestres. 
Etant une fédération d'organisations 
d'expéditeurs néerlandais jusqu'au 22 
juin 1991 et depuis cette date, une 
association regroupant directement des 
sociétés d'expédition, Fenex constitue 
une association d'entreprises au sens de 
l'article 85 (1). 
Lors de la procédure, Fenex a fait valoir 
que les tarifs en cause n'ont qu'une 
valeur de recommandation qui ne limite 
pas la liberté des expéditeurs de fixer 
leurs tarifs. Cette recommandation ne 
constituerait pas une décision 
d'association au sens de l'article 85 (1). 
Pour la Commission, l'élaboration et la 
diffusion de tarifs conseillés par Fenex 
doivent être interprétées comme 
l'expression fidèle de la volonté de 
l'association de coordonner le 
comportement de ses membres sur le 
marché en cause. La pratique 
d'élaboration et de diffusion de tarifs 
recommandés est une activité régulière 
et constante de Fenex depuis de très 
nombreux années. De plus, les sociétés 
membres de l'association avaient 
manifestement un intérêt commun à 
coordonner leur comportement en ce qui 
concerne les tarifs des prestations en 
cause. En outre, les recommandations 
tarifaires sont accompagnées de 
circulaires exprimant la ferme volonté 
de l ' a s s o c i a t i o n q u e s e s 
recommandations soient suivies d'effets. 
En fin, l'élaboration et la diffusion de 
tarifs recommandés constituaient pour 
Fenex une activité pour laquelle elle 
était clairement habilitée. Conformément 
à la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice 
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(Affaire 8/72 Cementhandelaren contre 
Commission, Ree. 1972, 977; Affaire 
45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer 
contre Commission, Ree. 1987, 405; 
voir également affaires jointes 209 à 
215 et 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck 
contre Commission, Ree. 1980, 3125 et 
affaires jointes 96-102, 104, 105, 108 
et 110/82 NV IAZ International 
Belgium contre Commission, Ree. 
1983, 3369), la Commission a 
considéré que la pratique de tarifs 
recommandés de Fenex avait un objet 
anticoncurrentiel. 
Par ailleurs, dans sa décision, la 
Commission a fait une distinction entre 
la diffusion par une organisation 
professionnelle de tarifs conseillés 
d'une part et la diffusion d'indications 
facilitant pour les entreprises, le calcul 
de leurs propres structures de prix de 
revient afin de leur permettre d'établir 
de façon autonome leurs prix de vente. 
Les tarifs conseillés sont de nature à 
inciter les entreprises en cause à aligner 
leurs tarifs, abstraction faite de leurs 
prix de revient. Ce risque n'est en 
revanche pas inhérent à un schéma de 
calcul de coûts. 
E udi m 
Eudim est une association de grossistes 
en matériel pour installations, avec 
pour objectif de promouvoir le 
commerce de gros européen dans trois 
segments : plomberie, chauffage et 
sanitaires. 
La Commission a reçu une plainte 
contre les membres de cette 
organisation professionnelle qui 
auraient enfreint l'article 85 (1) en 
limitant le nombre des membres à un 
seul par pays, en appliquant un 
gentlemen's agreement visant au 
partage du marché et en échangeant des 
informations commerciales de caractère 
confidentiel, notamment sur les prix. 
L'existence d'une "règle du marché 
national" limitant les activités 
transfrontalières de chacun des 
membres a pu être confirmée par la 
Commission au cours de son enquête. 
En outre, la Commission a pu établir 
que les membres d'Eudim échangent 
des informations confidentielles 
concernant les prix d'achat auprès des 
fournisseurs d'une part et le marché des 
clients d'autre part. 
La Commission a considéré que 
l'échange d'informations concernant le 
marché des fournisseurs n'était pas de 
nature à restreindre la concurrence sur 
le marché de gros en cause. S'agissant 
des informations relatives au marché 
des clients, la Commission a considéré 
que les échanges ne restreignaient pas 
la concurrence dans la mesure où ils 
étaient limités à des informations 
générales et non confidentielles. Par 
contre, l'échange d'informations 
confidentielles et individuelles, telles 
que le volume des ventes et les parts 
de marché, est susceptible de 
restreindre la concurrence, en 
p a r t i c u l i e r su r un m a r c h é 
oligopolistique. Dans le cas d'espèce, la 
Commission a considéré que le marché 
de gros du matériel pour installations 
est trop fragmenté pour être considéré 
comme oligopolistique. Dès lors 
l'échange d'informations individuelles et 
confidentielles entre les membres 
d'Eudim sur le marché des clients 
n'aurait pas d'effet sensible sur la 
structure concurrentielle du marché de 
gros en cause. 
Bienque Eudim a nié l'existence de tout 
accord territorial, les membres d'Eudim 
ont indiqué explicitement dans une 
déclaration formelle que chacun d'eux 
est libre de vendre ses produits et de 
s'établir partout où il le juge opportun. 
Cette déclaration est inclue dans les 
nouveaux arrangements en vigueur au 
sein d'Eudim qui ont ont été 
formellement notifiés à la Commission. 
La Commission a indiqué qu'elle a 
l'intention d'adopter une position 
favorable à l'égard de ces accords 
modifiés (Communication faite 
conformément à l'article 19 §3 du 
Règlement n 17, JO C 111 du 17.4.96). 
MARITIME TRANSPORT : 
COMMISSION GIVES GREEN 
LIGHT TO FIVE CONSORTIUM 
AGREEMENTS 
On the basis of proposals from Mr Van 
Miert, the Commission has recently 
authorised a series of consortium 
agreements in the maritime transport 
sector. These are the first cases 
involving the application of the 
regulation which the Commission 
adopted on 20 April 1995 (see 
IP/95/409 and Annex) and which grant 
a block exemption to liner shipping 
consortia offering international maritime 
liner services from one or more 
Community ports. Liner shipping 
consortia are agreements between 
shipping companies, the object of which 
is to bring about cooperation for the 
joint operation of a maritime liner 
transport service by means of various 
arrangements. Four of these consortium 
agreements, all of which existed before 
the entry into force of the regulation, 
have been authorised and may operate 
until 21 April 2000, the date on which 
the regulation expires. 
So far as the fifth agreement, it is not a 
consortium falling within the scope of 
the exemption regulation and has been 
granted individual exemption. 
The Commission has been able to 
establish that each of these consortia has 
not only allowed the participating 
shipping lines to rationalise their 
activities but has also contributed to 
significant improvements in the quality 
and frequency of liner shipping services 
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offered to shippers as well as, in some 
cases, the number of ports served. The 
Commission has checked that the 
consortia remain subject to effective 
competition on the routes where they 
operate thereby guaranteeing that 
shippers obtain a fair share of the 
benefits which result from these 
agreements. 
The following five consortia will 
benefit from exemption. 
(1) St Lawrence Coordinated Service 
On 13 October 1995, Canada Maritime 
Limited and Orient Overseas Container 
Line (UK) notified to the Commission 
the St Lawrence Coordinated Service 
(SLCS), a consortium agreement under 
which these shipping companies 
operate a joint liner service between the 
port of Montreal in Canada and various 
ports in North-West Europe. 
On 27 March 1996, the Commission 
decided not to oppose this agreement 
and to allow it to benefit from the 
group exemption. In order to be able to 
benefit from exemption, the parties 
agreed to delete, at the request of the 
Commission, a clause in the agreement 
which required all goods of Quebec or 
Ontario origin or destination to be 
shipped via the port of Montreal, which 
restricted the possibility of the parties 
to use, even within the scope of a 
different agreement, the competing 
Canadian port of Halifax. This clause 
was not considered to be indispensable 
for the objectives of the consortium. 
The deletion of this clause clearly 
shows the wish of the Commission not 
to allow parties to a consortium 
agreement to impose restrictions of 
competition relating to routes other 
than the routes on which the 
consortium operates. 
(2) East African Container Semice 
On 17 October 1995, six shipping 
companies notified to the Commission 
the East African Container Service 
(EACS), a consortium agreement under 
which they operate a joint liner service 
between ports in Europe (including in 
the UK and Mediterranean) and ports 
in East Africa and the Red Sea. The six 
companies are The Charente 
Steam-Ship Co Ltd, DSR-Senator 
Lines, Ellerman Lines Ltd, P&O 
Containers Ltd, WEC Lines, 
Mediterranean Shipping Company. On 
27 March 1996, the Commission a 
decided not to oppose the agreement 
and to allow it to benefit from the 
group exemption. 
(3) Joint Mediterranean Canada 
Service 
On 19 October 1995, Canada Maritime 
Limited and DSR-Senator Lines 
notified to the Commission the Joint 
Mediterranean Canada Service (JMCS), 
a consortium agreement under which 
these shipping companies operate a 
joint liner service between the port of 
Montreal in Canada and various ports 
in the eastern Mediterranean. On 2 
April 1996 the Commission decided 
not to oppose the agreement and to 
allow it to benefit from the group 
exemption. 
(4) Joint Pool Agreement 
On 20 October 1995, Andrew Weir 
Shipping Ltd and Euro Africa Shipping 
Line Co Ltd notified to the 
Commission the Joint Pool Agreement 
(JPA), a consortium agreement under 
which these shipping companies 
operate a joint liner service for the 
transport of goods between the British 
ports of Hull and Felixstowe and the 
Polish port of Gdynia. On 1 April 1996 
the Commission a decided not to oppose 
the agreement and to allow it to benefit 
from the group exemption. 
(5) Agreement benefitting from 
Individual Exemption - Exemption 
Decision of 9 April 1996 
On 11 August 1995, Finncarriers Oy Ab 
and Poseidon Schiffahrt AG applied to 
the Commission for an exemption under 
Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty in 
respect of the Baltic Liner Conference 
Agreement. Under the agreement the 
parties operate a joint service on a 
jointly agreed schedule at jointly agreed 
tariff and service arrangement rates. The 
joint service consists in the provision of 
regular ferry services for ro-ro, 
container and rail/ferry traffic between 
ports and points in Finland and (i) ports 
and points in Germany (and other 
Continental points via German ports) 
and (ii) ports and points in Scandinavia 
(Sweden, Denmark and Norway), with 
a small volume of traffic to and from 
Russia via Finland to those countries. 
The parties take joint investment 
decisions, in particular for the 
acquisition of vessels and equipment 
that are specifically designed for the 
climatic conditions where they operate 
and which are also specially designed to 
meet the specific needs of Finnish 
shippers. The joint service is managed 
by Finncarriers. 
Such an agreement which brings about 
a highly integrated joint service does 
not amount to a consortium agreement 
falling within the scope of the 
regulation adopted in April 1995 since 
it does not concern exclusively the 
transport of goods principally by 
containers. A large part of the goods are 
not containerised and the consortium is 
therefore unable to benefit from the 
group exemption and must benefit from 
an individual exemption if it is to be 
authorised. 
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In order to obtain the comments of 
third parties, in accordance with normal 
procedures, the Commission published 
a notice in the Official Journal on 16 
February 1996 setting out a summary 
of the application. No observations 
were received and within a period of 
ninety days following publication the 
Commission considered that the 
conditions of Article 85(3) were 
fulfilled and decided on 9 April 1996 
not to oppose the exemption of this 
agreement; Accordingly, in accordance 
with the applicable regulations, the 
maritime activities are exempted for a 
period of six years and the inland 
activities (which in this case are minor) 
are exempted for a period of three 
years. 
To that effect, a consortium which 
wishes to benefit automatically from 
the block exemption must have a trade 
share below 30% or 35% depending on 
whether or not it is a consortium 
operating within a liner Conference. 
The benefit of the group exemption is 
still available through a simplified 
opposition procedure to a consortium 
whose trade share exceeds the limits of 
30% or 35% but is not above 50% of 
the direct trade provided it fulfils the 
other conditions contained in 
Regulation No 870/95 and provided the 
Commission does not oppose 
exemption within a period of six 
months counting from the date of 
notification. 
filiales en Europe pour les produits du 
groupe. La circulaire confiait la 
responsabilité, pour chaque pays 
concerné, à une filiale spécifique du 
groupe. En outre, les filiales étaient 
soumises aux règles suivantes : 
- interdiction de vendre les produits 
dans un autre territoire ; 
- transfert de chaque commande d'un 
acheteur d'un autre territoire vers la 
filiale responsable du pays concerné ; 
- transfert de chaque commande 
destinée à un autre pays mais émanant 
d'un acheteur local sans activité 
commerciale locale vers la filiale 
responsable ; 
Principal Features of Commission 
Regulation No 870/95 
This favourable treatment on the part 
of the Commission is explained by the 
advantages brought about by consortia. 
In general, they help to improve not 
only productivity but also the quality 
and the frequency of the liner transport 
services offered to transport users by 
rationalising the activities of the 
member companies and by the 
economies of scale which they bring 
about. 
The conditions and obligations that a 
consortium must respect in order to 
benefit from the block exemption are 
set out in article 5 to 9 of Regulation 
No 870/95. These conditions and 
obligations are attached to the block 
exemption in order to guarantee that 
the requirements of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty are fulfilled. Above all, they 
seek to ensure that consortia are 
operating in trades where they remain 
subject to effective competition in order 
to guarantee that shippers obtain a fair 
share of the benefits resulting from 
these agreements. 
Where a consortium enjoys a trade 
share above 50% or where it does not 
fulfil the other conditions which the 
regulation attaches to the benefit of the 
block exemption, such an agreement 
must be notified to the Commission so 
as to apply for individual exemption 
pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty. 
Finally, the regulation provides a 
favourable procedural regime for 
consortia existing at the date of entry 
into effect of the Regulation As a 
result, consortia existing on that date 
which have a trade share higher to 50% 
but which fulfil the other conditions of 
the block exemption may, for a period 
of six months following the entry into 
force of the Regulation, also benefit 
from the simplified opposition 
procedure. [IP/96/400] 96/05/08 
ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 
Interbrew 
Le brasseur belge Interbrew a notifié à 
la Commission une circulaire interne 
r é g l a n t la p o l i t i q u e d e 
commercialisation à suivre par ses 
- même transfert pour des acheteurs 
locaux ayant pratiqué des exportations 
(parallèles) dans le passé, à moins que 
ces derniers puissent prouver que la 
commande était destinée à un client du 
territoire local ; 
- même traitement que décrit ci-dessus 
pour un acheteur local dont les 
commandes accusent une augmentation 
disproportionnée par rapport au marché 
local ; et 
- mesures d'accompagnement quant à la 
reprise des vidanges provenant d'un 
autre pays. 
Par sa notification, Interbrew a demandé 
à la Commission de se prononcer à 
l'égard de cette circulaire "intra-groupe" 
sur la non-applicabilité de l'article 85. 
Conformément à l'arrêt de Tribunal de 
Première Instance du 12 janvier 1995 
dans l'affaire T-102/92 Viho Europe 
contre Commission, la Direction 
Générale de la Concurrence a d'abord 
considéré que la circulaire n'est pas 
constitutive d'un accord restricif de 
concurrence au sens de l'article 85 (1) 
en ce qui concerne les relations entre les 
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entreprises au sein du groupe 
Interbrew. Il en est autrement de 
l'obligation pour chaque filiale du 
groupe de soumettre l'exécution de 
commandes de certains acheteurs -qui 
sont supposés d'exporter- établis sur 
son territoire de responsabilité à une 
condition d'accepter une clause de 
destination (qui revient à une condition 
explicite ou implicite de ne pas 
exporter). Cette obligation aboutirait à 
un accord restrictif couvert par l'article 
85 (1) au moment que cet accord est 
effectivement conclu entre quelconque 
filiale et son distributeur. 
Dans l'affaire Viho, le Tribunal ne s'est 
pas prononcé sur la question de savoir 
si la politique de distribution de Parker 
en confiant à une filiale la 
commercialisation de ses produits dans 
un Etat Membre et en contraignant les 
ache t eu r s à s 'approvis ionner 
exclusivement auprès d'une filiale 
déterminée, pourrait être constitutive 
d'un abus de position dominante. En 
effet, le Tribunal a pu constater que 
dans le cas d'espèce il n'y avait pas 
suffisamment d'éléments pour conclure 
que Parker se trouve en position 
dominante sur le marché concerné. 
Dans le cas d'espèce, les services de la 
Commission ont considéré que 
Interbrew se trouve en position 
dominante sur le marché belge de la 
bière. De plus, la concrétisation des 
différentes instructions contenues dans 
le circulaire constituerait un abus de 
cette position dominante d'Interbrew. 
Le fait que les comportements abusifs 
auraient lieu dans un marché 
géographique relevant autre que celui 
dans lequel Interbrew est en position 
dominante, n'exclut pas l'application de 
l'article 86, dans la mesure où ces 
comportements ont pour effet de 
maintenir et/ou à cloisonner les 
différents marchés nationaux permettant 
Interbrew de mieux exploiter sa 
position dominante sur le marché belge. 
En particulier, la mise en oeuvre de la 
politique de distribution comme elle a 
été décrite dans la circulaire, permettra 
à Interbrew de protéger le marché belge 
de la concurrence "intrabrand" des 
bières d'Interbrew en provenance 
d'autres Etats membres. En effet, les 
importateurs parallèles belges, et dès 
lors les consommateurs belges, se 
verraient limités considérablement dans 
leur possibilité de s'approvisionner en 
bières d'Interbrew en France où certains 
produits du groupe sont moins chers 
qu'en Belgique. 
Pour ces raisons , la DG IV a envoyé 
à Interbrew une lettre d'avertissement. 
Informée de cette prise de position, 
Interbrew a indiqué que les instructions 
du circulaire n'ont pas été mise en 
oeuvre, et elle les a retirées sous 
réserve de tous ses droits. 
L'intervention de la DG IV dans cette 
affaire confirme sa politique d'interdire 
toute entrave au commerce parallèle 
résultant soit d'un accord entre 
entreprises, soit d'un abus de position 
dominante. En effet, dans un marché 
unique, le consommateur doit avoir la 
possibilité de se procurer un produit là 
où son prix est le plus intéressant et le 
commerce parallèle doit pouvoir 
exercer sa fonction d'arbitrage. 
Novo Nordisk 
Undertakings have been accepted from 
N o v o N o r d i s k , the Danish 
pharmaceutical company, which are 
designed to ensure competition in the 
markets for components of Novo 
Nordisk's insulin self-injection delivery 
systems. 
Novo Nordisk is Europe's leading 
insulin producer. In 1985 Novo 
Nordisk introduced a new method of 
insulin self-injection, the so-called 
"insulin pen" system. For many 
diabetes sufferers, this has proved more 
convenient than traditional self-injection 
delivery systems such as the 
hypodermic syringe. About a third of all 
diabetics in Europe already employ such 
pen systems and the trend is continuing. 
The systems consist of an injection 
device (the "pen"), non-refillable 
cartridges containing the insulin dosage, 
and disposable needles. Other 
companies now produce similar pen 
delivery systems, including manufacture 
of the various components, some of 
which are compatible with Novo 
Nordisk sys tems . Compat ib le 
components in this context are those 
which can safely and effectively be used 
in combination with the Novo Nordisk 
products, and which do not cause the 
system to malfunction in any material 
way. 
On the foot of a complaint by US-based 
medical device manufacturer, Becton 
D ick in son , the Commiss ion ' s 
Directorate-General for competition 
carried out an investigation and arrived 
at the preliminary conclusion that Novo 
Nordisk occupies a dominant position 
on the insulin market, and on the 
markets for the various components of 
pen delivery systems, in most Member 
States. It concluded that it has been 
abusing its dominance, contrary to the 
Community's competition rules, by in 
some instances disclaiming liability for 
the malfunction of its pen products, or 
refusing to guarantee such products, 
when they are used in conjunction with 
the compatible components of other 
manufacturers. Objection was made not 
only to the explicit disclaimer of liability 
by Novo Nordisk in such circumstances, 
but equally to lhe phrasing of disclaimers 
in such a way as to create unfounded 
confusion or uncertainty in the minds of 
consumers as to the safety or effectiveness 
of using non-Novo Nordisk components in 
its pen delivery systems. 
Objection was also made by DG IV to the 
claim by Novo Nordisk that some 








* c ^ Volume 2 Number 2 Summer 1996 25 
> ANTI-TRUST RULES 
components were incompatible with 
Novo Nordisk systems because of their 
inability to facilitate the carrying out of 
an ancilliary and optional "function 
check" designed to check dosage 
accuracy. This check was not considered 
material to the issue of compatibility. 
Novo Nordisk, while expressly contesting 
the allegations made in the complaint and 
the Commission's preliminary 
conclusions, has now undertaken to take 
measures which meet the Commission's 
concerns: liability disclaimers, whether 
expressed orally or in writing, will no 
longer be used in relation to the issue of 
combined use of Novo Nordisk insulin 
pen products with other manufacturers' 
compatible components. Novo Nordisk 
has furthermore indicated that it will not 
treat other manufacturers' components as 
incompatible with its pen systems merely 
on the basis of their inability to enable 
the ancilliary "function check" for its pen 
products to be carried out. 
The wording of its safety warnings to 
patients for all relevant packaging, 
promotional material and product 
literature will be revised throughout the 
EEA in accordance with these 
undertakings. These changes, including 
adaptation of existing stock, will be 
introduced on a country by country basis 
as soon as the necessary regulatory 
approval has been obtained. Clear 
instruction concerning the new position 
will also be given to Novo Nordisk sales 
and marketing staff in all EEA countries. 
Deutsche Telekom 
On the 25th of June, Commissioner Karel 
Van Miert sent a letter f τ he German 
M i n i s t e r o f P o s t a n d 
Telecommunications, Mr Wolfgang 
Botsch marking his agreement on a series 
of conditions for the introduction of new 
business customer tariffs by Deutsche 
Telekom. 
Deutsche Telekom AG's (DT) had 
originally planned to introduce new 
tariffs as from 1 January 1996. The 
Commission consequently launched an 
own initiative investigation concerning 
DTs plans for the introduction of rebates 
for providing voice services to business 
customers in order to assess whether the 
public telecom operator is abusing its 
dominant position. Such abuse could 
result in unfair elimination of new 
competition in that part of the business 
market which has recently been 
liberalised. The Commission had also 
received a complaint (January 1996) from 
all the major competitors of DT in the 
recently liberalised areas of network and 
business voice services in Germany (CNI, 
RWE, Telliance, Plusnet, Meganet, Viag 
Intercom, Worldcom). 
In a provisional assessment of the 
proposed tariff scheme the Commission's 
Directorate General for Competition 
concluded that the new tariffs were 
incompatible with the competition rules 
of the Treaty. It was clear in particular 
that the tariffs would discriminate in 
favour business customers vis a vis 
residential customers, that they would 
have 'price squeezing' effects on 
competitors, and that they represented 
"bundling" i.e. the undue linking of the 
provision of monopoly and competitive 
services. The modifications and 
conditions now agreed between 
Commissioner Van Miert and Mr Bötsch 
aim at eliminating these problems. 
The Commission requires that the 
following conditions are met: 
­ New business customer tariffs will not 
enter into force before 1 November 1996. 
­ The new tariffs will not be applied 
retroactively. 
­ The Federal Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications confirms that on the 
date of entry into force of new business 
customer tariffs at least two licences for 
the construction or ownership and control 
of alternative infrastructure for the 
provision of liberalised services have 
come into force in Germany. 
­ The Federal Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications undertakes to ensure, 
that new access agreements between 
Deutsche Telekom and its competitors for 
the "break in" and "break out" [Passing 
calls into and out of DT's network] of 
DT's public switched telecommunications 
network are concluded at the latest at the 
time of entry into force of the new 
business customer tariffs. He will 
encourage the parties to initiate 
negotiations on such agreements 
immediately. 
­ Deutsche Telekom will ensure a strict 
separation between its general voice 
telephony offerings by Deutsche Telekom 
AG and the offering of Corporate 
Network solutions at least until 1 January 
1998. (6) Deutsche Telekom must offer 
trial rebates to domestic customers before 
the new business customer tariffs enter 
into force. These rebates will be generally 
applied as from 1 January 1997 at the 
latest. 
Since these conditions will meet the 
Commission's concerns regarding the 
compatibility of DT's proposed tariffs with 
the competition rules of the Treaty, Mr 
Van Miert said in his letter that he intends 
to suspend the Commission investigation 
until the measures requested have been 
fully implemented, and that he would 
recommend the Commission formally 
close the procedure once these conditions 
are met. 
The implementation of these measures is 
also expected to have important positive 
effects on the broader competitive 
structure of German télécoms markets. In 
particular: 
­ The introduction of the new tariffs will 
be delayed until the effective opening of 
alternative infrastructures and until one 
year before the introduction of full 
competition for voice telephony. 
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- Corporate Network providers competing 
with DT will get favourable terms of 
access (lower tariffs) for the network 
"break in" and "break out". 
- A clear separation of DT's offerings 
will increase market transparency for its 
customers - Residential customers will 
benefit from rebates introduced in parallel 
with the rebates for business customers. 
A number of telecommunications 
organisations in the European Union are 
currently considering major reform of 
their tariffs in preparation for full 
liberalisation of télécoms markets in 
1998. The Commission encourages the 
rebalancing of tariffs in so far as this 
reflects commercial adaptation to 
competitive conditions. However, until 
full liberalisation is achieved close 
attention must be paid to the effects and 
motivations of tariff reforms. 
Currently competition is growing in the 
recently liberalised markets such as 
business and data services, while other 
areas, such as access to end customers 
and public voice telephony, will mostly 
remain closed until 1998. In this run up 
period there is a risk that incumbent 
telecommunications operators may 
restructure tariffs in such a way as to 
exploit the difference between increasing 
price elasticities in the competitive 
markets and the lower price elasticity 
(due to absence of competition) in the 
latter. This could harm the new suppliers 
of liberalised services, by "price 
squeezing" them out of the market. 
During the current adjustment period, the 
Commission will therefore pay special 
attention to these aspects, in order to 
avoid anti-competitive effects. 
[IP/96/543] 96/06/25 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's 
Press releases are available on-
line from the RAPID database, 
on the day of their publication by 
the Commission's Spokesman's 
Service. To obtain access to 
RAPID, please write to EUR-OP 
Information, Marketing and 
Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 
Luxembourg tel. +352 2929 
42455, fax +352 2929 42763 
COMMISSIONER VAN MIERT 
SATISFIED WITH VISA 
DROPPING ITS PROPOSED RULE 
Mr Van Miert, the EU competition 
Commissioner, has announced that he is 
satisfied with the recent decision of the 
EU Board of Visa International to drop 
the proposal that would have banned its 
members from issuing competing cards. 
Before Visa's Board meeting, Mr Van 
Miert has warned taht Visa's propsal 
could not be accepted. Visa USA also 
confirmed to the Commission that its 
rules do not prevent the EU branches, 
parnts or subsidiaries of Visa USA 
members from issuing competing cards. 
As a consequence, the Commission's 
Directorate General for Competition (DG 
IV) intends soon to close its investigation 
of these matters. 
This investigation was launched in 
January after some of Visa's competitors, 
such as American Express and Dean 
Witter Discover, made formal complaints 
to the Commission. The Commission's 
DG IV has reached the preliminary view 
that Visa's proposal, if adopted, would 
have infringed the EC competition rules 
because it would have restircted 
competition between international cards 
systems as well as between banks wich 
issue cards riding on those systems. The 
Commission is determined to ensure that 
payment card markets are kept open and 
that access by new competitors is not 
impeded. IP/96/585 [96/07/03] 
Other press releases 
IP/96/432 : FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
MEETING CONSUMERS' 
EXPECTATIONS - COMMISSION 
ADOPTS GREEN PAPER [96/05/22] 
IP/96/456 : ELSINORE PORT OPENED 
FOR ACCESS TO A NEW 
COMPETING FERRY SERVICE 
[96/05/30]] 
IP/96/462 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
BRITISH GAS NETWORK CODE 
[96/05/31] 
IP/96/627 : THE COMMISSION 
PROHIBITS TARIFF CONCER-
TATIONS IN THE FIELD OF THE 
AIR TRANSPORT OF CARGO 
[96/07/10] 
IP/96/629 : CARTEL BUSTING : 
COMMISSION FORESEES LOWER 
OR NO FINES FOR COMPANIES 
DISCLOSING EXISTENCE OF 
ILLICIT PRACTICES [96/07/10] 
IP/96/685 : MONITORING THE 
APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY 
LAW - 1995 REPORT [96/07/23] 
IP/96/695 : NEW MECHANISM FOR 
REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY 
WITH REGARD TO INFORMATION 
SOCIETY SERVICES [96/07/24 
IP/96/713 : EU'S DUTY-FREE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
UNSATISFACTORY |96/07/29] 
IP/96/718 : COMMISSION TO CARRY 
OUT DETAILED INQUIRY IN 
FINNISH SUPERMARKET CASE 
[96/07/26] 
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Court Judgements 
These summaries of Court Judgements have been prepared by DG 
IV officials and represent their personal views on the Judgement. 
These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the 
Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the 
Commission's or DG IV's views. The C E LEX document numbers for 
these Judgements are also included within brackets. 
doctrine of issue estoppel, the doctrine 
could be extended beyond the above 
definition. In any case it was irrelevant 
whether not being able to relitigate 
previously decided facts and issues is 
termed issue estoppel or abuse of process, 
since both are manifestations of the same 
group of public policy considerations. 
THE ENGLISH HIGH COURT'S 
JUDGMENT IN IBERIA U.K. LTD 
V (1) BPB INDUSTRIES PLC AND 
(2) BRITISH GYPSUM LTD 
The facts 
The defendants (BPB Industries Pic and 
British Gypsum Ltd) are major suppliers 
of plasterboard to the UK and for the 
purposes of Article 86, occupy a 
dominant position in that market. When 
the plaintiff (Iberian UK Ltd) began to 
import cheaper Spanish plasterboard to 
the UK, the defendants took steps to 
protect their market. The plaintiff have 
complained to the Commission of abuse 
of dominant position by the defendants. 
Having initiated infringement 
proceedings, the Commission adopted a 
decision (89/22) in which it found 
breaches of Article 86 and imposed fines 
on both defendants. This decision was 
subsequently appealed to the CFI (Case 
T-65/89) and then to the ECJ (Case C-
130/93P). In both cases the appeals were 
dismissed in their entirety. 
The plaintiff also brought an action for 
damages in the English High Court 
alleging that, contrary to Article 86 of the 
Treaty, the defendants had acted in 
breach of their statutory duty so as to 
abuse their dominant position. It is in this 
context that the High Court dealt with the 
issue of whether a party could, in 
national proceedings, rely on conclusions 
of facts and issues reached by the 
Commission, the CFI and the ECJ in 
related proceedings. In essence, the 
plaintiff wanted to be able to proceed 
with its claim without having to prove 
from scratch that the defendants had 
abused their dominant position. 
Legal background: "res judicata" and 
abuse of process 
The plaintiffs arguments were based 
largely on the common law doctrine of 
"res judicata" in the form known as 
"issue estoppel". Namely, a party to civil 
proceedings is not entitled to make 
against the other party an assertion, if the 
same assertion was made in previous 
civil proceedings between the same 
parties and found to be incorrect. The 
plaintiff claimed that it is not open to 
either party to relitigate in the High Court 
issues which have been determined in the 
resolution of that dispute in European 
proceedings. 
The High Court gave consideration to the 
nature of Commission proceedings in 
competition cases and held that in 
relation to Article 85 and 86 
investigations, although proceedings took 
on an adversarial character, they were 
administrative in nature and could not be 
treated as civil for the purposes of issue 
estoppel. 
Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that it 
would be an abuse of process for the 
defendants to deny the correctness and 
applicability of the findings in the 
European proceedings. 
The High Court held that even though the 




In examining public policy considerations, 
the court looked at the relationship 
between national and European 
proceedings and, in particular, the risk of 
conflicting decisions associated with the 
competence the Commission shares with 
national courts in applying Article 85(1) 
and 86. The court referred to certain 
principles on the avoidance of conflicting 
decisions. These are restated in the 
Commission's notice on cooperation 
between national courts in applying 
Aticles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (OJ 
C 39, 13.2.1993) (at paragraphs 18, 19 
and 33). These principles are worth citing 
here. 
In Stergio Delimitis v. Henniger Brau 
[1991] ECR 1-935, the ECJ held that: 
"conflicting decisions would be contrary 
to the general principle of legal certainty 
and must, therefore, be avoided when 
national courts give decisions on 
agreements or practices which may 
subsequently be the subject of a decision 
by the Commission..." 
This was consistent with the ECJ's 
decision in Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt 
Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199: 
"Divergences between courts in the 
Member States as to the validity of 
Community acts would be liable to place 
in jeopardy the very unity of the 
Community legal order and detract from 
the fundamental requirement of legal 
certainty." 
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Also, Advocate General Van Gerven in H 
J Banks & Co. Ltd. v. British Coal 
Corporation [1994] ECR 1209 stated that: 
"the duty of cooperation which.... Article 
5 of the EEC Treaty imposes on the 
national court (and which applies 
expressly to acts of the institutions) 
entails for the national court the 
obligation in relation to a decision 
adopted by the Commission and relied 
upon or challenged by the parties before 
the court, to mitigate as far as possible in 
the interests of the Community the risk of 
a ruling that conflicts with that decision." 
The High Court also quoted a number of 
English authorities in support of the 
proposition that the English court should 
order a stay, where to do otherwise 
would run the risk of conflicting with the 
Commission's decision. 
The High Court's Conclusions 
On the basis of the above, the High 
Court concluded the following: 
1. The English courts should take all 
reasonable steps to avoid or reduce the 
risk of arriving at a conclusion which is 
at variance with a decision of, or on 
appeal from, the Commission in relation 
to competition law. 
2. Except in the clearest cases of breach 
or non­breach, it will be a proper 
exercise of discretion to stay proceedings 
in the English courts to await the 
outcome of the European proceedings. 
3. It follows that if as a matter of public 
policy national courts are required to stay 
proceedings pending the resolution of 
European competition proceedings, then 
the latter should have a major impact in 
proceedings before the national court 
(otherwise there is no point in there being 
a stay). 
4. Where, as here, the parties have 
disputed the same issues before the 
Commission and have had real and 
reasonable opportunities to appeal from 
an adverse decision, there is no injustice 
in obliging them to accept the result 
obtained in Europe. Therefore, whether 
expressed in terms of res judicata or 
abuse of process, it would be contrary to 
public policy to allow persons who have 
been involved in competition proceedings 
in Europe to deny in the English courts 
the correctness of the conclusions reached 
in Europe. It would be an abuse of 
process to allow the defendants to mount 
a collateral attack on the Commission 
decision in proceedings against any party 
before any national court. 
5. Thus the Commission Decision, the 
judgment of the CFI and/or the opinion 
of the AG and the judgment in the ECJ 
are conclusive of facts and issues in the 
relevant national proceedings. The 
defendants, being addressees of these 
decisions are bound by them. The issue 
of whether such decisions were 
admissible did not arise in this case, but 
the court held that a stay of the national 
proceedings followed by mere 
admissibility of the result in Europe 
would enable at least one of the parties to 
plead arguments as to why the 
Commission, the CFI and the ECJ were 
wrong. This goes against the cases cited 
above. C. MITROPOULOS [694J0018] 
Other Judgements 
Extracts are published in the weekly 
publication " Les activités de la Cour 
de Justice et du Tribunal de 
Première Instance des CE", 
available on-line from the RAPID 
database, a few days after its 
publication. 
Conclusions de M. CO. Lenz du 25 
avril 1996 : Aff.C­73/95 Ρ Viho Europe 
BV / Commission; Pourvoi contre l'arrêt 
du Tribunal, rendu le 12 janvier 1995, 
dans l'affaire T­102/92 ­ Annulation de 
la décision de la Commission rejetant la 
plainte de VIHO visant à faire constater 
une infraction à l'art. 85, par. 1, du traité 
CE de la part de Parker Pen (IV/32.725 
­ VIHO/Parker Pen II) ­ Obligation 
imposée par la société mère à ses filiales 
de se limiter à leur zone de distribution 
Arret de la Cour du 2/5/96: Aff. C­18/94 
Barbara Hopkins e.a. / National Power 
pic e.a.; Préjudicielle; Traite CECA 
Discriminations entre producteurs 
Application des art. 4 et 63 du traite. 
Effet direct ­ Abus de position 
dominante Art. 86 du traite Reparation 
des dommages resultant de la violation 
de ces dispositions Competences 
respectives de la Commission et du juge 
national; (Sixième chambre) 
Conclusions de M. D. Ruiz­Jarabo 
Colomer du 27/6/1996 Aff. C­333/94­P; 
Tetra Pak International SA / 
Commission ; Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal dans l'affaire T­83/91 opposant 
Tetra Pak International à la Commission 
­ Refus d'annuler la décision 
92/163/CEE de la Commission relative à 
une procédure d'application de l'art. 86. 
Ordonnance du Tribunal du 3 juin 1996, 
Aff. T­41/96 R Bayer AG / Com­
mission; Concurrence, Procédure de 
référé; Sursis à exécution 
Arrêt du Tribunal du 11 juillet 1996, 
Aff. T­528/93, T­543/93, T­546/93 
Métropole Télévision / Commission; 
Annulation de la décision (CEE) 403/93 
de la Commission du 11 juin 1993 ­
inapplicabilité de l'art 85 § 1 aux 
disposition statutaires de l'UER­
Restrictions dans l'accès au marché des 
spectatcles sportifs retransmis en 
Eurovision. 
Conclusions de M. Tesauro du 9 juillet 
1996 Aff. C­282/95­P Guérin 
Automobiles / Commission 
Conclusions de M. Lenz du 11 juillet 
1996, Aff. C­264/95 Ρ Commission / 
UIC Billets de transports ferroviaires 
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Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 
Main developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
Kristin SCHREIBER, DG IV-B-4 
NUMBER OF CASES AND 
DECISIONS 
The second quarter of 1996 has seen 
an increase in the number of 
decisions taken by the Commission 
under the Merger Regulation. 
Between Is' April and 22nd July, the 
Commission took 54 decisions under 
the Regulation. This total includes 
one prohibition decision under Article 
8 ( 3 ) of t he R e g u l a t i o n 
(Gencor/Lonrho), three decisions 
under Article 8(2) of the Regulation 
(clearance with conditions and 
obligations : Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz and 
Holland Media Groep; clearance 
without conditions : Shell / 
Montecatini- the two latter decisions 
replacing earlier decisions adopted by 
the Commission) as well as four 
decisions under Article 6(1 )(c) of the 
Regulation to begin in depth "Phase 
2" investigations into cases on which 
the Commission had serious doubts 
(Ciba-Geigy / Sandoz, Telefonica / 
Sogecable / Cablevision, Kesko / 
Tuko and Saint Gobain / Wacker 
Chemie /NOM). 
This brought the total number of 
cases on which decisions have been 
taken during the first half of 1996 
(up to 31s' July) to 73. 
Gencor/Lonrho 
Following five months of detailed 
investigations, the Commission 
decided on 24lh April 1996 to declare 
incompatible with the common 
market the proposed merger in the 
platinum sector between Impala 
Platinum, controlled by the South 
African company Gencor and Lonrho 
platinum division (LPD), a South 
African subsidiary of the British 
Company Lonrho PLC. 
Both Gencor and Lonrho have 
substantial operations in the European 
Union. The Commission considered 
that the merger would lead to the 
creation of a duopoly dominating the 
world market for platinum and 
rhodium as a result of which 
effective competition would be 
significantly impeded in the common 
market within the meaning of Article 
2(3) of the Merger Regulation. 
The parties have - seen relatively -
lower market shares in the Common 
market than in other parts of the 
world and have argued that the 
operation would, therefore, only have 
a minor impact on the common 
market. However, the platinum 
market is a world market and prices 
for platinum are set at the world 
market level . Therefore, 
anticompetitive effects of the 
operation in the platinum market 
would be felt in the European 
Community, for example through 
higher prices, for all the platinum sold 
in Europe. 
The merger between Gencor and 
Lonrho would have enabled these two 
companies to reach roughly equal 
market shares in the platinum market 
as the other South African Group 
Amplats (Anglo American Platinum 
Corporation); i.e. approximately 35% 
each, the other major supplier being 
Russia with an approximate market 
share of 25%. Half of the Russian 
supplies come from stocks. 
In addition to this situation with 
regard to market shares, it has to be 
noted that the market for platinum has 
special features which increase the 
potential for the existence of a 
dominant duopoly : 
1) Only 20% of the trade in platinum 
is transacted in the exchanges of 
London, New York and Tokyo. The 
bulk (80%) of the trade is determined 
by long-term contracts. 
2) The demand for platinum in its 
three major fields of application is 
inelastic at current prices since there 
are virtually no substitutes for 
platinum. The three major uses for 
platinum are jewellery (38%), the 
manufacturing of motor car catalytic 
converters (32%) and industrial 
catalysis applications (20%), 
particularly in chemicals, glass 
manufacturing and the production of 
liquid crystals for television and 
computer screens. 
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3) Purchasers have a very limited 
margin for negotiations and clearly 
no countervailing buyer power. 
4) On the supply side, the absence of 
genuine alternatives is an important 
factor, especially given the 
distribution of world reserves. The 
South African groups control 90% of 
world reserves, the remaining 10% 
being located in Russia. 
Since Russia started in 1990 to lower 
its stock levels, these stocks may be 
reduced to almost zero by the end of 
the century. 
5) Over recent years two main 
elements have contributed to the 
relative fall in platinum price : the 
Russian stock liquidation and 
Lonrho's relatively low production 
costs. Lonrho's absorption in the 
planned merger would therefore have 
led to less competition in the market. 
It is worth underlining that, from the 
outset of the procedure, the South 
African Authorities have been kept 
informed by the Commission of 
developments in this case and have 
attended the hearings organised in 
Brussels. 
Ciba-GeigyISandoz 
On 17lh July, after four months of 
extensive investigations, the 
Commission approved the proposed 
merger between Ciba-Geigy and 
Sandoz into Novartis. The decision 
was granted under the condition that 
the parties comply with an 
undertaking given in the area of 
animal health. 
The activities of Ciba-Geigy and 
Sandoz overlap in four areas : health 
care (where Novartis will become the 
second largest producer behind Glaxo 
Wellcome), animal health (number 2 
behind Pfizer), crop protection 
(number 1) and seeds (number 2 
behind Pioneer). Ciba has an 
aggregate worldwide turnover of 
ECU 13.1 billion, Sandoz of ECU 
9.1 billion. 
The Commission decided to open 
proceedings on 2nd May because of 
serious concerns with regard to the 
merger's compatibility with the 
Common Market. At that time, it 
could not be excluded that the merger 
would lead to the creation of 
dominant positions in a number of 
markets, not least because of its 
complexity and because of the 
combination of Ciba-Geigy's and 
Sandoz tremendous research and 
development potential. Further 
investigations eliminated all but one 
of these concerns. Indeed, while 
over 100 affected markets were 
ident i f ied , the merger is 
predominantly of a complementary 
nature. 
Even in overlapping markets, market 
share additions were found, in most 
cases, not to be significant and where 
they are, the merger will nevertheless 
not lead to a dominant position. 
Novartis will continue to face 
competition in all areas from a 
number of major competitors, 
including Glaxo Wellcome, Upjohn 
Pharmacia, Bayer, BASF, Agrevo, 
Rhône-Poulenc and many others. 
The presence of these competitors 
and the real possibility of market 
entry as well as the price restraining 
effects of generics (both in the health 
care and the crop protection area) 
will ensure that markets remain 
dynamic. 
The Commission also examined very 
closely the R&D activities of the 
merging parties. While the merger 
will result in a significant combined 
R&D potential - Novartis having for 
instance twice as large a potential as 
the next competitor in crop protection 
R&D - it was considered that enough 
other companies have the required 
"critical mass" at their disposal to 
alleviate concerns. 
Commission's investigations in the 
R&D area focused on developments 
in the field of gene technology and 
gene therapy in which the parties have 
a particular strength. In the course of 
its investigations, the Commission 
established that the two companies 
could, as a result of holdings in U.S. 
companies, have exclusive access to a 
combination of possible future patents 
in the area of particular gene therapies 
for brain and other tumours which 
might result in foreclosure effects. 
However, given a number of 
uncertainties linked notably to the 
unclear patent situation (the patents in 
question have not yet been granted), 
as well as to doubts about the success 
of the method of treatment and about 
the possibility of technically 
circumventing the patents, the 
Commission concluded that it can not 
be said with sufficient probability that 
the merger will lead to the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position 
on any future market. However, the 
Commission has taken note that the 
merging parties have declared their 
readiness to use their influence so that 
non-exclusive licenses shall be 
granted for those possible future 
patents which might cause the 
foreclosure. 
The remaining competition concern 
related to the market for small animal 
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ectoparasiticides (SAE), mainly 
products for treatment of fleas and 
ticks in cats and dogs. 
This market can be split in two ways 
: according to the place where the 
product is administered (the animal 
or the environment) and according to 
the nature of the product (" 
adulticides" killing mostly adult 
parasites and Insect Growth 
Regulators (IGR's) which interrupt 
the reproductive cycle of the 
parasite). 
Adulticides and IGR's cannot be 
considered as full substitutes. The 
merging parties will have a 
particularly strong position in the 
important IGR market segment. 
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz control three 
out of the five worldwide available 
active substances. 
In terms of the SAE market's 
development, access to IGR active 
ingredients is crucial for competitors' 
ability to develop IGR products. 
Access to one active ingredient of 
Sandoz (methoprene) has been of 
particular importance to competitors. 
In order to solve the identified 
competition problem, the parties have 
undertaken to grant non-exclusive 
licenses for methoprene and to supply 
the licensees with this active 
ingredient until the commencement of 
production by the licensee, but for a 
maximum period of 2 years. 
Subject to the condition of full 
compliance with this commitment 
made by the parties, the Commission 
declared the concentration compatible 
with the Common Market and with 
the functioning of the EEA 
agreement. 
Bosch/Allied Signal 
On 10,h April 1996, the Commission 
approved the acquisition by Robert 
Bosch GmbH of Allied Signal's total 
worldwide hydraulic brakes business, 
including anti-block systems (ABS) 
for hydraulic brakes. While Bosch 
does not manufacture hydraulic 
brakes and related components, 
Allied Signal reaches slightly over 
30% market share in the "actuation 
systems" market (behind the leading 
ITT and ahead of Lucas) and just 
under 20% in the "foundation 
systems" market (after Lucas and 
ITT). 
The Commission particularly 
examined the market for ABS for 
hydraulic brakes for which Bosch has 
an EEA market share of 50% (30% 
on a worldwide basis) a share which 
has, however, been continuously 
diminishing. Allied Signal only has 
low market shares, both on a 
worldwide basis and in the EEA. 
Apart from ITT, none of Bosch's 
competitors in the EEA market 
(Kelsey-Hayes, Nissin Kogyo and 
Lucas) reach market shares of over 
5%. The Commission concluded that 
the concentration would not create or 
strengthen a dominant position of 
Bosch because of ITT's significant 
and increasing market share nor 
would it lead to an anticompetitive 
oligopoly consisting of Bosch and 
ITT. 
Indeed, the demand side of the ABS 
market is very powerful. In addition, 
ABS are an inhomogeneous, very 
complex technical product, in which 
there is constant innovation and 
where special instructions from car 
manufacturers play an important role. 
It is a market characterized by great 
uncertainty about future trends which 
can therefore be expected to give rise 
to an intensification of competition. 
This market analysis of the 
Commission was to a certain extent 
confirmed by the decision of Lucas 
and Värity to enter into a full merger 
which was approved by the 
Commission on 15th July. Although 
Värity, through its subsidiary Kelsey-
Hayes is the world's largest producer 
of ABS, its current market share in 
Europe is indeed just under 5%, with 
Lucas reaching an even lower share. 
It is therefore expected that the 
merger will provide the new entity 
with the potential to compete 
effectively with the leading integrated 
brakes manufacturers and in particular 
with Bosch and ITT. 
Holland Media Groep (HMG) 
On 17lh July 1996 the Commission 
approved the Dutch TV joint venture 
Holland Media Groep SA (HMG) in 
a modified form. Initially HMG had 
been set up as a joint venture between 
RTL4 SA (RTL), Vereniging 
Veronica Omroeporganisa t ie 
( V e r o n i c a ) and E n d e m o l 
Entertainment Holding BV (Endemol) 
for the operation of the three Dutch 
general interest channels RTL4, RTL5 
and Veronica. Following an in depth 
investigation, on 20lh September 1995, 
the Commission declared this 
operation - which had already been 
completed - incompatible with the 
common market. 
The Commission's investigation of 
this case was initiated following a 
request from the Dutch government to 
this effect, based on Article 22 of the 
Merger Regulation. Since the 
required turnover thresholds set out in 
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the Merger Regulation were not 
reached by the parties, the 
Commission would, in the absence of 
the Dutch request, have had no 
jurisdiction to deal with the case. 
However, given that there is no 
suspension effect for cases under 
Article 22, the parties had been 
entitled to complete the operation. 
In its decision of 20th September the 
Commission concluded that the HMG 
joint venture would lead to the 
creation of a dominant position on 
the TV advertising market in The 
Netherlands and to the strengthening 
of Endemol's already existing 
dominant position on the Dutch TV 
production market. 
As a reaction to the Commission's 
Article 8.3 decision, Endemol 
completely withdrew its participation 
in HMG. Furthermore, HMG entered 
into the commitment vis-à-vis the 
Commission to transform RTL5 from 
a general interest channel into a news 
channel. 
The withdrawal of Endemol from 
HMG has removed the structural link 
between the largest Dutch TV 
producer and the leading commercial 
TV broadcaster in The Netherlands, 
a link which resulted in the 
strengthening of Endemol's dominant 
position. 
After the withdrawal, HMG will no 
longer have the preferential access to 
Endemol's productions. In addition, 
the withdrawal from HMG also 
allowed Endemol to set up a new 
sports channel in The Netherlands, 
together with other parties. 
Furthermore, after the transformation 
of RTL5 into a news channel, HMG 
will only operate two general interest 
channels with coordinated program 
schedules, giving thereby more room 
for competing general interest 
channels. Finally, the largest part of 
the current market shares of RTL5 in 
the TV advertising market will be 
probably set free for competition. 
Taking also into account the future 
market entry of the new sports 
channel, it can be expected that the 
current market share of HMG in TV 
advertising will decrease to a level 
which would be close to the position 
of RTL4 and RTL5 before the 
creation of HMG which was around 
50%. 
In view of the modifications of the 
joint venture and on the basis of 
HMG's commitment vis-à-vis the 
Commission with regard to RTL5, 
the Commission was now able to 
declare the concentration compatible 
with the common market and to 
adopt a decision based on Article 8.2 
of the Regulation. 
Amendment of Shell'Montecatini 
Decision 
On 24lh April 1996, the Commission 
decided to amend its Decision 94/811 
EC of 8.6.1994 which had authorized 
the establishment of Montell, a joint 
venture in the polyolefins sector 
between Shell and Montedison, 
subject to conditions and obligations 
corresponding to commitments given 
by the parties. In its initial Decision, 
the Commission considered that, as a 
result of the establishment of 
Montell, two fully-owned subsidiaries 
of the Royal Dutch/Shell group of 
companies would be linked with the 
two leading technologies for the 
manufacture of polypropylene (PP). 
These were : Montedison's Spheripol 
technology and the Unipol 
technology developed by Union 
Carbide Corporation (UCC) and Shell 
Oil, a Royal Dutch/Shell US 
subsidiary. In particular, Shell would 
be the industrial leader of Montell, 
which would develop and market 
Spheripol, while Shell Oil would be 
an important contributor to the Unipol 
technology package through the 
supply of catalysts. 
In the Commission's view, Royal 
Dutch Shell's control over the 
competitive behaviour of its two 
subsidiaries would affect the rivalry 
between Spheripol and Unipol, which 
was the main competitive relationship 
on the market for the licensing of PP 
technology and associated services. 
Other existing PP technology 
providers or potential entrants into the 
market were not likely to represent a 
significant constraint on the exercise 
of market power by the parties in the 
short to medium term. For these 
reasons, the Commission concluded 
that the notified concentration would 
lead to dominance on the PP 
t e c h n o l o g y market un less 
Montedison's PP technology business 
would be kept separate from Montell. 
The Decision, therefore, contained a 
condition which required that 
Montedison's Polypropylene (PP) 
technology business would remain 
outside Montell and would be 
transferred to a separate company, 
Technipol. 
However, after the adoption of the 
original decision, Shell Oil divested 
all its interests and assets in the PP 
technology business to Union Carbide 
Corporation (UCC), including its 
interests and assets in the Unipol 
technology business. In the light of 
these developments, the parties asked 
the Commission to review its original 
Decision, in order to assess whether 
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the separation of Montedison's PP 
technology business from Montell 
was still necessary. 
The Commission's investigation 
showed that, following the 
divestiture, Unipol would fall outside 
the scope of influence of Shell and 
UCC would be endowed with all the 
necessary assets and resources to 
continue competing effectively 
against Technipol on the market. 
The divestiture of Shell Oil's business 
on its own would therefore ensure 
that the creation of Montell would 
not lead to a dominant position on 
the market for the licensing of PP 
technology. The separation of 
Montedison's PP technology business 
from Montell was therefore no longer 
a necessary condition from the point 
of view of Community competition 
law. 
On this basis, the Commission 
amended its original decision by 
revoking the conditions and 
obligations relating to Montedison's 
PP technology business. The 
possibility for such a review was 
expressly provided in the original 
Decision itself (par. 118). 
GEHEILloyds Chemists (Referred 
to UK) 
On 22nd March 1996, the 
Commission decided that the public 
bid by GEHE for Lloyds Chemists 
should be referred to the UK 
Competition Authorities for further 
investigation. At that time, Lloyds 
was already subject to a bid by 
UniChem, another leading British 
chemist. This parallel UniChem bid 
for Lloyds did not fall under the 
Merger Regulation and had already 
been referred by the UK Competition 
Authorities to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC). 
Referral of the GEHE/Lloyds case to 
the UK Authorities therefore 
presented the advantage of allowing 
both bids to be examined by the 
same regulatory authority on a 
coordinated timeframe. 
Lloyds owns the second largest (after 
Boots) chain of retail pharmacies in 
the UK with over 900 outlets and has 
in recent years entered the business 
of pharmaceutical wholesaling, now 
being the third largest UK 
wholesaler. Through its AAH 
subsidiary, GEHE is the largest 
pharmaceutical wholesaler in the UK 
and, at the retail level, GEHE also 
owns a large chain of some 360 retail 
pharmacies. UniChem is the second 
largest UK wholesaler and owns a 
chain of around 400 retail 
pharmacies. 
On 19"' July, the UK Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry 
announced that DTI accepted the 
conclusion reached by MMC that 
both the UniChem and the GEHE bid 
for Lloyds would operate against the 
public interest in the wholesale 
pharmaceutical market. (The retail 
pharmacy sector is not expected to be 
adversely affected by either merger). 
It was decided by the UK that neither 
merger could go ahead unless 
UniChem and GEHE undertook, by 
18,h October, first to divest certain 
pharmaceut ica l wholesal ing 
businesses operated by Lloyds and, 
second, identified, within the same 
deadline, a firm buyer or buyers with 
whom agreements in principle have 
been reached to purchase the depots 
concerned. Those buyers would have 
to be unconnected with the company 
acquiring Lloyds and should be 
capable of running the depots as 
effective full-line wholesaling 
businesses. Buyers will have to be 
approved by the Secretary of Trade 
and Industry. He announced that if 
no such undertakings are given or if 
no suitable buyers are identified by 
the cut-off date, either or both 
mergers will be blocked. 
It is worth underlining that, with 
regard to the substance of the issue, 
the conclusion reached by MMC is 
fully consistent with the result of the 
Commission's investigations. 
Telefonica I Sogecable I Cablevision 
On 26th July 1995 Telefonica and 
Sogecable together with Canal Plus, 
Spain agreed to merge their activities 
relating to the supply of services to 
operators of cable, audiovisual and 
television services in a joint venture, 
Cablevision. This joint venture also 
has indirect effects on the voice 
telephony and data communications 
markets. At the time, the companies 
concerned considered the operation to 
be of a purely national dimension and 
no notification was made to the 
Commission. On 1st March 1996, the 
Spanish Government authorized 
Cablevision as a concentration with 
national dimension. The operation 
was completed and Cablevision has 
been active on the market for several 
months. However, the Commission 
took the view that the operation 
required notification under the Merger 
Regulation (see also below) and the 
parties finally submitted a notification 
on 31st May. On 19th July 1996, the 
Commission decided to initiate an in 
depth investigation of the operation 
because of serious doubts with regard 
to its compatibility with the common 
market. The Commission notably 
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believes that the concentration could, 
on the one hand, lead to foreclosure 
effects by preventing market entry of 
new competitors into the market of 
services to operators of cable, 
audiovisual and television services 
and, on the other hand, delay the 
effects of the forthcoming 
liberalisation of the market for voice 
telephony in Spain. The Commission 
initiated detailed "Phase 2" 
investigations in two other cases: 
K e s k o / T u k o a n d S a i n t 
Gobain/Wacker Chemie/NOM. 
Kesko/Tuko 
On 26 July the Commission decided 
to open proceedings on the 
acquisition of Tuko Oy by Kesko Oy. 
Kesko and Tuko are active in Finland 
in the wholesale and retail of daily 
consumer goods (both food and non-
food products) and specialty goods 
(including building materials, 
clothing, shoes and household 
electronics). 
As in the Holland Media Groep case, 
the Commission's investigation was 
initiated following a request from a 
Member State to this effect, based on 
Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. 
In the absence of the Finnish request, 
the Commission would have had no 
jurisdiction to deal with the case 
since both Kesko and Tuko achieve 
more than two thirds of their 
Community-wide turnover in one 
Member State, Finland. 
The decision to open proceedings 
was based on serious doubts as to the 
compatibility of the acquisition with 
the common market. During the 
detailed investigation of the case, 
particular attention will be devoted to 
the high market shares in the Finnish 
market, notably in the area of daily 
consumer goods. In addition, 
foreclosure effects for potential 
competitors wishing to enter the 
Finnish market as well as for 
suppliers of daily consumer goods 
cannot be excluded and will have to 
be closely examined. 
Saint-GobainlWacker Chemie/NOM 
On 31st July the Commission opened 
proceedings for a detailed 
investigation of the proposed joint 
venture between two subsidiaries of 
Saint-Gobain and Wacker Chemie 
and NOM (a private state-owned 
Dutch investment and development 
company) for the manufacture, 
processing, marketing and sale of 
silicon carbide. 
Silicon carbide is a synthetic, 
extremely hard and heat resistant 
mineral which is used among other 
application in the abrasives, the 
refractory and the iron and steel 
industry. 
The Commission is concerned that 
the proposed joint venture may lead 
to a dominant position in silicon 
carbide for abrasive and refractory 
applications in the EEA. The 
operation will, indeed, combine the 
two most important Western 
European producers of silicon 
carbide, under the leadership of 
Saint-Gobain, which will in this 
process become by far the largest 
producer of silicon for these 
applications in the EEA. Additional 
concerns stem from the fact that 
Saint-Gobain's silicon carbide 
business is vertically integrated and 
from the possibility that, if dominant 
positions were identified, this vertical 
integration could further distort 
competition. 
Key issues during the investigations 
will be the possibility to use 
substitutes for silicon carbide in 
abrasive and refractory applications as 
well as to source silicon carbide for 
these applications from outside the 
EEA. 
Final decisions on this case as well as 
on Kesko / Tuko and Telefonica / 
Sogecable / Cablevision shall be 
adopted by the Commission at the 
latest by end of November / beginning 
of December. 
COURT DECISION ON 
SOGECABLE 
On 12.07.1996 the Judge President of 
the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
decided to reject the request from 
Sogecable for interim measures by 
declaring the appeal irreceivable. 
Sogecable had brought action against 
the Commission before the CFI asking 
the Court to quash the Commission 
"decision" allegedly taken on 6.2.1996 
(letter from the Director General of 
DG IV informing the parties that, on 
the basis of the information in the 
Commission's possession, Cablevision 
was a concentration with a 
Community dimension within the 
meaning of the Merger Regulation) 
and subsequently requested interim 
measures under Articles 185 and 186 
of the Treaty. 
Sogecable notably asked the Court to 
decide that the Commission will not 
take any decision under the Merger 
Regulation in particular with regard to 
Articles 8, 13, 14 and 15 (definitive 
decisions on the compatibility of the 
concentration with the Common 
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Market or imposing fines to the 
undertakings) before the Court would 
rule on the validity of the acts 
challenged in the main appeal. 
The Court stated that when assessing 
the receivability of the appeal, it was 
first necessary to check whether the 
interim measures requested are 
compatible with the division of 
c o m p e t e n c i e s b e t w e e n t h e 
Community institutions and in 
particular between the Community 
Judiciary and the Commission. 
The President of the Court ruled that, 
in the context of interim measures, it 
is not possible for the Judge to take 
a decision that would impede the 
Commission to accomplish its powers 
of investigation and sanction 
immediately after the starting of an 
administrative procedure and even 
before the Commission has adopted 
the provisional or definitive decisions 
that the parties want to avoid. 
The Judge President stated that if the 
request of the plaintiff was accepted, 
the Judiciary would not be in the role 
of controlling the Commission but 
rather replacing the Commission in 
the exercise of its administrative 
functions. The granting of interim 
measures in the context of an 
administrative Commission procedure 
is only possible under exceptional 
circumstances that have to be proven 
by the parties. ■ 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's Press 
releases are available on-line from 
the RAPID database, on the day of 
their publication by the Commission's 
Spokesman's Service. To obtain 
access to RAPID, please write to 
EUR-OP Information, Marketing 
and Public Relations (OP/4B) 
2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, 
fax +352 2929 42763 
IP/96/283 : COMMISSION CLEARS 
ACQUISITION OF JOINT CONTROL 
OF SAP SOLUTIONS GMBH BY 
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM [96/04/02] 
IP/96/303 : THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES THE JOINT VENTURE 
OF ZENECA SEEDS AND 
VANDERHAVE [96/04/10] 
IP/96/304 COMMISSION APPROVES 
THE ACQUISITION BY BOSCH OF 
ALLIED SIGNAL'S HYDRAULIC 
BRAKE BUSINESS [96/04/10] 
IP/96/320 COMMISSION CLEARS 
KVAERNER'S BID FOR TRAFAL­
GAR HOUSE PLC [96/04/17] 
IP/96/323 THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE ACQUISITION OF 
JOINT CONTROL OF THE SWEDISH 
BUILDING MATERIALS COMPANY 
EUROC BYGGHANDEL [96/04/19] 
IP/96/334 THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS JOINT CONTROL OF 
SHEFFIELD FORGEMASTERS LTD 
BY NATWEST VENTURES LTD & 
SCHRODER VENTURE MANAGERS 
(GUERNSEY) LTD [96/04/25] 
IP/96/335 THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A JOINT VENTURE 
BETWEEN GEC ALSTHOM AND 
TARMAC [96/04/19] 
IP/96/346 THE COMMISSION 
OPPOSES THE MERGER OF THE 
PLATINUM OPERATIONS OF 
GENCOR AND LONRHO [96/04/24] 
IP/96/347 COMMISSION ALLOWS 
INCORPORATION OF MONTE­
DISON'S POLYPROPYLENE 
TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS INTO THE 
MONTELL JOINT VENTURE WITH 
SHELL [96/04/24] 
IP/96/382 COMMISSION OPENS 
DETAILED INVESTIGATION INTO 
CIBA­GEIGY/ SANDOZ MERGER 
[96/05/03] 
IP/96/385 THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES TAKEOVER BY KRUPP 
OF ACCIAI SPECIALI TERNI SPA 
(AST) [96/05/03] 
IP/96/386 THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS THE CREATION OF A 
JOINT VENTURE BY BHF­BANK 
AND CREDIT COMMERCIAL DE 
FRANCE [96/05/03] 
IP/96/426 COMMISSION CLEARS 
GEC/THOMSON JOINT VENTURE IN 
NON­MILITARY SONARS [96/05/20] 
IP/96/427 COMMISSION APPROVES 
JOINT VENTURE IN THE FIELD OF 
FLEXIBLE PACKAGING [96/05/20] 
IP/96/434 THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A JOINT VENTURE 
BETWEEN THOMSON S.A. AND 
DAIMLER­ BENZ AG [96/05/22] 
IP/96/435 THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS A CONCENTRATION IN 
THE BRITISH RAILWAYS SECTOR 
[96/05/22] 
IP/96/437 COMMISSION GIVES 
GO­AHEAD FOR ACQUISITION OF 
NUOVA TIRRENA BY TORO 
ASSICURAZIONI [96/05/23] 
IP/96/438 COMMISSION CLEARS 
THE CREATION OF A JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN HOECHST 
AND KLOCKNER WERKE [96/05/24] 
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IP/96/439 COMMISSION APPROVES 
ACQUISITION OF CONTROL OF 
MAZDA MOTOR CORPO­RATION 
BY FORD MOTOR CO.. [96/05/28] 
IP/96/471 THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES CREATION OF JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN EMERSON 
AND CATERPILLAR IN THE 
DIESEL GENSET SECTOR. [96/06/04] 
IP/96/483 THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A CONCENTRATION IN 
THE SPANISH SEED OIL SECTOR 
[96/06/10] 
IP/96/516 THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES CREATION OF JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN EXXON AND 
DSM IN THE METALLOCENE 
PLASTOMER AND POLYETHYLENE 
SECTORS [96/06/14] 
IP/96/527 COMMISSION APPROVES 
JOINT VENTURE IN BRICK 
INDUSTRY [96/06/18] 
IP/96/531 COMMISSION APPROVES 
THE MERGER OF SUN ALLIANCE 
GROUP AND ROYAL INSURANCE 
[96/06/20] 
IP/96/542 COMMISSION APPROVES 
A CONCENTRATION IN THE 
TEMPORARY PERSONNEL 
SERVICES SECTOR [96/06/25] 
IP/96/565 COMMISSION APPROVES 
ACQUISITION BY SARA LEE OF 
AOSTE HOLDING AND AL PONTE 
PROSCIUTTI [96/06/27] 
IP/96/567 COMMISSION CLEARS 
COOPERATION BETWEEN 
BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS 
AND DRESDNER BANK [96/06/28] 
IP/96/572 COMMISSION APPROVES 
THE CREATION OF A JOINT 
VENTURE BETWEEN 
BAYERNWERK AND GAZ DE 
FRANCE [96/07/02] 
IP/96/573 COMMISSION APPROVES 
THE ACQUISITION OF JOINT 
CONTROL OF BANQUE INDOSUEZ 
BY COMPAGNIE DE SUEZ AND 
THE CAISSE NATIONALE DU 
CREDIT AGRICOLE [96/07/02] 
IP/96/574 COMMISSION APPROVES 
JOINT VENTURE IN LUBRICATING 
OIL ADDITIVES [96/07/02] 
IP/96/601 COMMISSION APPROVES 
THE ACQUISITION OF POLIET BY 
SAINT­GOBAIN [96/07/04] 
IP/96/602 COMMISSION APPROVES 
JOINT VENTURE OF BAYER AND 
HUELS IN THE FIELD OF LATEX 
[96/07/04] 
IP/96/603 COMMISSION FINDS 
THAT THE ACQUISITION BY 
ISOVER ST. GOBAIN OF JOINT 
CONTROL OF BPB'S UK AND IRISH 
INSULATING PRODUCTS 
SUBSIDIARIES DOES NOT FALL 
UNDER THE MERGER 
REGULATION [96/07/04] 
IP/96/613 COMMISSION APPROVES 
CREATION OF JOINT ENTERPRISE 
INVOLVING IP GROUPE AND 
REUTERS [96/07/09] 
IP/96/628 COMMISSION PROPOSES 
TO REVISE RULES ON COMPANY 
MERGERS AND CONCENTRATIONS 
[96/07/10] 
IP/96/640 THE COMMISSION 
CLEARS A CONCENTRATION IN 
THE DUTCH INSURANCE 
MARKETS [96/07/12] 
IP/96/643 COMMISSION APPROVES 
THE MERGER BETWEEN LUCAS 
AND VÄRITY [96/07/15] 
IP/96/651 ATLAS­GLOB ALONE: 
COMMISSION GIVES GO­AHEAD 
TO GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICA­
TIONS ALLIANCE CONDITIONAL 
ON LIBERALISED REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK [96/07/17] 
IP/96/652 COMMISSION CLEARS 
MERGER BETWEEN CIBA­GEIGY 
AND SANDOZ AFTER AN 
UNDERTAKING BY THE PARTIES. 
[96/07/17] 
IP/96/653 COMMISSION APPROVES 
HOLLAND MEDIA GROEP IN ITS 
MODIFIED FORM [96/07/17] 
IP/96/677 COMMISSION STARTS 
ENQUIRY INTO CABLEVISION 
[96/07/22] 
IP/96/678 COMMISSION APPROVES 
ACQUISITION BY ENDERLY 
HOLDINGS LIMITED OF THE 
GROUP OF COMPANIES 
SAIA­BURGESS ELECTRONICS 
[96/07/22] 
IP/96/679 COMMISSION APPROVES 
TAKEOVER OF ALLDERS 
INTERNATIONAL BY SWISSAIR 
[96/07/22] 
IP/96/680 THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE CREATION OF A 
JOINT VENTURE COMPANY 
BETWEEN HOECHST AND 3M 
[96/07/22] 
IP/96/699 THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A CONCENTRATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL EXPRESS 
DELIVERY SECTOR [96/07/24] 
IP/96/705 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES THE ACQUISITION OF 
THE JOINT CONTROL OF THE 
GROUP SAINT­LOUIS [96/07/25] 
IP/96/717 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
JOINT VENTURE IN THE FIELD OF 
HOUSEHOLD PACKAGING 
PRODUCTS [96/07/26] 
IP/96/725 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
CREATION OF JOINT VENTURE 
COMPANY IN MID­STREAM 
NATURAL GAS [96/07/29] ■ 
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STATE AID 
Main developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
second quarter of 1996 
by Roland KOBIA, DG IV-G-1 
INTRODUCTION 
Pendant la période de référence 
(1/4/1996 à 30/6/1996) et pour ce qui 
concerne les textes de portée générale, 
la Commission a adopté une 
communication sur les aides d'Etat en 
relation avec les réductions du coût du 
travail (cfr infra). Elle est également 
sur le point d'adopter un encadrement 
sur les aides d'Etat aux entreprises 
situées dans des quartiers urbains 
défavorisés. En mai, les services de la 
Commission ont tenu avec les experts 
des Etats membres et de l'Autorité de 
Surveillance de l'AELE, une réunion 
multilatérale au cours de laquelle ont 
été discutés le projet de codification 
des règles en matière d'aides à finalité 
régionale, les futures lignes directrices 
en matière de ventes ou locations de 
terrain publics à des entreprises ainsi 
que la nécessité du maintien d'un 
régime particulier dans le secteur du 
textile/confection. La Commission est 
enfin en train de finaliser la 
constitution de son Cinquième "Rapport 
sur les aides d'Etat dans le secteur des 
produits manufacturés et certains autres 
secteurs de l'Union européenne" qui 
couvrira la période 1993-1994. La 
parution de ce dernier est prévue avant 
la fin 1996. 
Pour ce qui concerne les cas 
spécifiques, de nombreuses et 
importantes décisions ont été prises 
pendant la période de référence (cfr 
infra). Un fait marquant de cette 
période est assurément le nombre élevé, 
tant en termes relatif qu'absolu, de 
d é c i s i o n s f i na l e s n é g a t i v e s , 
conditionnelles ou mixtes. Cette 
tendance constitue une nouvelle 
confirmation de la volonté de la 
Commission de veiller à la stricte 
application des règles en matière d'aide 
d'Etat dans un contexte difficile de 
surenchère des interventions publiques. 
La C o m m i s s i o n e s t t o u t 
particulièrement attentive aux violations 
de l'obligation de notification contenue 
dans l'article 93§3 du traité CE et est 
résolue à user de tous les instruments 
nécessaires pour lui assurer un effet 
utile. 
TEXTE DE PORTEE GENERALE 
La communication de la Commission 
sur la réduction des coûts du travail 
en relation avec les aides d'Etat 
(Non encore publiée.) 
En juin, la Commission a adopté une 
communication confirmant et clarifiant 
sa position et son préjugé favorable, au 
titre des règles de concurrence en 
matière d'aides d'Etat, vis-à-vis des 
mesures publiques qui visent à réduire 
les coûts indirects du travail. Cette 
communication prend place dans le 
cadre du Livre Blanc "Croissance, 
Compétitivité, Emploi" ainsi que du 
Pacte de confiance pour l'emploi lancé 
par le Président J. Santer. 
La communication encourage les 
mesures de réduction des coûts du 
travail, notamment en faveur des bas 
salaires, dans la mesure où elles ne sont 
pas ciblées de manière spécifique sur 
des secteurs considérés comme 
sensibles, en situation de surcapacité ou 
en crise. L'expérience a cependant 
montré que ce sont ces secteurs qui sont 
le plus souvent visés par les mesures 
envisagées par les Etats membres. Or, 
des réductions sectoriellement ciblées 
ont généralement pour effet de 
transférer les difficultés et les problèmes 
de chômage vers les entreprises 
concurrentes qui ne bénéficient pas de 
telles mesures. Elles risquent d'avoir un 
impact négatif sur la compétitivité à 
long terme et donc sur l'emploi et 
d'entraîner une surenchère d'aides entre 
Etats membres. La Commission propose 
par conséquent des pistes alternatives 
visant le même objectif mais respectant 
le droit communautaire. Ainsi, les 
mesures de réduction du coût du travail 
ne relèveront pas de l'article 92§1 CE: 
a) lorsqu'elles s'appliquent à toutes les 
entreprises ou à certaines catégories de 
travailleurs seulement; b) lorsqu'elles 
tombent sous la règle de minimis (JOCE 
C68 du 6.3.1996); et c) lorsqu'elles 
concernent des activités ne faisant pas 
l'objet d'échanges entre Etats membres 
(les services de proximité notamment). 
Les autres mesures constitueront des 
aides d'Etat qui pourront, le cas échéant, 
être approuvées sur une base régionale 
(zones de développement), sociale 
(création d'emploi parmi les catégories 
les plus défavorisées) ou horizontale 
(PME). 
Cette communication présente un double 
intérêt. D'abord, elle contribue, dans le 
domaine social, à clarifier la notion 
d'"aide d'Etat" au sens de l'article 92§1 
CE par rapport à la notion de "mesure 
générale" visée notamment par les 
articles 101 et 102 CE. Ensuite, elle 
rend compte du soutien de la politique 
de concurrence aux objectifs 
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communautaires de lutte contre le 
chômage et d'amélioration de la 
compétitivité des entreprises. 
CAS SPECIFIQUES 
Les aides à la recherche-
développement 
Le cas Olivetti. (Aide d'Etat N812/95) 
En mai, la Commission a ouvert la 
procédure contradictoire de l'article 
93 §2 CE à l'encontre d'une aide 
proposée en faveur de l'entreprise 
Olivetti SpA pour le développement 
d'ordinateurs personnels multi-média 
pour usage individuel ou de groupe. Le 
projet s'inscrit dans un secteur qui fait 
clairement l'objet d'échanges entre Etats 
membres et où la concurrence entre 
opérateurs européens est importante 
(Siemens-Nixdorf et Vobis en 
Allemagne, ICL en Grande Bretagne, 
Bull en France). L'aide proposée 
consiste en un prêt à taux réduit de 37 
millions d'écus en 1996, couvrant 100% 
des coûts éligibles et remboursable sur 
une période de 10 ans. L'intérêt prévu 
pour le remboursement du prêt 
donnerait une intensité d'aide actualisée 
de 20,75%. La Commission a émis de 
sérieux doutes sur la nécessité de 
l'opération, considérant que le projet 
semble constituer une opération 
naturelle pour l'entreprise qui ne va pas 
au-delà des efforts normaux de 
recherche et développement (R&D). Le 
caractère incitatif de l'aide n'est donc 
pas encore démontré et il apparaît que 
l'entreprise pourrait en tout état de 
cause procéder à la réalisation de ce 
projet sans aide eu égard aux 
perspectives lucratives ouvertes dans ce 
domaine. 
L'intérêt de ce cas réside notamment 
dans le fait qu'il a permis un examen 
de ce qui est ou non une activité 
normale de R&D pour une entreprise 
active dans un secteur hautement 
concurrentiel et en développement très 
rapide, activité qui pourrait être 
conduite sans aides d'Etat; il a permis 
aussi un examen de la nature 
"précompétitive" d'un projet de R&D. 
Si les aides à la R&D jouissent 
généralement d'un préjugé favorable de 
la part de la Commission, cette dernière 
tient à éviter que les Etats membres 
n'utilisent cette voie afin d'octroyer des 
aides à des projets qui tiennent plus des 
aides à l'investissement normal ou pire 
encore au fonctionnement qu'à de 
véritables activités de R&D, 
particulièrement dans des secteurs de 
haute technologie comme les 
ordinateurs personnels ou les semi-
conducteurs. De telles aides peuvent se 
révéler particulièrement distorsives sur 
le commerce intra-communautaire. 
Transrapid. (Aide d'Etat N175b/94) En 
mai, la Commission a approuvé le 
programme allemand pour le 
développement du système ferroviaire 
Transrapid, basé sur la propulsion 
magnétique. L'apport public total du 
gouvernement allemand se monte à DM 
560 millions jusqu'à 1999, budget de 
développement qui constitue la 
continuation d'un programme de 
recherche commencé dans les années 
'70 dans le but de transporter passagers 
et fret à une vitesse comprise entre 300 
et 500 Km/h. 
L'aide a été approuvée car la 
Commission a acquis la conviction que 
ce projet allait au-delà du seul intérêt 
de l'industrie allemande et promouvait 
l ' i n t é r ê t c o m m u n a u t a i r e . Le 
gouvernement allemand a en effet 
ouvert l'accès des fonds publics à toute 
entreprise européenne intéressée à 
prendre part dans le projet de 
développement. 
Taxe parafiscale sur 
pétroliers au profit de l'Institut francais 
du Pétrole (IFP)(France). (Aide d'Etat 
C48/94) En mai, la Commission a 
décidé de clore la procédure de l'article 
93§2 CE ouverte à l'encontre de 
mesures en faveur d'industries de 
raffinage, pétrochimie et autres 
industries connexes, financées par une 
taxe parafiscale perçue sur certains 
produits pétroliers et versée à l'IFP. La 
Commission a considéré que les 
mesures ne constituaient pas des aides 
au sens de l'article 92§ 1 CE, après avoir 
notamment obtenu l'engagement des 
autorités françaises de supprimer 
l'exonération prévue pour les produits 
exportés. 
Cette décision est intéressante en ce 
qu'elle applique les dispositions de 
l'Encadrement des aides à la Recherche 
et Développement (JOCE C83 du 
11.4.1986) sur l'existence ou non d'une 
aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 92§1CE 
et éclaircit la position de la Commission 
vis-à-vis des aides parafiscales. La 
décision dispose que le mécanisme ne 
constitue une aide ni en faveur de l'IFP 
(en ce qu'il est un établissement de 
recherche public à but non lucratif), ni 
en faveur des entreprises bénéficiant in 
fine des résultats de la recherche menée 
par l'IFP (de par l'absence de 
discrimination dans l'accès aux résultats 
et de par la cession des résultais 
normalement au prix du marché). Ainsi, 
sur la base de données factuelles 
montrant que les entreprises étrangères 
sont dans ce cas des clients plus 
importants de l'IFP en termes de chiffre 
d'affaires que les entreprises françaises 
et outre l'absence d'aide au sens de 
l'article 92§1 CE, la Commission a 
estimé qu'en l'espèce la présomption de 
discrimination selon laquelle une taxe 
parafiscale finançant un régime d'aides 
bénéficie "par la force des choses" 
principalement aux entreprises 
nationales était renversée. 
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Les aides régionales 
La révision de. la carte 
luxembourgeoise. (Aide d'Etat N70/96) 
En mai, la Commission a approuvé, 
dans le cadre de l'article 93§3 CE, la 
nouvelle carte des zones de 
développement au Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg ainsi que les nouveaux 
taux d'intensité d'aide y afférents. La 
nouvelle carte est caractérisée par une 
réduction substantielle de la couverture 
de population nationale aux aides 
régionales (de 78,97% à 42,5%), du 
territoire couvert par ces aides (de 58% 
à 45%) ainsi que du nombre de 
communes éligibles (de 53% à 38%). 
De même, si les taux d'intensité d'aide 
faciaux sont restés les mêmes (17,5%-
20% et 25% bruts), ils ont néanmoins 
connu une baisse en termes relatifs. 
Cette décision est intéressante à 
plusieurs titres : elle marque la fin de 
l'exercice de révision des cartes des 
zones de développement de tous les 
Etats membres (même si de nouvelles 
révisions sont entre-temps déjà prévues 
en Italie, au Danemark et en 
Allemagne); elle confirme la politique 
générale de la Commission en matière 
de réduction des couvertures de 
population aux aides régionales (faisant 
ainsi application du principe de 
concentration des aides) ainsi que des 
taux maxima d'intensité d'aide; elle 
assure enfin une plus grande cohérence 
géographique entre les interventions des 
objectifs régionaux des Fonds 
structurels et celles des autorités 
publiques nationales. 
Les aides dans les secteurs encadrés 
Le secteur automobile 
VolkswagenIMoselandChemnitz. (Aide 
d'Etat C62/91 - ex NN75, 77, 78, 
79/91). En juin, la Commission a pris 
sur ce cas une décision finale 
partiellement négative. Le cas concerne 
une aide de DM 779,8 millions que les 
autorités allemandes envisagaient 
d'octroyer à Volkswagen, sous le 
couvert d'aides à finalité régionale (les 
régions de Mosel et Chemnitz étant des 
zones éligibles sur la base de l'article 
92§3.a CE), sous forme de subventions 
directes, d'amortissements spéciaux et 
de remboursements d'impôts sur le 
bénéfice. L'intensité de l'aide envisagée 
s'élevait à 30,5% à Mosel et 27,3% à 
Chemnitz. Suite à une analyse 
coûts/bénéfices comparative destinée à 
mesurer la proportionnalité entre l'aide 
proposée et les problèmes régionaux, la 
Commission en a conclut que l'intensité 
du handicap régional s'élevait à 22,3% 
pour Mosel et 20,8% pour Chemnitz. 
Ainsi, une aide à un tel investissement 
dans un secteur souffrant de surcapacité 
structurelle a été considérée comme 
devant s'en tenir à ce qui est 
strictement nécessaire pour compenser 
le handicap régional respectif des deux 
sites. La Commission a finalement 
décidé d'approuver DM 539,1 millions 
et de refuser le reste du montant 
proposé, ie 240,7 millions, ce montant 
ayant été considéré incompatible avec 
l'article 92§3.c CE pour non respect du 
critère de proportionnalité. 
Deux éléments intéressants de ce cas 
résident dans la définition d'un 
greenfield project dans l'analyse 
coût/bénéfice et dans la question de la 
capacité. Pour ce qui concerne le 
premier point, les handicaps 
d'exploitation de 5 années seront pris 
en considération par comparaison avec 
une expansion, alors que seules les 
trois premières années de production 
sont prises en compte. Pour ce qui 
concerne le second point, la 
Commission considère maintenant que 
le marché des voitures normales 
passagers souffre de surcapacité 
structurelle avec la conséquence que les 
aides d'Etat ne pourront être approuvées 
dans ce segment qu'à hauteur du 
handicap régional calculé dans l'analyse 
coût/bénéfice. 
Mercedez-Benzl Ludwigsfelde (MBL). 
(Aide d'Etat ,C61/91 - ex NN74, 80/91). 
En juin, la Commission a pris une autre 
décision partiellement négative dans le 
secteur automobile. Suite à l'intention 
des autorités allemandes d'octroyer une 
aide à la restructuration de DM 132,8 
millions en faveur d'un projet 
d'investissement (de DM 239,8 millions) 
à Ludwigsfelde, la Commission a 
identifié trois types d'intervention : une 
compensation des pertes par la 
Treuhandanstal t , des prêts à 
l'investissement, des subventions 
régionales ainsi qu'un élément d'aide 
dans la vente de participations. Dans 
son analyse de la compatibilité des 
aides, la Commission les a considérées 
comme des aides à la restructuration 
devant être analysées à la lumière des 
conditions contenues dans les lignes 
directrices sur les aides d'Etat au 
sauvetage et à la restructuration. (JOCE 
C368 du 23.12.1994) La vérification des 
conditions de viabilité à long terme 
endéans une période raisonnable, de non 
affectation des conditions de 
concurrence par le biais de réductions 
de capacité et de proportionnalité entre 
l'aide et les coûts et bénéfices de la 
restructuration, ont ainsi amené la 
Commission à accepter l'aide à hauteur 
de DM 124,3 millions. La réduction de 
capacité s'est faite à un niveau similaire 
à l'intensité de l'aide (51,8% pour cette 
dernière et 48,6% pour la première). Les 
DM 8,6 millions restants et constitués 
du prix de vente des participations ont, 
eux, été considérés comme non 
proportionnels avec les coûts et 
bénéfices du plan de restructuration et, 
par là, refusés pour incompatibilité avec 
l'article 92§3.c CE. Leur valeur avait en 
effet été estimée à DM 16,47 millions 
alors que MBL avait payé le portefeuille 
7,9 millions. 
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Les fibres synthétiques 
La Seda de Barcelona. (Aide d'Etat 
C56/94) En avril, la Commission a 
adopté une décis ion finale 
conditionnelle à l'encontre d'aides non 
notifiées octroyées par les autorités 
espagnoles à l'entreprise productrice de 
fibres synthétiques La Seda de 
Barcelona. La décision d'approbation a 
été prise sur la base de trois éléments 
principalement. D'abord, l'entreprise, 
dans le cours de la procédure de 
l'article 93 §2 du traité CE, a fourni un 
plan de restructuration qui doit 
permettre de revenir à la viabilité 
endéans une période raisonnable. 
Ensuite, la capacité de production totale 
de l'entreprise -pour ce qui concerne les 
produits tombant dans le champ 
d'application de l'encadrement des aides 
dans le secteur des fibres synthétiques 
(JOCE C346 du 30.12.01992 prolongé 
par JOCE C224 du 12.8.1994) - devait 
être réduite de 25%, ce qui a été 
considéré comme "significatif' par la 
Commission. Cette considération est 
fondée sur la viabilité probable à long-
terme de l'entreprise, sur sa localisation 
dans une zone de développement et sur 
le fait que les changements vont aboutir 
à une réduction nette de la capacité 
productive dans l'Espace Economique 
Européen d'environ 1%, améliorant par 
là le taux moyen d'utilisation des 
capacités pour les produits en cause. 
Enfin, l'aide est limitée au minimum 
nécessaire pour mener à bien la 
restructuration, le critère de nécessité 
étant ainsi rempli. L'approbation de 
l'aide a toutefois été soumise à la 
fourniture par les autorités espagnoles 
d'un rapport annuel démontrant la 
pleine application du plan de 
restructuration. 
Ce cas montre à nouveau que le terme 
"significatif' utilisé dans l'encadrement 
des fibres synthétiques est une notion 
qui doit être interprétée au cas par cas 
sur la base des mérites propres de 
l'affaire et nécessite des analyses 
économiques approfondies menées par 
la Commission, avec le cas échéant 
l'aide d'experts indépendants. 
Le secteur sidérurgique (traité CECA) 
Walzwerk ¡Isenburg GmbH. (Aide 
d'Etat Cl 1/95 - ex N777/94). En mai, 
la Commission a adopté une décision 
finale négative à l'égard d'aides d'Etat 
proposées par le gouvernement 
allemand à l'entreprise en question sous 
forme d'un subside à l'investissement 
de DM 5,85 millions et d'un abattement 
fiscal de DM 0,9 million. En effet, la 
base juridique permettant l'approbation 
d'aides régionales à l'investissement 
dans le secteur sidérurgique n'était plus 
applicable, le délai utile étant forclos. Il 
faut rappeler à cet égard que sous le 
traité CECA, toute aide à l'industrie 
sidérurgique est prohibée. Face à ce 
principe d'incompatibilité plus rigide 
que sous le traité CE, le Code des aides 
à la sidérurgie (JOCE L362 du 
31.12.1991 ) permettait toutefois l'octroi 
d'aides dans certains cas particuliers 
tels les activités de R&D. 
Le même Code permettait également 
des aides régionales à l'investissement 
sur le territoire de l'ex RDA. 
Cependant, cette dernière possibilité 
ex i s ta i t un iquemen t jusqu 'au 
31.12.1994, les notifications devant être 
déposées à la Commission au plus tard 
le 30.6.1994. Or, dans le cas d'espèce, 
la notification a été enregistrée en date 
du 25.11.1994, trop tard pour que la 
Commission puisse terminer la 
procédure de l'article 6§3 du Code 
(consultation des Etats membres) et 
prendre une décision avant le 
31.12.1994. 
Le raisonnement utilisé dans le cas 
d'espèce est similaire à celui que la 
Commission a développé dans les cas 
Halyvourgia Thessalia, Reinwald 
Recycling et Hansa Chemie Abbruch. 
Les aides dans les secteurs non 
encadrés. 
Chaussure 
Intervention extraordinaire au soutien 
de la production et de l'emploi (Italie). 
(Aide d'Etat C23/95 - ex NN 59/94). En 
avril, la Commission a adopté une 
décision finale négative à l'égard d'aides 
sous forme de fiscalisation totale ou 
partielle des charges sociales patronales 
pour les PME du secteur en question 
dans le but de créer des postes de 
travail. 
Les critiques de la Commission ne 
portaient bien entendu pas sur les 
objectifs poursuivis par les autorités 
italiennes en matière de création 
d'emploi (dont l'approche était par 
ailleurs novatrice car ciblée sur des 
catégories défavorisées de chômeurs), 
mais plutôt sur les modalités utilisées 
pour atteindre ces objectifs et les 
conséquences qui en découlaient. C'est 
le caractère sectoriellement ciblé, qui 
plus est sur un secteur déjà leader au 
niveau européen et dans lequel le 
volume d'échanges intracommunautaires 
est très fort, qui a motivé la position 
négative de la Commission dans ce cas. 
La Commission donne ici une 
confirmation supplémentaire de sa 
politique défavorable vis-à-vis des aides 
ciblées sectoriellement. La position de la 
Commission en matière de réduction des 
coûts du travail a fait l'objet d'une 
nouvelle communication qui permet un 
certain ciblage (cfr supra). 
Textile, Habillement, cuir, chaussure 
Mesures expérimentales de baisse des 
c har ge s sociales ("Plan 
Borona " XFranee). (Aide d'Etat 
N246/96) En mai, la Commission a pris 
une décision présentant certaines 
similarités avec le cas précédent des 
"Chaussures en Italie". Elle a en effet 
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décidé d'ouvrir la procédure de l'article 
93 §2 CE à l'encontre de mesures de 
suppression des charges sociales 
patronales au niveau du Salaire 
Minimum Garanti (SMIG) et un 
allégement dégressif jusqu'à 1,5 fois ce 
dernier prévues pour les seuls secteurs 
industriels en question. De par le 
caractère ciblé sectoriellement dans des 
secteurs connaissant d'importants 
échanges intracommunautaires, la 
Commission a des doutes sur la 
compatibilité de telles propositions 
dans la mesure où, jusqu'à présent, les 
autorités françaises n'ont pu apporter 
aucun élément démontrant la rationalité 
économique et la nécessité objective 
d'un traitement dérogatoire à l'efficacité 
générale du système des charges 
sociales. 
Une fois encore, la Commission se 
montre réticente vis-à-vis de mesures 
qui pourraient provoquer une escalade 
(et probablement un jeu à somme nulle 
aggravé de dépenses publiques inutiles) 
des aides sectorielles entre Etats 
membres avec comme conséquence la 
refragmentation artificielle du Marché 
Unique. La Commission est toutefois 
consciente des problèmes graves 
d'emploi dans l'Union et étudie les 
possibilités d'atteindre les mêmes 
objectifs au travers de mesures moins 
distorsives, telles des aides générales à 
l'emploi ciblées sur certaines catégories 
de chômeurs. 
Le secteur sidérurgique (hors CECA) 
(Aide d'Etat C13/95 - ex NN9/95). En 
mai, la Commission a clos la procédure 
de l'article 93 §2 CE par une décision 
finale négative déclarant à la fois 
illégales et incompatibles les d'aides 
d'Etat octroyées à l'entreprise BFM. 
Les aides versées ne trouvaient en effet 
justification dans aucune des 
dérogations prévues aux articles 92§2 
et 92§3 CE. La Commission a 
considéré que les aides ponctuelles 
versées n'étaient destinées à permettre 
que la survie industrielle de BFM, sans 
aucune compensation justificatoire. 
L'affaire touche aux relations entre 
l'Etat et les entreprises publiques et, 
dans ce cadre, au caractère d'aide des 
transferts de ressources entre eux. Ici, 
la Commission a considéré que les 
entreprises publiques peuvent tirer un 
avantage du fait d'être contrôlées par 
l'Etat lorsque ce dernier va au-delà de 
son simple rôle d'acteur économique 
propriétaire d'entreprises. Ainsi, 
l'application du critère de l'investisseur 
privé opérant dans des conditions 
normales de marché a permis à la 
Commission d'en conclure que, mutatis 
mutandis et toutes choses étant par 
ailleurs, l'octroi de prêts répétés, les 
injections de capital et l'effacement des 
dettes n'auraient pas été accessibles à 
une entreprise dont les propriétaires 
étaient privés. 
Enfin, l'affaire est intéressante en ce 
qu'elle a connu également des 
développements en droit interne, Breda 
Fucine ayant notamment été exclue 
d'un marché public pour pratique 
commerciale déloyale. En effet, le 
Tribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles 
(Chambre des actions en cessation) a 
confirmé en date du 13 février 1995 un 
jugement précédent rendu par défaut le 
26 décembre 1994 qui disposait "... 
qu'en participant à <un> appel d'offres 
... ,aux prix soumissionnés, alors 
qu'elle bénéficie de mesures d'aides 
d'Etat non régulièrement notifiées et 
qui font l'objet d'une procédure 
d'examen de la part des services de la 
Commission, et en enfreignant ainsi les 
articles 92 et 93 du traité de Rome, 
<Breda Fucine Meridionale commet 
un acte contraire aux usages honnêtes 
en matière commerciale, interdit par 
l'article 93 de la loi du 14 juillet 
1991". Un recours par Breda Fucine 
devant la section Administration du 
Conseil d'Etat est actuellement pendant 
contre son exclusion de l'appel d'offres 
et la décision d'attribuer le marché 
public à un concurrent. 
Press releases 
The full texts of Commission's Press 
releases are available on-line from 
the RAPID database, on the day of 
their publication by the Commission's 
Spokesman's Service. To obtain 
access to RAPID, please write to 
EUR-OP Information, Marketing 
and Public Relations (OP/4B) 2 rue 
Mercier L-2985 Luxembourg 
tel. +352 2929 42455, fax +352 2929 
42763 
IP/96/300: COMMISSION GIVES 
GREEN LIGHT FOR INVESTMENT 
AID TRANCHE OF SOME DM 48 
MILLION FOR EAST GERMAN 
SHIPYARD [96/04/03] 
IP/96/327 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES STATE AID TO 
SHIPBUILDING IN FINLAND. 
[96/04/18] 
IP/96/328 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
RESCUE AID TO GRUPPO FOCHI 
[96/04/18] 
IP/96/345 : COMMISSION FINDS 
FRENCH SCHEME TO ENCOURAGE 
INVESTMENT IN SHIPPING COMPA-
TIBLE WITH THE TREATY [96/04/24] 
IP/96/362 : COMMISSION DELAYS 
PAYMENT OF 2nd TRANCHE OF 
AID TO OLYMPIC AIRWAYS AND 
REQUESTS FURTHER INFOR-
MATION FROM GREECE [96/04/30] 
IP/96/363 : COMMISSION DECIDES 
THAT THE PRICE PAID BY THEUK 
GOVERNMENT FOR BUILDING THE 
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CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL LINK 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A STATE 
AID [96/04/30] 
IP/96/364 : COMMISSION ASKS 
ITALY TO SUSPEND AID TO 
RESTRUCTURING OF THE ROAD 
HAULAGE SECTOR & REQUESTS 
FURTHER INFORMATION [96/04/30] 
IP/96/367 : THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES AID TO THE 
SPANISH COALMINING INDUSTRY 
AMOUNTING TO A TOTAL OF 
PTAS 293 000 MILLION [96/04/30] 
IP/96/368 : THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES AID AMOUNTING IN 
TOTAL TO MORE THAN DM 13 000 
MILLION TO THE GERMAN 
COALMINIG INDUSTRY [96/04/30] 
IP/96/369 : THE COMMISSION IS 
AUTHORIZING AID TOTALLING FF 
4 400 MILLION TO THE FRENCH 
COALMINING INDUSTRY [96/04/30] 
IP/96/370 : COMMISSION RAISES 
NO OBJECTION TO REGIONAL 
INVESTMENT IN FAVOUR OF 
SEMICONDUCTORS' MANUFA-
CTURING PLANT IN DRESDEN 
[96/04/30] 
IP/96/371: GERMANY: COMMISSION 
GIVES GO-AHEAD FOR 1995-99 
PLAN TO IMPROVE REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES [96/04/30] 
IP/96/372 : GERMANY -
COMMISSION REQUESTS 
CHANGES TO STATE GUARANTEE 
SCHEME FOR INVESTMENT IN 
NEW LANDER [96/04/30] 
IP/96/373 : COMMISSION'S DOUBTS 
ABOUT STATE AID TO OLIVETTI'S 
DEVELOPMENT OF PORTABLE 
MULTIMEDIA PERSONAL 
COMPUTERS [96/04/30] 
IP/96/374 : ITALY - FOOTWEAR 
INDUSTRY: NEGATIVE 
COMMISSION DECISION [96/04/30] 
IP/96/421 : STATE AID FRANCE: 
COMMISSION REQUESTS 
FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE 
"TEXTILE PLAN" [96/05/15] 
IP/96/422 : STATE AID DENMARK: 
"ENERGIE 2000" [96/05/15] 
IP/96/423 : BREMER VULKAN: THE 
COMMISSION REQUESTS URGENT 
CLARIFICATION ON RESCUE AID 
FOR DORRIES SCHARMANN, A 
BREMER VULKAN SUBSIDIARY 
[96/05/15] 
IP/96/447 : INTEREST RATE 
SUBSIDY ON SHORT TERM 
OPERATING LOANS. [96/05/29] 
IP/96/448 : THE COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES AID OF ESC 345 
MILLION TO THE PORTUGUESE 
COAL INDUSTRY [96/05/29] 
IP/96/449 : COMMISSION FINDS 
THAT THE FINANCING OF SPATA 
AIRPORT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
A STATE AID [96/05/29] 
IP/96/459 : PARAFISCAL CHARGE 
LEVIED ON CERTAIN PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF 
THE INSTITUT FRANCAIS DU 
PETROLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
AID [96/05/30] 
IP/96/460 : STATE AID FOR 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN AGRICULTURE [96/05/31] 
IP/96/476 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES GERMAN AND 
AUSTRIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
PROMOTION SCHEMES [96/06/05] 
IP/96/486 : COMMISSION RULES ON 
THREE ITALIAN STATE AID CASES 
IN THE MARITIME SECTOR 
[96/06/12] 
IP/96/499 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORIZES INCREASE IN 
REGIONAL AID RATES IN WEST 
BERLIN [96/06/13] 
IP/96/500 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
GERMAN AID TO MERCEDES-BENZ 
IN BERLIN MARIENFELDE [96/06/13] 
IP/96/501 : COMMISSION DOES NOT 
OPPOSE TO A REGIONAL AID IN 
FAVOUR OF MERCEDES BENZ 
SPAIN [96/06/13] 
IP/96/502 COMMISSION AGREES 
WITH PROPOSED PUBLIC 
ACQUISITION OF A MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDING IN SERVÓLA SPA 
BUT OPENS PROCEDURE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATE AID 
CONCEPT. [96/06/13] 
IP/96/528 : COMMISSION DEVELOPS 
ITS POSITION ON AID AIMED AT 
REDUCING LABOUR COSTS 
[96/06/19] 
IP/96/553 : COMMISSION TO 
PROVIDE ECU 2.6 MILLION FOR 
TEXTILE AREAS IN AUSTRIA 
[96/06/27] 
IP/96/561 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
124 MILLION DM AID TO 
MERCEDES-BENZ IN 
LUDWIGSFELDE [96/06/26] 
IP/96/562 : FINAL DECISION ON A 
GERMAN PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE 
STATE AID TO VOLKSWAGEN IN 
THE NEW LANDER [96/06/26] 
IP/96/581 : CREDIT FONCIER DE 
FRANCE: COMMISSION ASKS 
FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR 
DETAILED INFORMATION |96/07/03] 
IP/96/582 : COMMISSION HAS 
SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT 
INVESTMENT ALLOWANCE IN 
NEW LANDER [96/07/03] 
IP/96/583 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AID FOR CLOSURE OF VLAAMSE 
SCHEEPSBOUW MAATSCHAPPIJ 
[96/07/03] 
IP/96/584 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
FOUR REGIONAL-DEVELOPMENT 
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AID SCHEMES IN ASTURIAS 
(SPAIN) [96/07/03] 
IP/96/626 : THE SITUATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AUTOMOBILE 
INDUSTRY [96/07/10] 
IP/96/656 : COMMISSION OPENS 
PROCEDURE ON AID TO BREMER 
VULKAN CRUISE VESSEL 
"COSTA I" [96/07/17] 
IP/96/662 : COMMISSION CLOSES 
ARTICLE 93.2 PROCEDURE 
RELATING TO COMPAGNIE 
GENERALE MARITIME [96/07/18] 
IP/96/693 : COMMISSION 
AUTHORISES THIRD TRANCHE OF 
STATE AID FOR AIR FRANCE 
[96/07/24] 
IP/96/458 : STATE AID [96/05/30] 
IP/96/619 : A GLOBAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ALL 
COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN 
FAVOUR OF SMES [96/07/10] 




IP/96/743 : COMMISSION APPROVES 
AUSTRIAN STATE AID IN FORM OF 
CAPITAL INJECTIONS BY AUSTRIA 
TABAK INTO HEAD TYROLIA 
MARES [96/07/30] 
IP/96/746 : VW SAXONY: 
COMMISSION INSISTS ON FULL 
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS DECISION 
OF 26 JUNE [96/07/30] 
IP/96/748 : COMMISSION DOES NOT 
OBJECT FRENCH AID IN FAVOUR 
OF AN EUREKA PROJECT OF R 
AND D FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF AN ELECTRIC CAR [96/07/31] 
IP/96/663 : AID TO CREATE 
STABLE JOBS IN EXTREMADURA 
(SPAIN) [96/07/18] 
IP/96/664 : SHIPBUILDING - THE 
COMMISSION DECIDES TO OPEN 
PROCEDURE AGAINST DENMARK 
[96/07/18] 
IP/96/665 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A FRENCH R&D 
SCHEME FOR THE AERONAUTICS 
SECTOR [96/07/18] 
IP/96/667 : THE COMMISSION 
DECIDES TO INVESTIGATE AN 
ITALIAN PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE 
R&D AID TO SGS-THOMSON 
[96/07/18] 
IP/96/668 : COMMISSION DECIDES 
TO CLOSE AGAINST PLANNED 
AID TO A WOOD PROCESSING 
COMPANY [96/07/18] 
IP/96/669 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A DUTCH R&D 
SCHEME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN 
TRANSPORT [96/07/18] 
IP/96/670 : COMMISSION 
DECLARES LAND SALES TO 
SIEMENS REAL ESTATE HOLDING 
ILLEGAL [96/07/18] 
IP/96/736 : STATE AID BREMER 
VULKAN: GREEN LIGHT FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF TWO FERRY 
BOATS BUT DOUBTS ON THE 
CONTRACT FOR TWO 
CONTAINERSHIPS [96/07/30] 
IP/96/737 : STATE AID BANCO DI 
NAPOLI: COMMISSION ASKS FOR 
MORE INFORMATION [96/07/30] 
IP/96/738 : SPAIN : COMMISSION 
APPROVES AID TO RESTRUCTURE 
CAR MAKER SANTANA [96/07/30] 
IP/96/739 : SKET: COMMISSION 
MAINTAINS DOUBTS ABOUT 
RESTRUCTURING PLAN [96/07/30] 
IP/96/740 : COMMISSION 
APPROVES AIDE TO MCC-FRANCE 
FOR ITS CAR INVESTMENT 
PROJECTS AT HAMBACH [96/07/30] 
IP/96/741 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVED THE AID TO GM/OPEL 
PORTUGAL, S.A. IN FAVOUR OF 
ITS INVESTMENT PROJECT IN 
AZAMBUJA [96/07/30] 
IP/96/742 : COMMISSION 
APPROVES AID TO NISSAN GROUP 
IN SUPPORT OF A RESTRU-
CTURING PROJECT OF NISSAN 
MOTOR IBERICA SA [96/07/30] 
IP/96/749 : STATE AID GERMANY: 
COMMISSION APPROVES AID TO 
HALBMOND TEPPICHWERKE 
GMBH (OELSNITZ ET ADORF) IN 
EAST GERMANY [96/07/31] 
IP/96/750 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A FRENCH R&D 
SCHEME FOR LAND TRANSPORT 
[96/07/31] 
IP/96/751 : THE COMMISSION 
APPROVES A DUTCH R&D SCHEME 
FOR 'CLUSTER' PROJECTS 
[96/07/31] 
IP/96/752 : THE COMMISSION 
DECIDES TO INVESTIGATE A 
DUTCH PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE 
R&D AID TO PHILIPS [96/07/31] 
IP/96/753 : STATE AID SPAIN -
TUBACEX: COMMISSION TAKES 
PARTIAL NEGATIVE DECISION 
ORDERING RECOVERY OF AID 
[96/07/31] 
IP/96/754 : COMMISSION TAKES A 
NEGATIVE DECISION WITH 
RESPECT TO STATE AID TO 
WERKSTOFF- UNION GMBH 
[96/07/31] 








* e ^ Volume 2 - Number 2 Summer 1996 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF COMPETITION POLICY 
Main developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996 
Summary of the most important 
recent developments 
by Stefaan DEPYPERE, Brona CARTON and 
Yannick SCARAMOZZINO, DG IV-A-3 
CENTRAL and EASTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 
BALTIC STATES, NEW 
INDEPENDENT STATES 
During the second quarter, activity has 
been focused on horizontal events and 
the pre-accession strategy. 
Horizontal Competition events 
Competition Conference Brno. The 
second Conference between the 
Commission and the competition 
authorities of the Central and Eastern 
european Countries took place from 8-
10 May in Brno (Czech Republic). 
Apart from the "traditional" participants 
(Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria) 
four more countries are now taking part 
in these conferences : Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia. 
The structure followed, to a large 
extent that of the Conference in 
Visegrad in 1995. The morning 
programme on the first day was 
dominated by speeches delivered by 
two EU representatives and a round 
table discussion between the head of 
the delegations.In the afternoon the 
participants split up into two working 
groups to give presentations on, and to 
discuss, antitrust and state aid issues, 
while a special programme for the 
delegation leaders was organised 
allowing them to discuss more general 
issues.On the last day of the conference 
the presidents of the working groups 
presented their report which was 
followed by a panel discussion and a 
press conference. 
The main objective of the Conference 
was threefold : 
- to underline the importance of 
cooperation in competition matters in 
the international field; 
- to stress the role of competition 
policy as comprising not only antitrust, 
but also state aid, state monopolies of 
a commercial character, as well as 
undertakings with special and exclusive 
rights; 
-to allow the officers of the various 
authorities to exchange ideas and to 
review technical matters together. 
The main results can be summarized as 
follows : 
-In the context of the pre-accession 
strategy, technical discussions, which 
have taken place in two working 
groups, were focused on issues related 
to the introduction and the 
implementation of antitrust rules and 
state aid control, 
-The cooperation between the European 
Commission and the CEECs' 
competition authorities, at the Directors 
General's level, as well as at the 
experts' level, has been strengthened. 
Conclusion. The Conference, financed 
under the PHARE programme, was 
well organised and can be considered a 
successful event in terms of being a 
follow-up to last year's Visegrad 
Conference. At the end of the 
conference, the Brno Joint Declaration 
on a joint action programme for 
competition was signed by all the CEEC 
representatives of the authorities 
responsible for antitrust and state aid, 
and by the Director General of DG IV. 
Baltic Booster Conference. The Baltic 
Booster Conference, financed by the 
PHARE programme, was organised to 
boost competition policy development 
in the baltic States, so that it can catch 
up with practice in other Central 
European countries. 
In each state a workshop was organised 
to tackle technical aspects of 
competition policy. Simultaneously, 
high level political contacts were 
organised to increase political awareness 
of competition policy issues and finally 
a larger scale conference took place, 
bringing together participants from the 
three States in one central location 
(Riga). An innovative aspect of the event 
consisted of the participation by a 
representative from one of the Member 
States and a competition specialist from 
a CEEC country to each of the 
meetings. 
Main results. Intensive technical 
discussions enhanced knowledge about 
the contents and substance of 
competition law and policy. At the end 
of the Conference a Memorandum of 
Understanding between Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic States and an 
agreement of Co-operation between the 
Competition Authorities of the Republic 
of Latvia and Lithuania were signed. 
This is eminently justified by the 
economic interest to apply the same 
competition policy in these three small 
countries. 
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Collective Traineeship. Currently, the 
DGIV is finalising, in cooperation with 
certain Member States, the "Second 
Collective traineeship for officials of 
the Central and Eastern European 
authorities responsible for anti-trust 
policy and state aid control".This 
project, financed by PHARE, will take 
place in November.Taking into account 
the necessity to set up efficient state 
aid controls in these countries, this 
year's collective traineeship will be 
focused not only on anti-trust rules, as 
was the case last year, but also on state 
aid control. 
Training for Academics. In the autumn, 
the first information and discussion 
programme for academics in Central 
European countries in the field of 
competition law and policy will take 
place in Athens.This project, financed 
by PHARE, aims to stimulate attention 
in the area of competition law and 
policy amongst scholars and academics 
in Central Europe. A further objective 
should be to analyze and approximate 
existing legislation within those CEECs 
with that of the EU. This should not 
only allow for an improvement in the 
functioning of CEEC competition 
authorities, but it should also establish 
a dialogue between the training staff 
and academics, with respect to their 
experiences regarding the functioning 
of competition authorities vis-a-vis 
their national competition laws. The 
hope is to encourage sustainable cross­
country cooperation and the 
establishment and strengthening of 
networks between academics in the 
CEECs and academics in the EU. 
Pre-accession strategy 
The European Council in Madrid has 
invited the Commission to submit its 
Opinion on the Central and Eastern 
European countries' application for 
membership to the European Union, as 
soon as possible after the conclusion of 
the Intergovernmental Conference. For 
the preparation of its opinions, the 
Commission sent to each applicant 
country a technical questionnaire in 
April.This questionnaire aims to get a 
full appreciation of the actual and 
prospective progress of each candidate 
country in its preparations towards 
assuming the obligations of 
membership.The Competition section of 
the above mentioned questionnaire 
contains questions regarding antitrust, 
state aid, public undertakings and 
undertakings with special or exclusive 
rights (general aspects and sector-
specific aspects) and state monopolies 
of a commercial character. Replies to 
the questionnaire are expected by the 
end of July 1996. 
In June, a series of bilateral meetings 
between the Commission and each 
applicant country took place in 
Brussels . The objective of this series 
of meetings was to review progress and 
resolve problems regarding the 
questionnaire for the preparation of the 
Commission's Opinions. The DG IV 
has provided some assistance with 
technical issues raised by the candidate 
countries. 
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK OF COMPETITION 
RULES 
On 18 June 1996, the Commission 
a d o p t e d a C o m m u n i c a t i o n 
(Communication from the Commission 
to the Council of 18 June 1996, 
"Towards an international framework 
of competition rules, COM(96) 284 
final) to the Council on trade and 
competition, which addresses the 
problem of anti-competitive practices 
hindering effective access to foreign 
markets. The reason for adopting a 
Communication at this time is to 
prepare a Community position on trade 
and competition for the WTO 
Ministerial meeting in Singapore at the 
end of the year. 
The Commission does not propose the 
creation of an international competition 
authority, with its own powers of 
investigation and enforcement, 
considering that this is not a feasible 
option at present. Rather, in line with 
the analysis and recommendations of the 
report of the independent group of 
experts, "Competition policy in the new 
trade order: strengthening cooperation 
and rules", the Commission prefers a 
gradual, building-block approach. To 
this end it proposes the creation of a 
working group in the WTO to examine 
those areas where consensus could be 
established. The first four blocks are 
outlined in the Communication. 
Firstly, countries would commit 
themselves to assuring domestic 
competition structures. This would 
imply basic competition rules on merger 
control, abuse of monopoly power and 
other restrictive agreements. This 
would be coupled with adequate 
enforcement structures and a right of 
access for private parties to domestic 
enforcement authorities, including 
national courts. 
Secondly, a core of common principles 
would be identified and would 
eventually be adopted at international 
level. The Commission suggests that it 
would be opportune to concentrate 
initially on 'horizontal' restraints, such 
as price or output fixing or market 
sharing cartels, bid-rigging, group 
boycotts, export cartels. Work on 
monopolies and 'vertical' restraints, e.g. 
exclusive distribution and supply 
agreements, would take longer but work 
could begin in parallel. 
Thirdly, the elements of a cooperation 
instrument would be developed. These 
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would be based to a large extent on 
experience to date under the OECD 
Recommendation and various bilateral 
agreements and include provisions on 
notification, cooperat ion and 
information exchange between 
competition authorities. The instrument 
could also include a "positive 
comity" provision, enabling one 
competition authority to request another 
to investigate and if necessary take 
action where anti­competitive conduct 
on the latter's market affects the 
former's important interests Finally, the 
WTO's rules for settling disputes could 
be used if a country fails to set up 
adequate competition rules or fails to 
react to a request by another country to 
investigate a case. 
The WTO is considered a more 
appropriate forum than either of the 
other existing multilateral fora, the 
OECD and UNCTAD, because of its 
near universal membership, its strong 
tools for settling disputes and the fact 
that it provides a forum for 
negotiations, consultations and 
information exchange to be conducted 
on a continuous basis. 
Nonetheless, the OECD and UNCTAD 
have a continuing and important role to 
play in the trade and competition 
debate and the Commission proposes 
that both organizations should be asked 
to continue their work in this area, 
taking account of developments in the 
WTO. 
As the group of experts suggested, the 
Commission considers that this 
international competition framework 
would initially draw members from the 
developed and advanced developing 
countries, although it would be open to 
any country prepared to accept the 
obligations which membership entails. 
The EU, both at Community and 
Member State level, has some of the 
toughest competition rules in the world, 
coupled with a strong commitment to 
their enforcement. Globalisation and 
liberalisation are resulting in increased 
competition in Europe while 
encouraging European firms to seek 
new markets further afield. Anti­
competitive conduct should not be 
allowed to exclude or limit European 
firms' access to foreign markets. 
Therefore, the Commission considers 
that it is clearly in the interests of the 
EU that competition on these markets 
is fair and that the competition rules 
are equitably enforced. 
The Communication was discussed by 
the Full Members of the Council's 
Article 113 Committee at a meeting of 
28 June, when it was given a generally 
warm reception. The Council will 
continue to consider the details of the 
proposal in the framework of the 113 
Committee and intends to invite 
competition experts of the Member 
States to join their trade colleagues in 
defining a position on the 





by Bernadette GATT, Maltese 
trainee with DG IV-A-3 
With the coming into force of the 
Competition Act, 1994 in Malta, one 
major source of concern for Maltese 
businessmen has been whether their 
business arrangements should be re­
organised in a way as to allow for the 
possibility of parallel importation. 
The source of this influence stems from 
the application and interpretation of the 
European Community competition rules, 
which have served, and continue to serve, 
as a model both for the enactment and 
application of Maltese competition law. 
Indeed, the European Court and the 
European Commission have not rarely 
annulled or condemned restrictive 
practices which tended to stifle parallel 
imports. 
The idea of having parallel importation 
works in two stages. First, goods are 
lawfully marketed in the place of export, 
the foreign country. These goods are 
channelled to the place of importation, the 
domestic country, via an authorised 
distribution network, usually at a higher 
price. Taking advantage of the lower 
price, a third person buys the goods in the 
cheaper, foreign country and imports them 
in parallel into the dearer, domestic 
country. 
Admittedly, there are arguments for and 
against the idea of parallel importation. 
From the positive side, making the goods 
available at a lower price through parallel 
importation is beneficial to consumers. 
As more distributors or producers enter 
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the market and seek customers, the 
quantity of goods increases, forcing 
prices further down. This fall in prices 
may also reflect a fall in costs as some 
distributors or producers strive to increase 
their profits by searching for even more 
efficient ways to make and supply the 
goods. 
However, if parallel imports are allowed, 
there are also risks. Considering the 
situation ex ante i.e. at the time an 
agreement is concluded, there is much for 
commending that a distributor who has to 
invest to tool up and set up shop, and an 
intellectual property right holder who has 
to carry out research and development to 
materialise his inventive activities, be 
given the adequate protection and 
incentive to undertake the commercial 
risk. If parallel importers are allowed to 
free ride on the efforts of the distributor 
and the intellectual property right holder 
to sell their goods in an established 
market at a cheaper price or after copying 
something someone else has produced, 
the incentive to invest and take risks may 
be lacking. 
In fact, at times both the European Court 
and Commission have been prepared to 
condone opposition to parallel imports (at 
least temporarily) when the necessity 
arose of encouraging incentives to invest. 
And this has been done at the expense of 
upholding the goal of establishing a 
common market. 
Common and Internal Market 
Perspectives 
Barring those exceptional instances where 
restrictions on parallel imports have been 
allowed at EC level, the Community has 
adopted a firm stand on the issue and the 
non-elimination of parallel imports has 
become an imperative in EC competition 
law enforcement. The rationale for such 
an approach in the Community is quite 
logical. 
Parallel imports confront the EC with a 
complication not faced in other 
48 Competition Policy Newsletter 
jurisdictions. The basic object of the EC 
is market integration: to create a unified 
market out of the several national 
markets of the Member States. 
Accordingly, an agreement to divide the 
common market along the frontiers of the 
Member States and to stay out of the 
competitors' territories in other States is 
the most serious of all breaches of EC 
competition law. 
Against this market integration scenario, 
domestic competition law regimes are 
concerned almost exclusively with 
economic efficiency. In other words, 
when applying domestic competition law 
local authorities are primarily concerned 
with maintaining a healthy competitive 
environment within the national market. 
This situation would logically lead to a 
less interventionist attitude than is 
expected under the EC system. Indeed, 
the different objectives pursued under the 
two systems serve to alter legal and 
economic perspectives. For example, a 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s y s t e m w h i c h 
compartmentalises the common market 
along national boundaries may serve to 
enhance interbrand competition at the 
expense of eliminating intrabrand 
competition across national boundaries. 
While such a system - which may 
introduce a new brand on the market -
may be allowed under national 
competition regimes, it will definitely 
infringe the EC competition rules since 
there is an effect on trade between 
Member States. 
As a result one should proceed with 
caution when following the EC attitude 
towards parallel imports: EC competition 
law if not necessarily performing the 
same function as national competition 
law. 
Applying these premises within the local 
context, it was arguably not the intention 
of the Maltese legislator to adopt blindly 
the EC practice of prohibiting absolute 
territorial protection with the aim of 
opening up markets. The provisions of 
the Competition Act are infringed only 
where the obstruction of parallel imports 
restricts competition within the parameters 
of the Maltese market. Until Malta 
becomes an EU Member State, the scope 
of the local competition rules ought to be 
that of achieving the aims of economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare. It is 
against this background that the notion of 
parallel importation should. be made to 
apply. 
The Local Scene 
The question which consequently needs to 
be addressed is to what extent can local 
agreements obstructing parallel imports 
survive the test imposed by section 5 of 
the Maltese Competition Act ? 
By far the most common instances where 
parallel imports may be impeded occur in 
exclusive distribution or sole agency 
agreements, and trade mark licensing 
agreements. Taking, the relevant market 
to be the whole of the national market, a 
foreign manufacturer or wholesaler may 
supply goods to a local distributor, 
granting him absolute territorial 
protection, or a foreign licensor supplies 
trademarked goods to a local licensee 
enabling the latter to sue for infringement 
of trade mark law anyone who tries to 
import the same goods bearing the same 
trade mark. 
Under the Maltese Competition Act, 
Section 5 declares unlawful any agreement 
between undertakings, any decision by an 
undertaking or by an association of 
undertakings and any concerted practice 
between undertakings having the object or 
effect or preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition within the relevant 
market. 
Primafacie, both agreements mentioned 
above infringe section 5 since there exists 
an agreement between undertakings 
having the object or effect of restricting 
competition within the local market: the 
goods can be obtained by users from one 
source only, i.e. intrabrand competition is 
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the dealer need not strive for more cost-
effective ways of getting the product to 
the consumer, the market would not 
adapt so flexibly to changes in consumer 
wants, etc. 
However, a situation could arise where a 
local dealer would not consider it worthy 
to invest in bringing over to Malta a new 
brand of goods or to import a well-
known brand and invest in providing the 
optimal quality in sales services unless he 
is protected, at least temporarily, from 
parallel imports via exclusive distribution 
agreements or trade mark licences. 
Could one not say that allowing the 
impedition of parallel imports in such 
instances serves to promote interbrand 
competition and allows consumers a 
wider choice of brands at different prices 
than would be the case if the dealer is 
given no territorial protection and no 
incentive to invest and penetrate the 
market ? In other words, would not an 
agreement providing for absolute 
territorial protection in such 
circumstances serve to stimulate - and not 
restrict - competition on the local market 
and is therefore not caught by section 5 
at all ? 
The next crucial issue is whether the 
same argument holds once Malta 
becomes a European Union member. 
Upon EU accession, the Competition Act 
would apply in parallel with the 
Community competition rules and must 
be applied in a way as not to frustrate 
EU objectives, including that of market 
integration. The Act would regulate 
internal competition cases; whilst the 
Treaty rules would apply to cases having 
a European Union dimension. 
At this stage there exists the threat that 
exclusivity which might otherwise be 
cleared under section 5, falls foul of the 
EC rules. If business agreements 
involving local businessmen aim at 
isolating the Maltese market from the rest 
of the common market, there is 
doubtlessly an effect on inter-state trade. 
In such an eventuality it is hoped that, on 
account of the diminutive market shares 
which the majority of local undertakings 
have within the common market, 
agreements entered into between local 
undertakings and foreign enterprises do 
not exceed the threshold of the de 
minimis doctrine under EC law (currently 
set at a market share of not more than 
5% and an aggregate turnover not 
exceeding 300 million ECU). Such 
agreements would then escape the 
application of the EC competition rules 
on account of the insignificant impact on 
the EU market. 
Still, it is important to note that the de 
minimis doctrine does not apply where an 
agreement concluded in one country 
forms part of a network of similar 
agreements within the common market so 
that, although the single local agreement 
may not have an appreciable effect on the 
common market, the cumulative effect of 
the parallel agreements may serve to 
compartimentalise the common market 
along national boundaries. 
Another possible solution would be for 
the foreign supplier to integrate forward 
and acquire the local undertaking as a 
subsidiary. Any arrangements concluded 
would then amount to unilateral conduct 
performed by a single economic unit and 
therefore cannot be considered to infringe 
EC rules on restrictive agreements (which 
regard only bilateral conduct). 
However, unilateral conduct by a 
dominant entity stands to be controlled 
by Article 86 of the EC Treaty where a 
stricter yardstrick is applied (than under 
Article 85) and absolute exclusivity is 
condemned. Hence, one must beware 
whether an arrangement (concluded 
between foreign parent and local 
subsidiary) which had a de minimis effect 
during its initial stages proves to be 
successful and a position of dominance 
within the common market settles in. In 
such an eventuality, it is difficult to 
imagine how territorial protection will be 
allowed under Article 86. 
Conclusion 
The issue of parallel importation will 
continue to constitute a struggle on the 
market. Consumers will keep up an 
unremitting demand for cheaper prices and 
faster availability. But they will also want 
new and better products and sales 
services, and guarantees of quality. 
It is hoped that the Maltese authorities 
will emphasise the goals of economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare when 
dealing with arrangements impeding 
parallel imports. An ex ante analysis of 
the market is called for when examining 
the effect of such clauses. If the market 
remains more competitive on account ol 
providing an investor with territorial 
protection, there appears to be no reason 
why, in the particular circumstances 
examined above, the elimination of 
parallel imports should not be condoned, 
at least temporarily, until an adequate 
return is ensured. ■ 
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Documentation ... 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given by 
Community officials that may be of interest. Copies of these are 
available from DGIV's home page on the World Wide Web. Future 
issues of the newsletter will contain details of conferences on 
competition policy which have been brought to our attention. 
Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this facility 
should refer to page 1 for the address of DGIV's Information Officer. 
SPEECHES AND ARTICLES 
Règles de concurrence de l'Union 
Européenne applicables aux 
entreprises. Joos Stragier. Charleroi, 
7.10.95 
EU pharmaceutical forum. Mergers, 
Jo int Ventures and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry by J. Gatti 
Calendrier et mesures d'ouverture 
des télécommunications à la 
concurrence par J.F. PONS. 
Symposium international des 
télécommunications Monaco, le 22 
mars 1996 
Transport multimodal et fixation 
des taux de transport terrestre. 
Paris, le 28 mars 1996 par J.F.PONS 
Distribution automobile et autres: 
les relations verticales entre règle 
de concurrence et règle de raison 
par R. GOYER (paru le 7 mars 1996 
dans SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, 
Cahiers de Droit de l'Entreprise 
(Supplément) 
T h e EU a p p r o a c h on 
demonopolisation issues 
presentation delivered by Mr Claude 
RAKOVSKY Directorate General for 
Competition of the European 
Commission, BRNO, May 1996 
Preparing for 1998 and beyond -
Keynote address by Commissionner 
K. Van Miert at the IIC 
Telecommunications forum 15 July 
1996 - [SPEECH/96/198] 
Auswirkungen des EU-Beitritts 
Österreichs auf den öffentlichen 
Unternehmenssektor, by G. 
Obermann and K. Soukup, in 
Zeitschrift für öffentliche und 
gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, 
Band 19, Heft 1 1996 p. 95 
COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS 
ON COMPETITION 
Unless otherwise indicated, 
these publications are available 
through the Office for Official 
Publications of the European 
Communities, 2 rue Mercier, 
L 2985 Luxembourg -
Tel.4992821 - Fax 488573, or its 
sales offices (see last page).; 
use ISBN or Catalogue Number 
to order. 
LEGISLATION 
Competition law in the European 
Communities - volume 1A Rules 
applicable to undertakings, situation at 
30 june 1994; this publication contains 
the text of all legislative acts relevant to 
Articles 85, 86 and 90. catalogue No: 
(xx=language code; 9 languages) CM 29-
93-AOl-xx-C 
Competition law in the European 
Communities, Addendum to Volume 
IA: Rules applicable to udertakings 
situation as of 31 December 1994. 
catalogue No: (xx=language code; 9 
languages) CM 88-95-436-xx-C 
Merger control in the European 
Union, this publication contains the text 
of all legislative acts relevant to the 
Merger regulation; catalogue No: 
(xx=language code; 9 languages) CV 88-
95-428-xx-C 
Competition law in the European 
Communities - volume IIA Rules 
applicable to State aid, situation at 31 
December 1994; this publication contains 
the text of all legislative acts relevant to 
Articles 42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. Catalogue 
No. (xx=language code; 9 languages) : 
CM-29-93-A02-XX-C 
Brochure concerning the competition 
rules applicable to undertakings as 
contained in the EEA agreement and 
their implementation by the EC 




Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition 
-Articles 85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty. 
Catalogue numbers: 
* 64/72, in it, de, fr, ni: CM 76-92-996-xx-C 
* 73/80, in da, de, en, fr, it, nl: CM 76-92-
988-xx-C 
* 81/85, in 7 languages: CM79-93-792-XX-C 
* 86/88, 9 languages: CM 80-93-290-xx-C 
* 89/90, 9 languages: CV 73-92-772-xx-C 
* 90/92, 9 languages: CV 84-94-387-xx-C 
* 93/94, 9 languages: CV 90-95-946-xx-C 
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COMPETITION REPORTS 
European Community competition 
policy 1995, 11 languages, (available on 
request through DG IV's Cellule 
Information) 
XXV Report on competition policy 
1995, 11 languages, CM-94-96-429-xx-
C 
XXIV Report on competition policy 
1994, 11 languages, CM-90-95-283-xx-
C 
XXIIIeme Rapport sur la politique 
de concurrence 1993, 9 languages, CM 
82-94-650-xx-C 
XXIIe Rapport sur la politique de 
concurrence: 1992, 9 languages, CM 
76-93-689-xx-C 
XXIe Rapport sur la politique de 
concurrence: 1991, 9 languages, CM 
73-92-247-xx-C 
Fourth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the manufacturing 
and certain other sectors (11 
languages). ISBN 92-827-5381-6. 
Older annual reports are also available 
on request. 
Community Competition Policy in the 
Telecommunications Sector, a 
compedium prepared by DG IV; it 
contains Directives under art 90, 
Decisions under Regulation 17 and 
under the Merger Regulation as well as 
relevant Judgements of the Court of 
Justice. Volume I and addendum; copies 
are available through DG IV-C-1 (tel. 
+322-2968623, 2968622, fax +322-
2969819). 
Interim report of the Multimodal 
group CM-95-96-350-EN-C 
Survey of the Member States national 
laws governing vertical distribution 
agreements CM-95-96-996-EN-C 
Brochure explicative sur les modalités 
d'application du Règlement (CE) NQ 
1475/95 de la Commission concernant 
certaines catégories d' accords de 
distribution et de service de vente et 
d'après-vente de véhicules 
automobiles. Copies available through 
DG IV-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880, 
2950479, fax. +322-2969800) 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition, 
CV-87-95321-EN-C. 
The Institutional Framework for the 
Regulation of Telecom-munications 
and the Application of EC Compe-
tition Rules - Final Report, Forrester 
Norall & Sutton, CM-94-96-590-EN-C 
Competition Aspects of Access Pricing 
-December 1995, M. Cave, P. Crowther, 
L. Handler, CM-94-96-582-EN-C 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector, CM-90-
95-801-EN-C 
The effect of conglomerate mergers 
on competition; CM-59-90-039-EN-C 
Surveys of the Member States' 
powers to investigate and sanction 
violations of national competition 
laws, CM 90-95-089-EN-C 
L' Office de l'harmonisation dans le 
marche interieur, AH-89-95-260-FR-C 
Information exchanges among firms 
and their impact on competition, 
CV 89-95-026-EN-C 
Impact of EC-funded R&D 
programmes on human resource 
development and long-term 
competitiveness, CG NA-15-920-EN-C 
Meeting universal service obligations 
in a competitive telecommunications 
sector, CV 83-94-757-EN-C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European single 
market, CV 78-93- 136-EN-C 
Copyright and information limits to 
the protection of literary and 
pseudo-literary works in the Member 
States of the EC, CM 75-92-049-EN-C 
Evaluation of the Impact of European 
Community Research Programmes 
upon the Competitiveness of European 
Industry: Concepts and approaches, 
CDNA-14-198-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control 
policy,CM AR-94-057-EN-C 
Growth, competitiveness, employment: 
The challenges and ways forward into 
the 21st century: White paper, 9 
languages, CM 82-94-529-xx-C 
Growth, competitiveness, employment: 
The challenges and ways forward into 
the 21st century: "White paper" - Vol. 





Competition policy in the new trade 
order: strengthening international 
cooperation and rules, 
CM 91-95-124-EN-C 
The impact of joint ventures on 
competition: The case of petrochemical 
industry in the EEC, 
CM 70-91-491-EN-C 
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Forum consultatif de la comptabilité: 
subventions publiques, 
C­184­94­735­FR­C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier de 
la Communauté: Rapport sur 
l'enquête 1993, CM 83­94­2963­A­C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier de 
la Communauté: Enquete 1992, 9 
languages, CM 76­93­6733­A­C 
The effect of different state aid 
measures on ¡ntra-Community 
competition, CM 59­90­702­EN­C 
Study on the impact of liberalization 
of inward cross-border mail on the 
provision of the universal postal 
service and the options for 
progressive liberalization: Final 
report, CV 89­95­018­EN­C 
Green Paper on the development of 
the single market for postal services, 
9 languages, CD NA­14­858­EN­C 
COST allocation and cross subsidies, 
CV 83­94­894­EN­C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European merger 
control: New lessons about collective 
dominance ? CM 89­95­737­EN­C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control policy, 
CM AR­94­057­EN­C 
The effects of ¡ntra-Community 
competition of export subsidies to 
third countries: The case of export 
credits, export insurance and official 
development assistance, 
CM 59­90­281­EN­C 
Aid element of government R&D 
contracts, CM 70­91­314­EN­C 
Concurrence et cooperation dans le 
transport aérien en Europe, 
CV 74­92­815­FR­C 
European Economy, Supplement A, 
Recent economic trends, No 4 ­ 04/94, 
State aid control in the context of 
other community policies, 9 languages, 
CM­AS­94­004­XX­C. 
European Economy,; "Competition and 
integration ­ Community merger control 
policy", Supplement A nr. 3/95, 9 
languages, CM AS­95­005­XX­C, 
Activities in favour of SMEs and the 
craft sector. European Commission. 
1995. ISBN 92­827­5175­9 + version 
FR et DE. 
Aides et prêts de l'Union européenne 
­ Guide des financements 
communautaires. 1995. ISBN 92­827­
4601­1. 
Répertoire de jurisprudence de droit 
communautaire 1977-1990. 3 volumes. 
Cour de justice des Commuautés 
européennes. 
Conference on Competition Policy. 
Organised by the European Commission 
in cooperation with the Office of 
Economic Competition of Hungary. 
Visegrad. 19­21 June 1995. 
Les marchés publics en Europe ­ Les 
directives (+EN,DE) ISBN 92­826­
8189­0. 
The institutional framework for the 
regulation of telecommunications and 
the application of EC competition 
rules. Document DG IV. ISBN 92­827­
6508­3. 
Competition aspects of access pricing. 
Document DG IV. 1996. ISBN 92­827­
6509­1 ■ 
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
1st April to 31 July 1996 
ARTICLES 85, 86, 90 
(RESTRICTIONS AND 
DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITION 
BY UNDERTAKINGS) 
Commission Notice on the non­
imposition or reduction of fines in cartel 
cases (published on 18­07­96 in OJ 
C207) 
DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT 
COMMITTEE No 12/96 of 1 March 
1996 amending Annex XIV 
(Competition) to the EEA Agreement 
(published on 23­05­96 in OJ L124) 
Corrigendum to Directive 95/62/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 1995 on the 
application of open network provision 
(ONP) to voice telephony (Official 
Journal of the European Communities 
No L 321 of 30 December 1995) 
(published on 01­05­96 in OJ LI08) 
Council Decision of 25 June 1996 on the 
implementation of a Community action 
programme to strengthen the 
competitiveness of European industry 
(published on 06­07­96 in OJ L167) 
Commission Decision of 5 June 1996 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.983 ­
Fenex) (published on the 20­07­96 in OJ 
L181) 
Commission Decision of 24 June 1996 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Art 
85 of the EC Treaty and Art 53 of the 
EEA Agreement (IV/34.607 ­ Banque 
Nationale de Paris ­ Dresdner Bank) 
(published on the 27­07­96 in OJ LI88) 
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Commision Regulation (EC) No 
1523/96 of 24 July 1996 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices 
concerning joint planning and 
coordination of schedules, joint 
operations, consultations on passenger 
and cargo tariffs on scheduled air 
services and slot allocation at airports 
(published on the 31-07-96 in OJ LI90) 
Preliminary notice of an exclusive 
dealing contract (Case No IV/35.832/E-
1 - Comineo + Anvil) (Text with EEA 
relevance) (published on 02-04-96 in 
OJ C99) 
Notification of a joint venture (Case No 
IV/35.939 - Automotive products & 
Kongsberg) (published on the 11-04-96 
in OJ C105) 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 (Case No 
IV/33.815, 35.842 - Eudim) (Text with 
EEA relevance) (published on 17-04-96 
in OJ CI 11) 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 (Case No 
IV/E-2/35.813 - BP 
Chemicals/Erdölchemie) (Text with 
EEA relevance) (published on 18-04-96 
in OJ CI 13) 
Notice pursuant to Article 12(2) of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 
(Case No IVMAR/35.488 - HansaFerry) 
(Text with EEA relevance) (published 
on 23-04-96 in OJ CI 18) 
Notice pursuant to Article 12(2) of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 
(Case No IV/35.481 - Stena Tor Line) 
(Text with EEA relevance) (published 
on 20-07-96 in OJ C209) 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17/62 (Case No 
IV/E-3/35.485 - REN/Turbogás) (Text 
with EEA relevance) (published on 23-
04-96 in OJ CI 18) 
Amended proposal for a Council 
Directive on access to the 
groundhandling market at Community 
airports (Text with EEA relevance) 
(published on 27-04-96 in OJ C124) 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17/62 (Case No 
IV/E-3/35.698 - ISAB Energy) (Text 
with EEA relevance) (published on 09-
05-96 in OJ C138) 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17/62 (Case No 
IV/F-1/33.055 - Danish Tennis 
Federation) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(published on 09-05-96 in OJ C138) 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 (Case No 
IV/35.293 - IBOS Association) (Text 
with EEA relevance) (published on 23-
07-96 in OJ C213) 
Notification of a cooperation agreement 
(published on 25-06-96 in OJ C184) 
Notification of a joint venture (Case No 
IV/36.054 - CGI+Lombard) (published 
on the 02-07-96 in OJ C191) 
Notification of an agreement (Case No 
IV/36.061 - ECU Banking Association) 




COMMISSION DECISION of 16 
January 1996 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4064/89 declaring a concentration to 
be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agree-
ment (Case No IV/M.623 Kimberly-
Clark/Scott) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(Only the English text is authentic) 
(published on 23-07-96 in OJ LI83) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 20 
September 1995 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4064/89 (IV/M.553 -
RTL/Veronica/Endemol) (Only the 
English text is authentic) (published on 
the 05-06-96 in the OJ LI34) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.738 -
Natwest/Schroder/Sheffield) (published 
on the 09-07-96 in OJ C199) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.700 -
Emerson/Caterpillar) (published on the 
06-07-96 in OJ C195) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.689 -
ADSB/Belgacom) (published on the 
05-07-96 in OJ C194) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.748 -
CGEA/NSC) (published on the 02-07-96 
inOJC191) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.742 - Toro 
Assicurazioni/Nuova Tirrena) (published 
on the 02-07-96 inOJC191) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.556 -
Zeneca/Vanderhave) (published on the 
28-06-96 in OJ C188) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.721 -
Textron/Valois) (published on the 
26-06-96 in OJ C186) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.724 -
GEC/Thomson-CSF (II)) (published on 
the 26-06-96 in OJ C186) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.732 -
Nordic Capital/Euroc) (published on the 
04-06-96 in OJ C159) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No 1V/M.733 
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Frantschach/B+K/Volfin) (published on 
the 01-06-96 in OJ C157) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.683 -
GTS-Hermes Inc./HIT Rail BV) 
(published on the 01-06-96 in OJ C157) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.726 -
Bosch/Allied Signal) (published on the 
30-05-96 in OJ C155) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.710 -
BHF-Bank/Credit Commercial de 
France) (published on the 29-05-96 in 
OJC154) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.740 -
Krupp (II)) (published on the 16-05-96 
in OJ C144) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.731 -
Kvaerner/Trafalgar) (published on the 
07-05-96 in OJ C135) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.717 -
Viacom/Bear Steams) (published on the 
04-05-96 in OJ C132) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.714 -
Preussag/ELCO Looser) (published on 
the 03-05-96 in OJ C130) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.699 -
Tomkins/Gates) (published on the 
27-04-96 in OJ C124) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.675 -
Alumix/Alcoa) (published on the 
25-04-96 in OJ C121) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.704 -
Unilever/Diversey) (published on the 
18-04-96 in OJ CI 13) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.741 -
Ford/Mazda) (published on the 22-06-96 
in O J C179) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.744 -
Thomson/Daimler-Benz) (published on 
the 22-06-96 in OJ C179) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.663 -
DOW/Dupont) (published on the 
10-04-96 in OJ C104) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.698 -
NAW/Saltano/Contrac) (published on 
the 04-04-96 in OJ C102) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.702 -
Starck/Wienerberger) (published on the 
04-04-96 in OJ C102) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.718 -
Phoenix/Comifar) (published on the 
03-04-96 in OJ C101) 
Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.651 -
AT&T/Philips) (published on the 
02-04-96 in OJ C99) 
Inapplicability of the Regulation to a 
notified operation (Case No IV/M.711 -
Generali/Unicredito) (published on 04-
05-96 in OJ C132) 
Inapplicability of the Regulation to a 
notified operation (Case No IV/M.722 -
Teneo/Merill Lynch/Bankers Trust) 
(published on 04-07-96 in OJ C159) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.797 - GrantRail 
Limited) (published on the 30-07-96 in 
OJ C221) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.803 - Rewe / Billa) 
(published on the 30-07-96 in OJ C221) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.806 - British 
Airways/TAT) (published on the 
27-07-96 in OJ C218) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.800 - Siemens/Sommer 
Allibert Industrie) (published on the 
23-07-96 in OJ C213) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.798 - General Electric / 
CompuNet) (published on the 19-07-96 
in OJ C208) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.736 - CCB/CLF) 
(published on the 19-07-96 in OJ C208) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.785 - Thomas Cook / 
Sunworld) (published on the 13-07-96 in 
OJ C203) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.727 - BP/Mobil) 
(published on the 12-07-96 in OJ C202) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.767 - Thomson-
CSF/Finmeccanica/Elettronica) 
(published on the 11-07-96 in O J C201) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.774 - Saint-
Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM) 
(published on the 10-07-96 in OJ C200) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.769 - Norsk 
Hydro/Arnyca (Enichem Agricoltura)) 
(published on the 05-07-96 in OJ C194) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.750 - IFTL/Worms/Saint 
Louis) (published on the 05-07-96 in OJ 
C194) 
Request for examination of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.784 -
Kesko/Tuko) (published on the 04-07-96 
in OJ C193) 
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Request for examination of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.801 -
Blokker/Toys R Us) (published on the 
26-07-96 in OJ C216) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.734 - Melitta/Dow-
Newco) (published on the 04-07-96 in 
OJ C193) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.760 - Klöckner/ARUS) 
(published on the 26-07-96 in OJ C216) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.747 - Chevron 
Corporation/British Gas/NOVA 
Corporation/NGC Corporation) 
(published on the 02-07-96 in OJ C191) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.709 - Telefonica / 
Sogecable / Cablevision) (published on 
the 11-06-96 in OJ C167 and on the 29-
06-96 in OJ C189) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.771 - AMB/Rodutch) 
(published on the 29-06-96 in OJ C189) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.787 - PTT Post/TNT -
GD NET) (published on the 27-06-96 in 
OJ C187) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.789 - Enderly/SBE) 
(published on the 27-06-96 in OJ C187) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.757 - 3M/Hoechst) 
(published on the 27-06-96 in OJ C187) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.782 - Swissair/Allders 
International) (published on the 
25-06-96 in OJ C184) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.768 - Lucas/Varity) 
(published on the 20-06-96 in OJ C177) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.730 - IP/Reuters) 
(published on the 12-06-96 in OJ C168) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.751 - Bayer/Huls -
Newco) (published on the 12-06-96 in 
O J C168) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.764 - St-Gobain/Poliet) 
(published on the 12-06-96 in OJ C168) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.709 -
Telefonica/Sogecable/Cablevision) 
(published on the 11-06-96 in OJ CI 16) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.745 - Bayernwerk/Gaz 
de France) (published on the 08-06-96 
in OJ C165) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.735 - BPB/Isover) 
(published on the 08-06-96 in OJ C165) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.775 - Hong Kong Aero 
Engine Services - 'HAESL') (published 
on the 06-06-96 in OJ C162) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.719 - Rohm/Rohm and 
Haas) (published on the 06-06-96 in OJ 
C162) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.756 - Credit 
Agricole/Banque Indosuez) (published 
on the 01-06-96 in OJ C157) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.765 - ADIA/ECCO) 
(published on the 30-05-96 in OJ C155) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.758 - Sara Lee/Aoste 
Holding SA) (published on the 29-05-96 
in OJ C154) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.759 - Sun 
Alliance/Royal Insurance) (published on 
the 22-05-96 in OJ C148) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.708 - Exxon/DSM) 
(published on the 22-05-96 in OJ C148) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.755 -
Creditanstalt/Koramic) (published on the 
21-05-96 in OJ C146) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.720 - Cereol/Aceprosa) 
(published on the 11-05-96 in OJ C140) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.700 -
Emerson/Caterpillar) (published on the 
03-05-96 in OJ C130) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.742 - Toro 
Assicurazioni/Nuova Tirrena) (published 
on the 25-04-96 in OJ C121) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.741 - Ford/Mazda) 
(published on the 25-04-96 in OJ C121) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.605 -
Hoechst/Klockner-Werke/Hartfolien) 
(published on the 23-04-96 in OJ CI 18) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.748 - CGEA/NSC) 
(published on the 20-04-96 in OJ CI 16) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.744 -
Thomson/Daimler-Benz) (published on 
the 19-04-96 in OJ CI 14) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.724 -
GEC/Thomson-CSF (II)) (published on 
the 19-04-96 in OJ CI 14) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.733 -
Frantschach/B+K/Volfin) (published on 
the 12-04-96 in OJ C106) 
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Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.710 - BHF-Bank/Credit 
Commercial de France) (published on 
the 11-04-96 in OJ C105) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.740 - Krupp II) 
(published on the 10-04-96 in OJ C104) 
Prior notification of a concentration 
(Case No IV/M.737 -
Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy) (published on the 
04-04-96 inOJ C102) 
Opinion of the Advisory Committee on 
Concentrations given at the 32nd 
meeting on 5 September 1995 
concerning a preliminary draft decision 
relating to Case IV/M553 -
RTL/Veronica/Endemol (published on 
05-07-96 in OJ C160) 
Opinion of the Advisory Committee on 
Concentrations given at the 35th 
meeting on 20 December 1995 
concerning a preliminary draft decision 
relating to Case IV/M.623 - Kimberly-
Clark/Scott Paper (published on 23-07-
96 ¡nOJC213) 
STATE AID 
Amended proposal for a Council 
Regulation (EC) amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70 on the 
granting of aids for transport by rail, 
roal and inland waterways (published on 
20-06-96 inOJ C177) 
Commission communication on the 
method of application of Article 
92(3 )(c) of the EC Treaty to national 
regional aid (Text with EEA relevance) 
(published on 26-06-96 in OJ C186) 
Community guidelines on State aid for 
small and medium-sized enterprises 
(published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213) 
Accelerated procedure for processing 
notifications of employment aid -
Standard notification form (published on 
27-07-96 in OJC218) 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 
on aid to shipbuilding (published on 23-
07-96 in OJ C213) 
DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT 
COMMITTEE No 16/96 of 4 March 
1996 amending Annex XV (State aid) to 
the EEA Agreement (published on 
23-05-96 in OJ LI24) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 20 
December 1995 amending Spanish aid 
schemes for the motor vehicle industry 
(Only the Spanish text is authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) (published 
on 16-05-96 in OJ LI 19) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 13 
March 1996 concerning fiscal aid given 
to German airlines in the form of a 
depreciation facility (Only the German 
text is authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) (published on the 20-06-96 in 
the OJ LI46) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 21 
February 1996 relating to aid granted by 
the French Government to Cellulose du 
Rhone et de l'Aquitaine (CDRA) (Only 
the French text is authentic) (Text with 
EEA relevance) (published on the 
18-06-96 in the OJ LI44) 
EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY 
DECISION No 23/96/COL of 6 March 
1996 on the seventh amendment of the 
procedural and substantive rules in the 
field of State aid (new rules on State aid 
to the synthetic fibres industry) 
(published on the 13-06-96 in the OJ 
LI 40) 
EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY 
DECISION No 124/95/COL of 6 
December 1995 on the sixth amendment 
of the procedural and substantive rules 
in the field of State aid (published on 
the 23-05-96 in the OJ LI24) 
EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY 
DECISION No 106/95/COL of 31 
October 1995 on a tax exemption for 
glass packaging from a basic tax on 
non-reusable beverage packaging (Aid 
No 95-002 (Norway)) (published on the 
23-05-96 in the OJ LI24) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 7 
February 1996 concerning aid to be 
granted by Ireland to the steel company 
Irish Steel (Only the English text is 
authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(published on the 21-05-96 in the OJ 
L121) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 15 April 
1996 relating to aids in Finland in the 
live plant and floriculture products sector 
(published on the 03-05-96 in the OJ 
LI 09) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 31 
January 1996 concerning the 
recapitalization of the Iberia company 
(Only the Spanish text is authentic) (Text 
with EEA relevance) (published on the 
27-04-96 in the OJ LI04) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 7 
February 1996 concerning additional 
financial aid by the United Kingdom in 
respect of the coal industry in the 
1995/96 financial year (Only the English 
text is authentic) (published on the 
25-04-96 in the OJ L102) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 29 
November 1995 on aid to be granted by 
Austria to Voest-Alpine Erzberg 
Gesellschaft mbH (Only the German text 
is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) 
(published on the 16-04-96 in the O J 
L94) 
COMMISSION DECISION of 31 
October 1995 concerning the aid granted 
by Spain to Seat SA, a member of the 
Volkswagen group (Only the Spanish 
text is authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) (published on the 05-04-96 in 
the OJ L88) 
Commission Decision of 13 May 1996 
amending Decision 96/169/EC 
concerning the dates to be fixed by 
Member States for the submission of 
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'area' aid applications under the 
integarted administration and control 
system for certain Community aid 
schemes (the 'integrated system') 
(published on the 15-05-96 in the OJ 
L142) 
Commission Decision of 20 March 1996 
on aid which Italy plans to grant to 
enterprises in a state of insolvency 
resulting from the obligation to repay 
State aid pursuant to Community 
decisions adopted under Articles 92 and 
93 of the Treaty (Text with EEA 
relevance) (published on the 19-07-96 
inOJ LI80) 
Authorization for State aid pursuant to 
Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty -
Cases where the Commission raises no 
objections (Text with EEA relevance) 
- published on 04-04-96 in OJ C102 
- published on 10-04-96 in OJ C104 
- published on 18-04-96 in OJ CI 13 
- published on 19-04-96 in OJ CI 14 
- published on 20-04-96 in OJ CI 16 
- published on 26-04-96 in OJ C123 
- published on 01-05-96 in OJ C128 
- published on 24-05-96 in OJ C150 
- published on 30-05-96 in OJ C155 
- published on 01-07-96 in OJ C157 
- published on 12-06-96 in OJ C168 
- published on 18-06-96 in OJ C175 
- published on 28-06-96 in OJ C188 
- published on 05-07-96 in OJ C194 
- N136/95 and N137/95 published on 
11-07-96 inOJC201 
- published on 19-07-96 in OJ C208 
- published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213 
- published on 25-07-96 in OJ C215 
- published on 31-07-96 in OJ C222 
State aid 
- C54/95 (ex N777/95, N780/95, 
N790/95, N791/95, N793/95, N794/95): 
Italy (published on 03-04-96 in OJ 
C101) 
- C61/95 (ex NN69/94): Germany 
(published on 03-04-96 in OJ C101) 
- C55/95 (ex NN46/95): Italy 
(published on 04-04-96 in OJ C102) 
- C4/96 (ex N360/95): Italy (published 
on 10-04-96 in OJ C104) 
- C1/96 (ex N977, 978, 979/95): Italy 
(published on 25-04-96 in OJ CI21) 
- C2/96 (ex N829/95): Germany 
(published on 25-04-96 in OJ C121) 
- CIO/96 (NN 142/95): Belgium 
(published on 25-04-96 in OJ C121) 
- C27/95 (ex NN 45/95): France 
(published on 27-04-96 in OJ C124) 
- C60/95 (NN 169/95): Austria 
(published on 27-04-96 in OJ C124) 
- C5/95 (ex N741/94): Belgium 
(Wallonia region) (published on 14-05-
96 in OJC142) 
- C15/95 (ex N 679/94) Belgium 
(Flanders) (published on 14-05-96 in OJ 
C142) 
- C53/95 (ex NN 143/95): Spain 
(published on 16-05-96 in OJ C144) 
- C57/95 (ex NN 67/95): Germany 
(published on 16-05-96 in OJ C144) 
- C58/95 (ex NN72/95): Germany 
(Northrhine Westphalia) (published on 
16-05-96 in OJ C144) 
- Cl 1/96 (ex N1/96): Germany 
(published on 16-05-96 in OJ C144) 
- C7/96 (ex N806/95 and NN31/96): 
Germany - New Länder (published on 
24-05-96 inOJ C150) 
- C9/96 (ex N518/B/95): Italy - Sicily 
(published on 24-05-96 in OJ C150) 
- C8/96 (ex N5 37/94): Italy (published 
on 25-05-96 inOJC151) 
- C6/96 (ex N853/95): Austria 
(published on 12-06-96 in OJ C168) 
- C53/94 (NN 126/94): France 
(published on 15-06-96 in OJ C171) 
- C14/94 : Greece (published on 19-06-
96 in O J C176) 
- C2/95 (ex N775/94 and N776/94): 
Germany (published on 26-06-96 in OJ 
C186) 
- C16/96 (ex N205/96): France 
(published on 09-07-96 in OJ C199) 
- C43/95 (ex NN73/94): Italy (Lazio) 
(published on 12-07-96 in OJ C202) 
- C3/96 (ex NN187/95): France 
(published on 17-07-96 in OJ C206) 
- C13/96 (ex N88/96): Spain (published 
on 17-07-96 in OJ C206) 
- C18/96 (ex N246/96): France 
(published on 17-07-96 in OJ C206) 
-C19/96 (ex N 177,178, 180, 181, 
182/96): Italy (published on 25-07-96 in 
OJ C215) 
Corrigendum to the authorization for 
State aid pusuant to Articles 92 and 93 
of the EC Treaty (OJ C 55, 24-02-96) 
(published on 17-04-96 in OJ CI 11) 
Corrigendum to the authorization for 
State aid pusuant to Articles 92 and 93 
of the EC Treaty (OJ C 53, 22-02-96) 
(published on 17-04-96 in OJ CI 11) 
Assent No 14/96 given by the Council 
pursuan! to the second paragraph of 
Article 64 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community 
(published on 13-07-96 in OJ C203) 
Assent No 16/96 given by the Council 
pursuant to the second paragraph of 
Article 54 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community 
(published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213) 
Authorization of State aid pursuant to 
Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and 
Article 4(7) of the Act referred to in 
point lb of the Annex XV to the EEA 
Agreement - EFTA Surveillance 
Authority decision not to raise objections 
(published on 23-05-96 in OJ C149) 
Authorization of State aid pursuant to 
Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and 
Article 1(3) of Protocol 3 to the 
Surveillance and Court Agreement -
EFTA Surveillance Authority decision 
not to raise objections 
- published on 23-05-96 in OJ C149 
- published on 20-06-96 in OJ C177 
WRITTEN QUESTIONS 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-430/96 by 
Bernie Malone (PSE) to the Commission 
(29 February 1996) (96/C 173/110) 
Subject: State aid to Iberia (published on 
17-06-96 in OJ CI 17) 
WRITTEN QUESTION P-811/96 by 
David Hallam (PSE) to the Commission 
(26 March 1996) (96/C 183/92) Subject: 
European Union subsidies to the carpet 
industry (published on 24-06-96 in OJ 
C118) 
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WRITTEN QUESTION P-709/96 by 
Richard Howitt (PSE) to the 
Commission (12 March 1996) (96/C 
183/87) Subject: Mobil and BP merger 
(published on 24-06-96 in OJ CI 18) 
WRITTEN QUESTION P-707/96 by 
Carl Lang (NI) to the Commission (12 
March 1996) (96/C 183/86) Subject: Aid 
to the textile industry (published on 
24-06-96 in OJ CI 18) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3501/95 by 
Per Stenmarck (PPE) to the Commission 
(3 January 1996) (96/C 161/36) Subject: 
De-regulation of the postal services 
market (published on 05-06-96 in OJ 
CI 16) 
WRITTEN QUESTION P-237/96 by 
Phillip Whitehead (PSE) to the 
Commission (31 January 1996) (96/C 
122/79) Subject: Car distribution 
Regulation (published on 25-04-96 in 
OJC112) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-166/96 by 
Bryan Cassidy (PPE) to the Commission 
(1 February 1996) (96/C 122/73) 
Subject: Ρ & I Clubs - The International 
Group Agreement (IGA) (published on 
25-04-96 in OJ CI 12) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-165/96 by 
Bryan Cassidy (PPE) to the Commission 
(1 February 1996) (96/C 122/72) 
Subject: Ρ & I Clubs - The International 
Group Agreement (IGA) (published on 
25-04-96 in OJ CI 12) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-164/96 by 
Bryan Cassidy (PPE) to the Commission 
(1 February 1996) (96/C 122/71) 
Subject: Ρ & I Clubs - The International 
Group Agreement (IGA) (published on 
25-04-96 in OJ CI 12) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3563/95 by 
Irene Crepaz (PSE) to the Commission 
(5 January 1996) (96/C 112/78) Subject: 
Liberalization of the energy market: 
consumer protection (published on 
17-04-96 in OJ CI 11) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3453/95 by 
Susan Waddington (PSE) to the 
Commission (18 December 1995) (96/C 
112/56) Subject: State subsidies to 
European airlines (published on 
17-04-96 in OJ CI 11) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3072/95 by 
Bartho Pronk (PPE) to the Commission 
(20 November 1995) (96/C 112/32) 
Subject: European generic 
pharmaceuticals industry (published on 
17-04-96 in OJ CI 11) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-3134/95 by 
Jesus Cabezón Alonso (PSE) to the 
Commission (20 November 1995) (96/C 
109/47) Subject: EU workers on board 
Moroccan fishing vessels (published on 
15-04-96 in OJ C110) 
WRITTEN QUESTION P-575/96 by 
Peter Skinner (PSE) to the Commission 
(1 March 1996) (96/C 173/129) 
Subject: Kimberley Clark/Scott merger 
and subsequent redundancies (published 
on the 17-06-96 in OJ CI 17) 
WRITTEN QUESTION E-210/96 by 
Cristiana Muscardini (NI) to the 
Commission (5 February 1996) (96/C 
173/64) Subject: Acquisitions by the 
Olivetti Group of telecommunications 
media (published on the 17-06-96 in OJ 
C117) 
COURT OF JUSTICE/TRIBUNAL 
Affaires introduites devant la Cour 
Aff. C-67/96 
Albany International BV / Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie 
Préjudicielle - Kantongerecht te 
Arnhem - Interprétation des art. 85, 86 
et 90 du traité CE - Application à une 
fondation gérant un fond de pensions 
obligatoires pour les entreprises de 
l'industrie textile 
Aff. C-106/96 
Royaume-Uni / Commission 
Annulation des décisions faisant l'objet 
du communiqué de presse de la 
Commission du 23 janvier 1996 
(IP/96/67) - Aides aux projets européens 
pour combattre l'exclusion sociale 
Aff. C-148/96 Ρ (R) Anthony Goldstein / 
Commission; Pourvoi contre 
l'ordonnance de référé du Président du 
Tribunal, rendue le 27 février 1996, dans 
l'affaire T-235/95 - Ordonnance portatnt 
rejet d'une demande de mesures 
provisoires introduite dans le cadre d'une 
procédure tendant à faire constater la 
violation des art. 85 et 86 du traité CE 
par le "General Medical Council" 
organisme chargé de réglementer les 
professions médicales au Royaume-Uni. 
Aff. C-163/96 
Silvano Raso e.a. 
Demande de décision préjudicielle -
Pretura circondariale - La Spezia -
Interprétation des art. 59, 86 et 90, par. 
1, du traité CE - Réglementation 
nationale qui interdit aux entreprises 
concessionnaires d'un terminal portuaire 
d'avoir recours à l'activité 
d'entreprises autres que celles 
constituées par les anciennes 
compagnies ou groupes portuaires pour 
la prestation de services aux utilisateurs 
du terminal 
Aff. C-176/96 
Jyri Lehtonen et Castors Canada Dry 
Namur-Braine ASBL / Fédération 
royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball 
(FRBSB) ASBL 
Demande de décision préjudicielle -
Tribunal de première instance de 
Bruxelles - Interprétation des art. 6, 
48, 85 et 86 du traité CE -
Réglementation d'une fédération sportive 
qui fixe des périodes de transferts pour 
l'engagement de joueurs professionnels 
pouvant être alignés au cours d'une 
période de championnatAff. C-182/96 
Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision C(96)841 
final concernant une aide fiscale en 
matière d'amortissements octroyée au 
profit d'entreprises allemandes -
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Amortissements extraordinaires sur les 
aéronefs 
Aff. C-195/96 
Allemagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision C(96)1203 
final de la Commission concernant une 
aide d'Etat concédée par le Freistaat 
Bayern à l'entreprise CECA Neue 
Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH 
Affaires introduites devant le 
Tribunal 
Aff. T-37/96: Luftfartsfunktionaererne / 
Commission; Annulation de la 
decision de la Commission 
96/180/CE relative a une procedure 
d'application de l'art. 85 du traite CE 
et de l'art. 53 de l'accord EEE 
(IV/35.545 LH/SAS) - Accord de 
cooperation entre Lufthansa et SAS 
Aff. T-38/96: Guerin Automobiles / 
Commission; Recours en carence 
tendant a faire constater que la 
Commission s'est illégalement abstenue 
de prendre une decision suite a la 
plainte déposée par la requérante sur le 
fondement de l'art. 85 du traite CE et 
du reglement (CEE) no 123/85 de la 
Commission et concernant l'imposition 
par la société Nissan France d'un 
regime de concession incompatible 
avec les conditions dudit reglement -
Nouvelle mise en demeure adressée a 
la Commission suite a l'exception 
d'irrecevabilité soulevée par celle-ci 
dans l'affaire T-195/95 - Recours en 
indemnité en reparation du prejudice 
prétendument cause par le 
comportement de la Commission 
Aff. T-39/96: SGA / Commission; 
Recours en carence tendant a faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre une 
decision ainsi que d'adopter des 
mesures provisoires suite a la plainte 
déposée par la requérante sur le 
fondement de l'art. 85 du traite CE et 
de l'art. 3 point 11 du reglement (CEE) 
no 123/85 de la Commission, et 
concernant les agissements de la 
société Peugeot auprès des 
concessionnaires de ses filiales 
étrangères afin de les empêcher 
d'accepter de vendre des véhicules 
aux intermédiaires francais - Nouvelle 
mise en demeure - Recours en 
indemnité en reparation du prejudice 
prétendument cause par le 
comportement de la Commission 
Aff. T-31/96: Credit Lyonnais / 
Commission; Annulation de l'art. 2 c) 
de la decision (95/547/CE) de la 
Commission portant approbation 
conditionnée de l'aide accordée par la 
France a la banque Credit Lyonnais 
Aff. T-32/96: Société Generale / 
Commission (Voir affaire T-31/96) 
Aff. T-41/96: Bayer / Commission; 
Annulation de la decision de la 
Commission relative a une procedure 
d'application de l'art. 85 du traite CE 
(IV/34.279/F3) ADALAT - Interdiction 
imposée par la requérante aux 
grossistes établis dans les divers 
Etats membres d'exporter le 
medicament en question vers d'autres 
Etats membres - Demande de 
dommages-intérêts 
Aff. T-45/96: Sodima / Commission; 
Recours en carence tendant a faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre une 
decision suite a la plainte déposée par la 
requérante sur le fondement des art. 85 
et 86 du traite ainsi que du reglement 
(CEE) no 123/85 de la Commission et 
concernant l'imposition par la société 
Peugeot d'un regime de concession 
incompatible avec les conditions 
d'exemption établies par ledit reglement 
- Nouvelle mise en demeure adressée a 
la Commission suite a l'exception 
d'irrecevabilité soulevée par celle-ci 
dans l'affaire T-190/95 - Recours en 
indemnité en reparation du prejudice 
prétendument cause par le comportement 
de la Commission 
Aff. T-52/96: Sogecable / Commission; 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission de considérer que l'accord 
de création de la société 
"Cablevision" constitue une opération 
de concentration de dimension 
communautaire, dans le sens du 
règlement (CEE) nu 4064/89, relatif au 
contrôle des opérations de 
concentration entre entreprises 
Aff. T-65/96: Kish Glass / Commission; 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 21 février 1996, rejetant 
la plainte de la requérante relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'art. 86 du 
traité CE (Affaire IV/34.193 - Kish 
Glass) 
BOOKS and PUBLICATIONS 
Received by DG IV' s library 
GATS: the General Agreement on 
Trade in services: a guide for 
business/EU. European Commission. 
ISBN 92-827-4230-X. 
The law of the European Community: 
including the EEA agreement by 
Andrew Evans. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994. 
ISBN 82-518-3234-9. 
Cases and materials: the law of the 
European Community including the 
EEA Agreement edited by Andrew 
Evans and Per Falk. Helsinki: 
Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1994. ISBN 
82-518-3276-4 
Konzeption, Formen und Wirkungen 
der Subventionen zur Förderung der 
Transformation in Ostdeutschland von 
Kersten Trojanus. München: IFO-Institut 
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für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1995. ISBN 3­
88512­252­9. 
Country profile-Lithuania 1993. 
European Commission 1996. ISBN 92­
827­5952­0. 
Kooperationsgruppen des Handels 
und Franchisesysteme in Europa aus 
der Sicht des EG-Wettbewerbsrechts 
von Volker Beuthien, Günter Christian 
Schwarz. ISBN 3­525­86053­6. 
Droit communautaire des affaires. 
Tome 2. Droit communautaire de la 
concurrence par André Decocq. Paris: 
Cours de droit­Litec, 1995. 1994/95. 
ISBN 2­7111­2482­7. 
Die Wettbewerbs- und Kartellgesetze 
der osteuropäischen Staaten/hrsg. und 
eingeleitet von Ulrich W. Schulze. 
Berlin Verl. 1994. 
European Community air law by John 
Balfour. London Butterworths 1995. 
ISBN 0­406­05217­4. 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute. 
22nd annual conference on international 
antitrust law & policy. 1995. 
Free movement of goods in the 
European Community under articles 
30 to 36 of the Rome Treaty by Peter 
Oliver. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1996. ISBN 0­421­51110­9. 
Die Finanzierungshilfen des Bundes, 
der Länder und der internationalen 
Institutionen. Ausgabe 1995/96. 
Electric utility regulation in the 
European Union - a country by 
country guide by Eugene D. CROSS. 
Chichester : Wiley, 1996 
Competition policy : a game-theoretic 
perspective by Louis Philips. 
Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 1995. ISBN 0­521­49871­6. 
Cinema, television, video et nouveaux 
medias en Europe : annuaire 
statistique... by Ismo Silvo 1995/96. 
ISBN 92­871­2661­5 
Commercial Communications. DG 
XV. March 1996. Vol. 1. Issue 3. Cl­
AA­96­003­EN­C. 
Le Traité de Maastricht: genese, 
analyse, commentaires. J. Cloos, G. 
Reinesch, D. Vignes, J. Weyland. 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1994. ISBN 2­
8027­0931­3. 
Privatisations: un défi stratégique, 
juridique et institutionnel. P. Guislain 
avec la collaboration de M. Knerf. 
Bruxelles, De Boeck, 1995. ISBN 2­
8041­1981­5. 
EEC competition law handbook. M. 
van der Woude, C. Jones and X. Lewis. 
London, Sweet and Maxwell. 1995. 
Sicherung des Leistungswettbewerbs 
durch das Verbot der unbilligen 
Behinderung in § 26 Abs. 4 GWB. J. 
Wuttke. Carl Heymanns Verlag 
KG. 1995. 
Aspects juridiques de la concurrence 
martitime. G. Athanassiou. Paris, 
Pedone 1996. ISBN 2­233­00286­5. 
Europe, concurrence et service 
public/Centre européen des 
entreprises à participation publique. 
Paris, Masson 1995. ISBN 2­225­84975­
7 
La consommation d'électricité, de gaz 
naturel et de fuel en France et les 
conditions de la concurrence entre 
les énergies. J.J. Rosa. Janvier 1996 
Les communications cellulaires 
mobiles: stratégies de tarification et 
concurrence/OCDE. Paris, OCDE, 
1996. ISBN 92­64­24789­0 
Comparative Competition Policy. 
National Institutions in a global market. 
G. Bruce Doem and S. Wilks. 
Clarendon Press ­ Oxford, 1996 
Competition policy. 1994 Workshop 
with the dynamic non-member 
economies. Organisation for economic 
co­operation and development. Paris 
1996 
The revival of Japanese competition 
policy and its importance for EU-
Japan relations. S. Wilks with a preface 
by K. Sanekata. ISBN 0­905031­83­0 
European consumer guide to the single 
market/EU (2nd edition)EN & FR. 
European Commission. 1996. 
Trends in Europe. Consumer Attitudes 
and the Supermarket 1995. Report by 
A. Tordjman, HEC School of 
Management. France. 
Die Kontrolle und Harmonisierung 
nationaler Beihilfen durch die 
Kommission der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften. M. Rosenstock. 
Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften 
Peter Lang. 
Subventions à l'industrie: manuel de 
notification/OECD. Paris, OCDE, 1995. 
ISBN 92­64­24318­6. 
Forschungssubventionen aus 
wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht. M. 
Meyer. Baden­Baden, Nomos, 1995. 
ISBN 3­7890­3701­X. 
Policy issues in insurance: investment, 
taxation, insolvency/OECD. Paris, 
OECD, 1996. ISBN 92­64­14787­X. 
Aspects fondamentaux des assurances: 
investissement, fiscalité, 
insolvabilité/OCDE. Paris, OCDE, 
1996. ISBN 92­64­24787­4 
Guide de l'artisanat et de la petite 
entreprise dans l'Union européenne: 
Représentation -Services officiels -
Politiques/UE, Commission 
européenne. Bruxelles, Delta 1995. 
ISBN 2­8029­0119­2. 
The Merck index. An encyclopedia of 
chemicals, drugs and biologicals ed by 
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Susan Budavari, Maryadèle J. O'Neil (e. 
a.) 12th ed. 1996. ISBN 0-911910-12-3 
Reshaping Greece's Energy 
Legislation: the Gradual Adjustment 
to EC Standards and Objectives, by 
Anna Papaioannou. Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law. Vol. 14. N 1. 
February 1996 
Öffentliche Unternehmen und die 
Beihilfeaufsicht der EU, Wie 
Subventionen von der Europäischen 
Kommission beurteilt verden, by Karl 
Soukup, MANZ, ISBN 3-214-08235-3 
Coming up 
The following publications are 
under preparation by DG IV; 
however, a budget has been 
allocated only for publications 
marked with an *: 
EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter: autumn/Winter 1996 
Competition law in the European 
Communities -volume IB 
Explanation of rules applicable to 
undertakings. 
Dealing with the Commission -
notifications, complaints, 
inspections and fact-finding 
powers. 
Competition law in the European 
Communities -volume 3A: 
International aspects of 
competition policy* 
Competition law in the European 
Communities -Addendum to 
volume 2A: Rules applicable to 
State aid. 
Actes Forum Européen de la 
Concurrence.(co-edition with J. 
Wiley) Catalog number: CV-88-95-
985-EN-C* 
L' application des articles 85/86 
par les juridictions nationales* 
Recueil des décisions sur les aides 
d'Etat* 
Brochure sur la politique de la 
concurrence dans le Marché 
unique (concernant les 
art.85,86,90 et le règlement sur les 
concentrations) 
Brochure sur la politique 
concernant les aides d'Etat 
Brochure concernant des sujets 
présentant un intérêt pratique 
pour l'industrie de la 
Communauté et plus 
particulièrement les PMEs 
Video: Introduction to 
competition policy 
Video: Dealing with the 
Commission - Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact-
finding powers 
Exchange of confidential 
Information Agreements and 
Treaties between the US and 
certain Member States 
DG IV on the World 
Wide Web 
Since the 25th of June 1996, DG IV 
has a home page on the Europa 
server available on the World Wide 
Web. Our address is 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/ 
dg4home.htm. 
On the new homepage the following 
information can be found: 
DG TV's Mission & Directory : 
Under this heading the user can find 
a brief description of the main areas 
of DG IV's activity and some 
introductury articles on European 
competition policy. DG IV's staff list 
is also available. 
What is New : Most recent 
developments. 
DG IV's areas of activity : for the 
main DG IV's areas of activity we 
already introduce (or plan to 
introduce in the near future) data for 
the following sub-headings: 
Press releases issued during the past 
month : These documents are 
downloaded daily from the RAPID 
database; because of the updating 
procedure data is introduced with a 
delay of 2-3 working days. 
Published in the Official Journal 
during the last 6 months : We plan to 
introduce the full text of important 
documents published in the Official 
Journal. Only the published version 
will be legally binding and data will 
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be introduced some days after 
publication. 
Legislation in force : A full list by 
subject will be introduced. This sub­
heading will in term contain an 
updated version of the legislation 
published in Vol IA: Rules 
applicable to undertakings; Vol IIA: 
Rules applicable to state aid; Vol 
ΠΙΑ: International dimension. 
Commission Decisions on individual 
cases : A full list by year is already 
available for the antitrust and merger 
headings. A list of the most 
important decisions by subject year 
is also under preparation. We also 
plan at a later stage to introduce the 
text of the most important acts of the 
latest week, after their publication in 
the Official Journal. 
Judgements of the European Court 
of Justice and the Court of First 
instance : According to preliminary 
information, the Court of Justice will 
inaugurate its own World Wide Web 
site later this year. By using 
extensive links we hope we will be 
able to provide : a) the schedule of 
the Court and the Court of First 
Instance; b) a full list of cases 
introduced; c) a full list of 
Judgments of the Court and the CFI 
by year and by subject; and d) the 
text of the most important acts of the 
latest week. Interested users can 
already find several comments and 
analyses drafted by DG IV officials 
and already published in the EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter. 
Communications and important 
documents : this heading will 
eventually contain miscelaneous 
information of some importance 
(e.g. under the State Aid heading the 
reference rates used by the 
Commission to measure the aid 
element of state subsidies; under the 
Mergers heading the monthly and 
annual equivalences between the 
ECU and national currencies 
necessary for the calculation of the 
yearly turnover in ECUs) 
Documentation, publications 
speeches and articles : This heading 
already contains all speeches of the 
Commissionner for Competition and 
of DG IV officials since 1993, as 
well as the Newsletter, the Annual 
Competition Report, the list of 
Community publications on 
Competition available to the public 
and what is coming up etc. 
Specialfeatures : under the heading 
International Dimension the user 
will find links to the most important 
sites of national competition 
authorities. DG IV's publications are 
available in a portable document 
format (pdf) produced with the 
Adobe Acrobat® software. 
Interested users can download the 
documents but they will also need 
the Acrobat Reader® software to 
read them. This software is available 
free of charge and enables the user 
to read and print pdf documents on 
his/her printer without changing the 
initial format. In a certain way an 
exact facsimile "paper copy" of the 
original can be reproduced locally. 
Finally, interested users should note 
that DG IV's pages are under 
construction. Members of DG IV's 
Cellule Information do their best -
view the extremely limited resources 
available - to introduce data for each 
heading and we expect to cover all 
headings systematically as from 
September onwards. It goes without 
saying that your comments, ideas 
and corrections - even your positive 
feedback - are always welcome, 
preferably by e-mail 
(info4@dg4.cec.be). The site was set 
up since January 1996 by Gerald 
Messiaen, official at DG IV-01. 
More Information ... 
The Directorate General for Competition 
(DG IV) receives many requests with 
specific questions. It is in fact 
impossible, given the resources 
available, to investigate and reply 
individually to each one of them., so in 
the future we will answer only requests 
for the annual report and the 
Newsletter. In order to better inform the 
public on Competition Policy, DG IV 
produces several publications, available 
through the Office for Official 
Publications of the European Union (see 
catalog under the heading Community 
Publications on Competition). Wc also 
publish three times a year the "EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter", 
available free of charge. Speeches by the 
Competition Commissioner and by 
officials from the Directorate General as 
well as general documentation will be 
systematically available through our 
WWW home pages. Please address your 
correspondence to : 
European Commission, 
Directorate General IV-Competition, 
Cellule Information, 
C150 001158, Rue de la Loi 200 
Wetstraat, Bruxelles 
B-1049 Brussel, Belgium. 
fax(+322) 29 55437 E-Mail: 
Internet: info4@dg4.cecJje X.400: 
c=be;a=rtt;p=cec;ou=dg4;s=info4 
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Cases covered in this issue 
Anti-trust Rules Mergers 
Commission Decisions 
20 Banque Nationale de Paris / Dresdner Bank 
21 BFGoodrich / Messier-Bugatti 
21 Fenex 
22 Eudim 
23 St Lawrence Coordinated Service 
23 East African Container Service 
23 Joint Mediterranean Canada Service 
23 Joint Pool Agreement 
23 Baltic Liner Conference Agreement 
24 Interbrew 
25 Novo Nordisk 
26 Deutsche Telekom 
27 VISA 
Commission Decisions 
30 Gencor / Lonrho 
31 Ciba-Geigy / Sandoz 
32 Bosch / Allied Signal 
32 Holland Media Groep 
33 Shell / Montecatini 
34 GEHE / Lloyds Chemists 
34 Telefonica / Sogecable / Cablevision 
35 Kesko / Tuko 
35 Saint-Gobain / Wacker Chemie / NOM 
Court Judgements 





38 Aides à l'emploi (reduction des coûts du travail) 
39 Olivetti 
39 Transrapid 
39 Institut Français du Pétrole 
40 Carte luxembourgeoise 
40 Volkswagen / Moseland Chemnitz 
40 Mercedes-Benz / Ludwigsfelde 
41 La Seda de Barcelona 
41 Walzwerk Ilsenburg 
41 Chaussures italiennes 
41 Plan Borotra 
41 Breda Fucine Meridionali 
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Rue de Louvain 40-42/ 
Leuvenseweg 40-42 
B-1000 Bruxelles Brussel 
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Tél. (32-2) 295 26 39 
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DANMARK 
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DK-2620 Albertslund 
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GREECE/ELLADA 
G.C. Eleftheroudakis SA 
International Bookstore 
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GR-105 64 Athens 
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Mundi Prensa Barcelona 
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